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Note on Sources and Associated Difficulties*
The main difficulty related to the fact that much 
material of essence to the research was regarded as classified 
hy the national authorities concerned. Two obfuscating 
factors exacerbated this difficulty. One relates to the 
authorities, and to the process of sifting and selection 
through which any classified material must pass before it 
reaches the decision-makers; conscious or unconscious dis­
crimination en route from information gathering, to the 
delineation of alternative hypotheses, and to final decision­
making, entails a (sometimes convenient) restricting of the 
data available, a restricting which may in itself prejudice 
the final option choice. The other obfuscating factor 
concerns ’convenient intelligence’. This is ’intelligence’ 
and ’facts’ released or leaked by the national authorities. 
This type of information all too often rests on politically- 
determined selection criteria; it always rests on some type 
of selection, from the already selected material available 
to the decision-makers. The resultant information, is not 
necessarily wrong or misleading, but it would very often be 
different if the selection process from which it had emerged,
had been subject to different criteria.
This catholic caution relates also to Soviet military 
"debates", and to the question as to whether contributions 
are ’genuine’, or whether they merely reflect differing 
aspects of policy decisions already arrived at. The question 
is analysed more extensively in Chapter 5« But it is proper
to indicate that the conclusion there arrived at encourages
maximum caution lest one infer non-credible levels of anta­
gonism from apparent debate discrepancies.
The debate analyses make it clear that an author’s
relative obscurity or prominence does not necessarily reflect 
on the importance of an article. Considerations such a,s 
relate to troop morale, the domestic economy, or international 
relations, often make relative or apparent obscurity a pre­
ferred forum for a text's dissemination. The more prominent 
the source, the more obviously the concerns of ' declaratory 
policy* intermingle with those of * action, policy* $ . For these 
reasons the debates are investigated primarily with a view 
to their- illuminating or explaining of procurements and 
actions, - with a view to their relationship with ascenbain- 
able developments.
The data is available. The problem lies in acquiring 
sufficient knowledge to judge their comprehensiveness and 
their relative worth. Hopefully, the present work evinces 
a successful outcome.
Finally; some related factors, such as concern Chinese 
(or Japanese) capabilities and prospects, are not treated 
extensively. The reasons for this are inherent in the text.
CHAPTER OÏTE.
THE ’ COLD WAR* PERIOD - HISTORICAL STRATEGIC 
BALAI^ CE INEQUITIES o
1 a 1943-1955: "Mirror mirror on the wall, ---- ?"
A number of western academics have in recent years re^ 
assessed the period in question. In the process they have 
demonstrated that many previous analyses were too facile, too 
encumbered by ulterior motives, and hence too prone to black- 
white generalizations. Some of their data, vRiich appear of 
essence to our study, will here be presented. As will further 
evidence which tends to support their implications.
The reassessment does not concern' the fact and/or the 
morality of the Soviet securing of hegemony over East Europe. 
Although it must be remembered that v/hile ideological desiderata 
as well as recent invasions may have increased the necessity for 
this in Soviet eyes, it was also considered necessary by earlier 
Tsarist regimes. The reassessment concerns rather the fear that 
this action had further aggressive implications, the fear which 
provided the raison d'etre for the creation of NATO.
Adam B. Ulam^ presents some of the contradicting data.
He points out that the rapid contraction of the Soviet armed 
forces, from llo565oOOO men at the end of the war to 2o874o000 
men by 1948, scarcely left more men than needed for domestic and
p
satellite "garrison" duties. The figure is certainly not
lo HIam, Adam B., "Expansion and Co-existence", Seeker and 
Warburg, London, 1968.
2o Ibid., page 404«
See also Ruban M. Captain First Class.
"Soviet Military Construction in Post-War period", Kommunist 
Vooruzhiennykh Sil, Ho. 15, July 1968, pg. 77-85= "The 
total number of persons discharged was ... 8.3 million 
persons". See also Pravda January 13, I960 (H. Khrushchev's 
report).
compatible vbLtb any grandiose schemes of aggression. That a 
significant factor behind the demobilisatin was to be found in 
domestic economic needs of reconstruction and further industri­
alization is not here relevant.
After presenting a number of Soviet statements and 
actions which tend to cast question on the premises under­
lying the anti-Soviet convictions current among U.S. policy- 
makers during 1946-4-8, HI am proceeds to refer to a book 
edited by A.G. Mileykovsky. The Marshall Plan was therein 
portrayed as greatly increasing Soviet suspicions regarding 
UoSo motives sjid designs, and augmenting the fear of capitalist 
encirclement. The plan's "eventual aims" were seen to be 
"clearly military". "The real purpose of the Marshall Plan 
was (thus) to create large standing armies that could threaten 
Russia while the Americans would back them up if necessary, with 
their naval strength and their atomic-armed Strategic Air 
Command". ^
The Allerican generosity inherent in the Marshall Plan was 
seen as due to the calculation that "it was cheaper to purchase 
British, French, German etc. soldiers than to equip American 
ones. It explained why the Aaericans were not building a large 
standing army". — - "The formula of containment took on a much 
more sinister meanings the doctrine of 'containment* foresaw 
such a building of 'the positions of strength in the free 
world' (this phrase was authored by Secretary of State Acheson)
3o Blam, op, cit., pg. 44-8. Mileykovsky A,G. ed., "Interna­
tional Relations after the Second World War",Moscow,1962.
4o HI am, op.cit*, pg. 44-7 „
as would allow a series of successful l.ocal wars against 
socialist states at the same time that one would he prepared 
for a major war"." HIam accepts this view as being seriously
held, since it constitutes a natural ascribing to UoS. policy 
of considerations underlying Soviet policy, "i.e. avoiding a 
major conflict and at the same time justifying and inciting 
wars of 'national liberation'". Western Europe was conceived 
of as being made prepared to intervene in Eastern Europe.
Ulam synopsizes his tenet thu s: "The period is replete
with historic ironies. America's monopoly of nuclear weapons 
lasted until the fall of 1949 and her economic preponderance 
in the world was never again to be so great. Yet for all this 
the vision of Soviet armies sweeping to the English Channel 
panicked some American policy-makers. For their part the 
Sovie’te appear to have been less alarmed by and responsive to 
American possession of the a,tom bomb than by the implications 
of that most non-aggressive initiative of U.S. policy - the 
Marshall PlaUo"^
Professor Ulam then goes on to treat certain So^ riet 
initiatives which he believes may have been too easily dis­
missed at the timm. Prime among these were the proposals
agreed upon at the 1950 Prague meeting of foreign ministers
■7
from the USSR and Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Note of 
March 10, 1952.^ The former proposed to forbid German
5o Ibido, page 448, quoting Mileykovsky, op.cito, pg. 564= 
6o Ibido, pgo 455o
7o "Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50" RoIdoA. 
London, 1955, pgo 167/168; Ulam op. cit. pg. 509o
8o "Documents on International Affairs, 1952", R.I.I.Ao 
London, 1955, pgo 88.
militerization, but eillow for "the creation of a unified, 
peace-loving democratic state", ihi all-German Constituent 
Council, with equal representation for East and West 
Germany, was to prepare a constitution. And "under certain 
conditions the German people could be directly asked to 
give their opinion on this proposal". The 1952 Note was 
basically similar, but proce/ded to express acceptance of 
rearmament by a unified Germany, provided she pledged herself 
to neutrality.
That the Prague proposals may have been sincere is 
indicated by their timing. Immediately prior to the Prague 
Meeting the Western Powers had decided to revise the 
•Occupation Statute and had furthermore, through the North 
Atlantic Council, implied that a West German force wrould 
be incorporated into NATO. Soviet apprehension must have 
been genuine. Talc en in conjuncti on with other evidence at 
the time, which indicated Soviet willingness to abandon 
East Geimiany if necessary,^ it appears that the Soviet 
initiative may well have been sincere.
The 1952 Note can be similarly viewed. It was 
preceded by the setting up of the European Defence Community, 
the granting of sovereignty to Bonn and the definite agree­
ment that the West German forces would join the Allies. The 
Korean War was raging, with General MacArthur advocating 
nuclear strikes against Cliina. U.S. Armed Forces were 
being very rapidly expanded, and "roll back communism" 
advocates flourished in America. It would not be surprising
9o Bell, Coral, "Negotiations From Strength", London, 
1962, pgo 99; Ulam op.cit., pg. 508 and 5IO0
if concessions were then considered seriously as being 
necessary in Moscow.
The expansion of the U.So Armed Forces has been portrayed
as follows: " ---  after the war Anerica demobilized. But only
two years later, with Britain's withdrawal from Greece and the 
enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the tide of military 
spending turned and has been flooding ever since. It surged 
during the Korean War, subsided briefly, and then continued 
to mount.
i\mong the "roll back commuiism" advocates the most 
prominent was Joïin Foster Dalles. His attitudes are represen­
tatively conveyed by the following quotes. In a December,29s 
1951? rebuttal to isolationist suggestions put forth by 
former President Hoover in a December 20 broadcast, the then 
Republican advisor to the State Department began by high­
lighting the fear that a "tide of commuiism" would "roll on", 
with the U.S. becoming "encircled, isolated and finally 
engulfed". Further playing on the hysteria, sprouted by the 
Korean War, he warned that some peoples "are so inexperienced 
in the ways of self-government that it will be hard for them 
to preserve their independence in the face of the diabolically
clever apparatus of Soviet communism. -- But within the
captive world there are grave internal v/eaimesses." (There is
hope yet, it seems :) -"War can be very uikind to rulers
who are despots and who have systematically destroyed the 
individual initiatives of their peoples". "There is only one 
effective defence. That is the capacity to counter-attack.---
10. Bingham, I.E. (Representative BIS. Congress, and Member 
of the U.S. U.No Delegation) "Can Military Spending be 
controlled?", Foreign Affairs, October, 1969» pgo5I-66.
The places of assembly (for the arsenal of retaliation)
should be chosen not as places to defend but as places suitable
11for destroying the forces of aggression."
A year later, and now Secretary of Stale, Dulles stated
that the U.S. would not start a war, although she would
prepare to defeat aggression. Hit he continued: "To all
those suffering' under communist slavery -— —  let us say this:
12'^ you can count on us
Such utterances and bellicosity were of course more than 
mirrored verbally by Soviet pronouncements. Among the best 
Imown are the harsh speeches by the Soviet delegates to the 
September 1947 founding of Cominformp Andrei Zhdanov" and 
Georgi Malenkov. The world was clearly seen as divided into 
hostile camps, the "imperialist" and the "peace-loving".
There could be no in-between; those not for us are against 
us (a concept the inversion of vAiich was later to be propounded 
and furthered by Dulles I ) The "peace-loving" would have to
15co«-operate and org:anize defences against the "imperialists".
But the propaganda mirror is false, and gives a lop-sided 
impression. Professor Ulam referred in passing to the American 
nuclear monopoly. This has been expanded on by others, such as
Herman Kahn, who have pointed also to t he then decisive 
ihnerican monopoly of effective delivery capacity.The 
monopoly was to last well into the 1950's. The U.S. had the
11. Keesings Contemporary Archives 1950-52, pg. 11215o
12. Keesings Contemporary Archives 1952-54? pg. 12740.
13. Documents   1947-48? R.I.l.A., London, pg. 141.
14. Most lucidly in his talk sponsored by the Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs (BUPI), Oslo, 9 May,
1969 (Attended by author)
capacity to obliterate Soviet cities; the Soviet Union had 
no capacity to attack the American homeland.. Inherent in this 
constellation was a potential impunity to engage in actions 
against Soviet controlled territory with the U.S. nuclear 
shield deterring retaliation.
There were few overt aclmowledgeinents of this total
Soviet vulnerabilityo Yet Djilas reports Stalin as intent on
stopping the post-war Greek uprising becane the Allies would
not permit a Soviet brealoing of tlieir communication lines, %=>
ISnecessary for the success of the uprising. It was evidently 
regarded as indisputable fact that if the Allies would not 
permit it, then the Soviet Union had to accept it. She could 
not afford to challenge the Allies directly. This same realiza^ 
tion may be seen as the logical premise behind the enforced 
development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs. The speed with 
which they were researched and developed in the face of 
economy reconstruction demands indicate great priority, a 
priority which unequivocally refutes assertions that the 
Soviet Union was unav/are of the import of the U.S. nuclear 
monopoly.
Soviet conceptions with regard to the motives under- 
pinning the Marshall Plan, together with the promulgation of 
the Truman Doctrine, increased U.S. arms spending, and 
bellicose U.S. anti-communist pronouncements (not least in 
conjunction with Korean events) , all clearly combined to 
produce apprehension in Moscow. It is in this light that one
15. Djilas, Milo van, "Conversations with Stalin", Pelican
1969 s (Copyright by liar court, Brace & World, Inc. 1962), 
pg. 141.
V±-L-L
should see J.D. Stalin's October 1952 report in which he 
indicated that the time might have come to pursue 'peaceful 
co-existence'.^^ With Dulles becoming Secretary of Stqte in 
Washington and vnth the influence of MacArthur's sentiments 
(if not his person) retaining and recruiting adherents, the 
implications of Dulles' "You can count on us" had finally to 
be seriously considered.
One further aspect or curiosa must here be presented. 
Following L.Po Beria's ousting after Stalin's death, a 
seemingly inexplicable luniour concerning his foreign policy 
aspirations gained wide-spread circulation in Eastern Europe. 
Tibor Moray, for example, reported that: "according to one 
report a, secret Central Committee letter to satellite leaders 
accused Beria of having proposed after the East German riots 
to liquidate the East Germ an regime in order to unify Germany
It pg
in agreement with the western powers. The existence of
the letter, not to mention Berta's intent, remains highly 
speculative. Do conclusive evidence either way is yet avails 
able. The most plausible explEnation may be that the lealcage 
vfas inspired to compromise Beria’s reputation and thus justify 
his removal, while at the same time reinforcing East European 
fears of German revanchist potentials - thus enouraging their 
dependence on Moscow.
16. Pravda, October 4? 1952.
17o Meray, Tibor: "Thirteen days that shook the Kremlin 
F.Ao Praeger, Dew York, 1959? p g o  28.
ir
?
Wliat needs recognition is that an initiative such as 
described would be a logical alternative on the basis both of 
immediate history, viz. the Pragu.e proposals and the March 
1952 Note, and of the in t e m  at i on al situât bn at the time. If 
Stalin had feared that UoSo extremists might be attaining 
power such as to upset previous prognostications of US. 
action-patte?rns, then there were all the more reasons for his 
heirs to fear the influence of these extremists in a situation 
of Soviet political disarray or uncertainty. The East German 
riots aid the lack of a definite and secure Soviet leadership 
hierarchy ha,d to induce fear of "strike now while they are 
disorgaiized" advocates. Concessions such as that reputedly 
sponsored by Beria must have been considered in conjunction 
with the need to 'buy time' un.til domestic and East liiropean 
stabilization was secured.
The prevailing view, however, clearly saw a furtherance 
of Stalin's lower-key posture as sufficing to buy the time 
necessary for essential arms modernization and development.
1 B MALENKOV - KHRUSHCHEY
The years following the death of Stalin saw a stagnation 
of the growth of the Armed Forces. The maximum personnel 
strength of 5o763.000 men appears only to have been reached 
in 1955o^^ But the troop-re ducti ons initiated by the 
demobilisation of 64-0.000 men in 1953^^ were foreshadowed by
18. Pravda, 15 January, I960,
19. Pravda, 11 April, I960.
Athe military budget cuts of 2$ in 1953 and 8*9% in 1954-0
These budget cuts were based on Malenkov's early
championing of budgetary reallocations towards greater consumer
20goods priority, and the easing of international tensions.
The premise was that modern weapons of warfare meant that
war would result in "the destruction of world civilization";
the logical consequence being a "paralysing" of "the law of the
0-1
inevitability of war".
This doctrine, that v^ ar had become impossible, remained 
the prime novelty of the Malenkov periods Although emerging 
opposition (see below) soon forced him to restrict his vision 
of the consequences of v^ ar to orthodoxy's belief in the 
destruction of capitalism, neither he nor his associates were 
ever to repudiate convincingly their belief in more all- 
embracing consequences (that is: the destruction of the USSRS )o
Three inter-acting motives for his postulation of the 
doctrine may be envisaged;
lo Fear, arising from the credence accorded in Moscow to 
Dulles and like rhetoric, — combined with growing awareness of 
expanding D.S. military might. The indications presented 
above regarding Stalin's and Beria's attitude make this 
postulate likely. There was a realization that the United 
States was in too dangerous a mood for the Soviet Union to 
indulge in challenging postures, and that s^ ^^ mbolic or otherwise 
concessions might have to be given. Especially in the light
20o Pravda, 9 August, 1953.
21. GuSoMo, as quoted by Dinerstein, Herbert, "War and the 
Soviet Union^ f^, Praeger, Hew York, 1959. See especially 
pg. 71 and 171*
of growing evidence (see above and following chapters) that, 
notwithstanding the recent testing of a Soviet hydrogen bomb, 
the USSR remained extremely strategically vulnerable and we ale 
vis a vis the U.SoA. Remaining sediments of international 
revolutionary ardour had to be encrusted in even greater 
caution than before — —- .
2o A possible genuine belief in the deterrence value of 
the Buropean-hostage concept, as strengthened through the 
acquisition of atomic and hydrogen bombs. But the public 
belief in this tenet., and the lack of any public aclmowledge^ 
ment of awareness of the USSR's vulnerability and limited 
capabilities vfithin an inter-continental context, ought not 
necessarily to lead to the conclusion that the deterrence vsras 
really thought either adequate or acceptable. Two years later, 
and thereafter, came public admissions or intimations of the 
real strategic relationship (see below). But then also came 
the acquiring of such missile delivery capabilities as 
entailed some promise of escape from the strategic inferiority. 
It is hence plausible to view the pre 1955 credence accorded 
the European-hostage deterrence concept as politically and 
psychologically motivated.
This is supported by the described increasingly messianic 
character of U18. anti-coimnunismS the more religious the tone 
and the greater the ultimate evil of your opponent, the greater 
the ultimate good of his destruction, and the greater the 
immediate suffering that can be tolerated if necessary in the 
furthering of that destruction. The greater the element of 
fear or distrust, the less could Moscow rely on its capabilities 
versus Europe deterring the USA. Above-presented evidence 
provides the rationale for fear or distrust. In conjunction 
with the effects of ideology and experience, it could but lead 
to doubt as to the genuineness of the belief in the existing
"deterrence"a Although for ideological, political and 
psychological reasons, it could not he mentioned in public, 
there must have been acute awareness of the fact that a war 
would result in the destruction of only one super-power, the 
USSR, and of a Western ]hirope of increasingly minor signifi-- 
cance - as a power.
3o Economic strains resulting from the basic contradic­
tion between military requirements and the need to buy time 
domestically. This need for relaxation and living standard 
increments - to alleviate the tense pace of Stalinist recon­
struction and advance - was certainly felt by some to be as 
great as that relating to the international conditions. An 
early Malenkov article does not equivocate in its espousal of 
this vieWc.
One might elaborate on a hypothetical fourth motive, that 
of pure humane-ness recoiling from the horrors of war. But as 
this author tends towards the belief that such purity as a 
prime action rationale is incompatible with emergence through 
any existing 'corridor' to political emminence, the conclusion 
must rest in essence on a combination of factors 1 and 3 as 
having been decisive. International relaxation and domestic 
economic advances were considered necessaryp (the latter for 
political reasons at the time and possibly also for the purpose 
of creating a future basis better equipped to sustain necessary 
military procurements).
But opposition to Malenkov's doctrine, and/or its 
consequences and implications, soon emerged, thereby producing 
yet another novelty of the Malenkov years: For the first time
22. Pravda, 9 August, 1933,
A IJ - J .
there appeared what looked like purely military demands, for
the continued predominance of heavy industry, for continued
international vigilance, and for constant attention to military
25preparedness prerogatives.
The novelty of these demands and the articles' eloquent
neglect of Malenkov's consumer policies may in part he seen to
reflect on the novelty of the policies themselves* But they
might further he seen to reflect on the greater professional
autonomy apparently conferred on the Military in late 1931* A
decree highlighting the increasing desire and need for military
efficiency then reputedly re-emphasized the principle of
24unified, one-man command. (The intervening post-war years 
had witnessed the réintroduction of extensive political involV'.---^ 
ment in command procedures and duties.) One cannot ascertain 
whether the decree reflected on Stalin's fluid operative theme 
of counterbalancing semi-competitive 'conveyor belts' of 
power, or whether it merely reflected on increasing inter­
national tensions.
It remains clear, however, that the more open military 
opposition to the prevailing line was accompanied by and 
probably received its main raison d'etre from evident opposition 
within the Party. The international situation was apparently 
considered either too tense, - or not quite as tense and 
precarious as judged by Malenkov -, and the need for domestic 
consumer orientation not (yet) sufficiently acute. There must 
furthermore have been doctrinal and Party-justifying considéra™ 
tions leading to scepticism regarding Malenkov's doctrine*
23o See e.g. - Col. Nenalchov,L, "Voennaya Mysl", Sept.,1935 
pgo 6, "Kommunist" Ho. 8, 1954, Pravda,27 Jan., 1953? 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 Pebruarqry 1933, and Garthoff,R.L*, 
"Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analyses", Faber
1 Faber, 1966, pg. 45.
24. Ibid., pgo 44 and 245.
A J . V
By. late 1954 Khrushchev gave a speech strongly emphasizing
the place and role of heavy industry, and on the 21st of
December Pravda (representing the Khrushchev-led Party) and
Isvestia (representing the Government and Malenkov) openly
2Sdemonstrated the serious divergence. The former supported, 
and vra.s supported by, the articles in the military press, the 
second persisted with the championing of MaleiHov's consumer 
re-orientation program.
The Khrushchev!te gaining of ascendency in early 
1955^^ therefore inherently entailed a semblance of victory for 
the Armed. Forces. And this was further indicated by the 
promotions shortly thereafter of two Generals to the rank of 
Marshals, of the war-hero Zhulcov to the post of Minister of 
Defence, aid of Marshal Bulganin - vjho although basically a, 
political general, would presumably be aware of aud possibly 
sympathetic to military requirements - to the post of 'Prime 
Minister'.
The years of Zhulcov prominence have been dealt with
28sufficiently elsewhere, but a'synopsis supplemented with 
some additional comments is nevertheless appropriate.
25o Pravda, 21st December, 1954° Isvestia, 21 December 1954*
261 Pravda, 9 February, 3-955? announced Malenkov's replacement
with Bulganin.
27 0 Ibid*
28o See e.g. coverage in Fainsod,Mo, "How Russia is Ruled",
revised ed., Harvard University Press, 1965, pg* 482-489,
or Garthoff, op.cit., pg* 51-54o
While independence from Party control as such was never
demanded, a nnmher of military articles were to demand the
maximum possible assertion of military professional autonomy.
In September 1955 the purported 1951 decree was followed up,
and the role of the Party organs within the Armed Forces was
limited to edu cational and political rather than operational
aspects. The military was evidently shying away from the
previous integration, to such an extent as affected even local
on
party-military organs’ co-operation.
And it pursued efforts to increase the role of the
professional commanders in the formulation of strategy and
theory. This was primarily through articles exposing Stalin’s
military miscalculations, his dogmatic dismissal of the
potential importance of strategic surprise, and his on occasion
faulty dispositioning*But it was further supplemented by
the first open intimations that political leaders in general
might meJce mistalces if they engaged in strategic decision™
making without givi ng prime attention to the professionals'
advice: "Political leaders must know the potentialities of
51strategy in order to set tasks ----  skilfullyo"
But such intimations, and the one-man command concept's 
corollary of a suppression of the old principles of criticism 
and self-crittcism (according to vwiich subordinates could 
criticise th eir commanders), clearly went against the grain of 
Khrushchev's inclinations. These may be synopsized as moving 
away from the 'conveyer-belts' of power practice, back to
29o Most evident in subsequent Party efforts directed at re­
versing the process: See e.g. Partinaya Zhizn, August,
1958, pgo 15"25, and Pravda, 29 August, 1958*
50o An attack which gained Khrushchev’s explicit supports See 
his 'Secret Speech’ to the 20th CP3U Congress, 1956.
31. Voennaya Mysi, March 1955, pgo 6.
■undiluted 'Leninist' Party dominance * And as favouring, albeit
in a fashion primarily symboli c and not exempt from internal
contradictions and vacillations, a lessening of disparities and
a more egalitarian leadershaipo Viz, here his introduction of
Party Rules which at least theoretically limited lengths of
32tenure and thus opportunities for patronage*
Yet there were a number of reasons for acquiscence in the 
military self-assertions*
lo The Party may be presumed to have been not immune to 
divisive influences; supporters of Malenkov, as also he 
himself, remained prominent members«
2o The international situation remained strained, if not 
tense, and thus psychologically bolstered the case of the 
militaryo One might speculate that the 1956 H’ungarian crisis 
for this reason prolonged Khrushchev's tolerance*
3o A presumed we aliening of the security forces follomng 
Beria's ousting may further have worked against any Party 
clamp-down conceptions*
4-0 Zhulcov' s personality, combining as it did evident profes­
sional expertise with the war-hei-o aura, was in itself a 
powerful deterrent in combination with the above*
The alliance was furthermore politically useful* Thus
Khrushchev's praising of Zhulcov, and the promotion of Zhukov to
33Praesidium candidate member, were to contribute to Zh-ulcov* s 
possibly crucial help in the s-unmier of 1957 ousting of the 
'anti-Party' group*
32o Adopted at the 22nd CPSU Congress* 
33o At the 20th CPSU Congress*
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Ironically Zh.nltoT''s reward at the time (full Praesidium: 
membership) also meant his emergence as an obvions wielder of 
ultimate powero And his emergence conld, within the setting of 
traditional Party antipathy towards potential rival power 
sourcesj, only lead to the crystallizing of a concensus 
favouring his removal«
May 1957; which witnessed a Central Committee instruction 
reasserting the rule and authority of political officers and 
organs within the Porces, was the first portent* The subse»^  
quunt near Èilence regarding efforts towards increased Party 
control connected with the summer events was finally discarded 
in October* A more united and self-confident Khrushchev-led 
Party was by then to utilize a Zhukov visit to Yugoslavia to 
arrange the publishing of a number of articles reflecting 
Khrushchev’s views* By the end of the month Pass has announced 
ZhuKov’8 dismiseal*
Yet this development ought not to be seen as revoking the 
professional autonomy that had been granted to the military* 
Later events, as will be shown, demonstrate considerable aware­
ness of military requirements on the part of Khrushchev* The 
development ought rather to be seen as a basic reassertion or 
reminder of the bounds to the military professional autonomyp 
as well as a reflection on the inadmissability of Zhulcov’ s 
’Napoleonic’ aur’sc* Most of the military demands had been 
limited to non-political concerns* and one sees no reason for or 
evidence of any basic military-Party conflict beyond that 
indicate do
But one final concern of military articles of this period 
is of importance to our investigation, and must be mentioned 
before proceeding to ’the Khrushchev years’ as sucho This is 
that of the effects of nuclear weaponry and the potential role of 
strategic surprise*
Although temporarily politically impossible due to the 
implications of the Malenkov doctrine, there soon appeared 
reassertions of the Stalinist belittling of the effects of 
nuclear weapons* And this must surely be seen as inspired 
by a psychological need to bolster troop morale, - a need made 
more obvious by command awareness of strategic inferiority on 
an inadmissable scale*
The subsequent appearance of articles asserting the 
potential decisiveness of surprise attacks and the need for 
such sophisticated intelligence as would allow the USSR to 
react against potential hostile attack preparations was only 
superficially contradictory* The noting of the possible need 
for the Soviet Union to strike first clearly indicated that 
she might otherwise be incapacitated* And the conclusion must 
be that these latter articles were directed at policy-making 
Party levelso The fact that they were published in spite of 
their apparent incompatibility with the morale—raising endea­
vors may then be seen to reflect on the acuteness of the 
military concern* And this may then again be seen reflected in 
the assertions that Apolitical leaders must loiow the potential 
lities of strategy and in the novel awareness inherent
therein, of the need for more professional strategic research
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facilities, and new thinking*
See e*g* 01isev,}3*, May * General, in Krasnaya Zvezda, 3o 
August, 1955c
35o Although intimated in a Pebruary, 1955? article by Marshal
Rotmistrov, this was first explicitly recognized by 
Emelin, V*, in "Sovremennaya Voennaya Teknika" , Moscow 
1956, pgo 131o
36* Voennaya Mysl, March 1955? op*cit*
37* Ibid. provides the first indication of this trend, which
finally received extensive'elaboration in the article by
Marshal Sokolovsky and Maj *General Cherednichenko in 
Kommunist Vooiu.zhiennikh Sil, No* 7, 1966*
Purther points of friction, relating to specific aspects
38
of strategy, have been suggested, by other authors* But such 
are less easily ascertainable than the described aspects of 
more general military professional concern (See also following 
section, and Chapter 3 for cautions regarding exaggeration of 
the role of the debates)*
One ought to be careful about focussing on details of 
strategic friction vûthin the Soviet hierachies* One ought to 
be equally careful about dismissing Soviet awureness of 
strategic constellations and thought processes* The lack of 
any explicit theoretical formulation of the deterrence—doctrine 
until 1962^^, need not imply previous lack of understanding*
It.might equally reflect merely on the lack until about that 
time of the physical wherevûtha]-l, capacity, to allow for a 
credible well-elucidated deterrence posture* There might be 
problems as to hovf much contradiction or undermining the above
mentioned morale-upholding efforts could sustain  ----(?)*
As has been made clear there could be little doubt 
regarding military scepticism with respect to the practical 
value of the European-hostage deterrent* And this entailed 
consiaerable concern regarding the search for one of greater 
credibility, and the securing of a maximum war-waging capability 
in the case of its failure* The worries may have become most 
acute at the time of the Malenkov doctrine, but were of course 
not dissipated by the advent of Khrushchev*
38* G-arthoff, op*cit*,pg* 50, suggests a further downgrabing of 
the role of the Navy initiated by Zhulcov in 1955 and the 
establishment of a separate long-range missile command* But 
naval priorities had in practice languished prior to tliis, 
and the latter might merely reflect the novel characteris­
tics of the weaponry -*
39o Malinovsky, R* , Marshal, "Bditelnoe stoyat na strazhe mirsf, 
Moscow, 1962, pg* 25*
40o Western theoretical expositions on the subject were made 
available: See for example Kissinger *’Jademoe Oruzhie i
Vneshnaya Politika", Moscow, 1959o
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I C 1957 - 1964 (See also Chapter 5)
The above referred to lChiri_shchev’ s attmement to military
needs* This was indicated both in his alliance with the
military against Malenkov’s relative degradation of heavy
industry, and in his early good relationship with the
’Stalingrad’ generals who he was later to promote to Armed
forces Leadership^'^ (see below)* His drift towards and final
4-2espousal of a massive retaliation missile strategy^ related
to the priority need for an effective deterrent a,s soon as
possible* H is statement at the time that the Army, Navy and
Air Force had had their importance decreased^^ was relative,
and must be seen in conjunction with the accompanying "quote^ '^ ç
"A reduction in the size of the Army does not prevent us 
from maintaining the country’s defence capacity at the 
proper level* We shall continue to have all the means 
necessary for the country’s defence —  while reducing 
the minimal strength of the Armed Forces we shall not 
reduce their fire-powers on the contrary, it will in­
crease many times over in quality*"
His policy presentation did therefore not entail disregard for
the traditional branches of the Forces, but reflected rather a
combination of military priority and economic consideratal
There is no doubt that Khrushchev was, or became, aware of
the need for significant improvements of the domestic economy
and the consumer good sector* This is seen both in his
justification for the I960 troop reductions, that they would
entail) great savings (about 16-17 milliard roubles)^^ and in his
more explicit later admissions regarding the guns vs* butter
41o Kolkowicz, R*, "The Soviet Military and the Communist 
Party", Princeton University Press, 1967? pg* 224-238,
42* Pravda 15 January, 1960»
43* Ibido
44o Ibid. (this author’s stress)*
45* Ibido
quandary o But again, included in the former, there v/as the
assertion that strategic capabilities and qualitative improve^
47nients would more than offset the' apparent military loss* The 
point was that the military could not expect significantly 
increased infusions of finances and might in fact have to 
tolerate a lower level of budgetary allotments* The implication 
was that they must proceed with the introduction of qualitative 
improvements to replace and offset previous quantitative 
cushioning*
But they were at first conceeded significantly augmented
funds: there v/as a 12$o increase in the military budget
approved in 1955* Remembering that the first operational
testing of an ICBM took place in 1957? and that the necessary
’lead time’ (of research and initial development) meant that
one would by 1955 be acquainted with the probable imminence of
the long-awaited effective delivery vehicle, then this may be
talc en to indicate the scale of the commitment and considered
needs* This scale is further emphasized by a consideration of
the savings accruing from the troop cuts of the later 1950s*^^
1955s 640*000 were demobilized
1956-57: 1,200*000 " "
1958: 300*000 "
1960: 1,200*000 " ’’
Cuts which decreased the size of the Armed Forces to 
2 million 423 thousand men*'^ ^
46* Pravda,15 February, 1964&
47o Pravda, 15 January, I960*
48* Pravda, 11 April, I960*
49o "Theslmaya Politika 3SSR na Sovremennum Etape", Moscow, 
1964? p g o  205o
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Al indirect confirmation of Ulam's estimate that previous 
high levels were not out of proportion to the Military’s 
domestic and East European tasks, as well as confirmation 
that the new lower level was such as to demand extensive re­
organization and qualitative innovations, is provided in an 
unpublished Moscow exposition of 1966*^^ It was herein stressed 
that the demobilisations had resulted in the Armed Forces 
personnel level falling below that of the UoSoA* "in spite of
the greater size of Soviet territory and the greater length of
92Soviet borders ...,," , the two factors quite evidently being
seen as placing considerable demands on the Armed Forces*
There therefore ensued the. enforced attention to modemi'--
sal ion which was to continue to provide a prime focus of
military concern through the years of our investigation*
Mobility and dispersal criteria came to be emphasized more and
more, as also offensive operations - away from concentrated
target areas (See also Chapter 6 0)*
The aim was to ensure the units’ maximum independant
capacity to overcome the effects of nuclear war* Thus 1955
SaW the reorganisation of the air defence forces into a separate
unified command with status equal to that of the other services,
and 1957’witnessed the major upgrading and r eorganf sation of
the logistics services* In the latter context M* Mackintosh
99quoted an illustrative comment by General EuroclAin:
50* Elam, op* cit., pg* 404*
51* Tolnacheva, Aolo, "Sovj etsko—Aaerikanskie Otnoshenie
1956-1965", MGU thesis 1966 under the supervision of LoM* 
Papin (MGU’s authority on Soviet Foreign Policy)*
52* Ibido, pg* 26*
55 o Macintosh, M*, "Soviet Strategy in World War III" Survival 
188, July-August, I960, pg* 149-158*
'« .— problems of transport, the defence of supply lines 
against destruction at their bases or during rail transport to 
the frontlines, becomes of prime importance in view of the 
deplo;^ mient of new weapons"*
The conmieiit is interesting both for its highlighting of the 
problem and for its indication regarding the continued reliance 
on rail transport * The general trend clearly evinced a new 
determination that the Armed Forces be moulded and dispositioned 
so as to decrease their vulnerability to a Imock-out nuclear 
blow*
But it was the corollary to this Khrushchev-encouraged 
streamlining and emphasis on military qualitative improvements 
which was to produce the main ascertainable friction between 
the military and Khrushchev* The corollary vras clearly seen by 
the military to be increased effectivity through increased 
discipline* Khrushchev’s inclinations with regard to the place 
and role of the Party as described above were not, however? 
immediately conducive to the effecting of such disciplinée
The 1957 reassertion of political authority within the 
forces, and the later repeated stress on the Central Committee 
being the only body competent ultimately to pronounce on 
questions of military science, strategy and doctrine (See 
Chapter 8 A), was not inherently inimical to military needs*
But together with the encouraging of self-criticism and more 
extensive efforts towards increasing the military role and 
influence of the Party , it clearly perturbed the military? 
lest this should negatively affect their professional duties*
The autumn of 1958 saw the emergence of a number of military
54-0 Emelin, V*, Col*, op * ci t *
55o See e.g* Partinaya Zhian, Au gust, 1958, op*cit* and 
Pravda, 29 August, 1958, op*cit*
articles complaining of worsened discipline and lowered
efficiency, with political promotions and interferences being
96assigned the blame witli considerable franlcnesso
In fact it was Khrushchev’s reluctance to concede and
respect a sufficiently precisely defined sphere of military
professional autonomy which was to provide the prime obvious
difference in Party-Military relations prior to and following 
97his ousting* Hence this emerged as the prime public reason 
for a possible military preference for his successors* As 
opposed to him, they were not to place the same stress on vague 
assertions of the "role and influence" of the Party,assertions
which inherently diluted the acceptance of the "one-man-command"
• -1 58prrncipleo
It was only after late 1958 that this really appeared as 
an issue* hut before proceeding to an analysis of the post" 
Zhukov military leadership, it may^be appropriate to present 
a partial summary of the reasons for the early seemingly 
complete, and even subsequent basic harmony - this issue only 
excepted:
1* Regarding fear and international tensions: There were
efforts aimed at international disarmament agreements and the 
abolition of nuclear stockpiles'^ (One presumes that expect ac­
tions here were minimal, since the latter would have meant a 
unilateral voluntary abdication by the UoSoA* of its position 
of supremacy.)*
56* See e*g* Marshal'Malinovsky’s article in Krasnaya Zvezda, 
1 Novembery 1958*
57o Pravda, 6 July, 1962, and Pravda, 4 July, 1965*
58* Ibid* - compare*
59o See e*g* Soviet Government Proposals of 10th May, 1955*
There was the 1956 proposal to end nuclear testing, and the
dramatic temporary Soviet halt to such testing in 1958*^^
There was the January 1958 US-J3oviet agreement on cultural,
scientific and other exchanges aid contacts (the "first step"
towards a normalizing of relations)aid the stressing of the
potential benefits from further su ch agreements in ai era when
v:ar was no longer seen as necessary*V/liile there wras a hard
faction, one also now recognized a "temperate" faction within
65the TJoSoAo hierarchy, Eind there were recurrent gestones 
made in its direction (not least of which were hints as to the 
possible harvest from increased trade^^)*
Notwithstaiding other positive motives there was, however, 
also the military* The more eased the relationship, the less 
chance would there be that the lack of effective strategic 
retaliation capabilities would prove fatal* And the less
messianic the UoSoA*, the greater the relative weight of the 
moral deterrent of the Europe-hostage concepts
2o 'Efforts aimed towards redressing the strategic 
imbalance* One may here observe that the troop cuts were a 
further stimulant to the efforts directed at easing the 
prec8,riousness out of the cold-war confroiitation<> Meanwhile 
progress-reports and the ini tial procurement of missiles, as 
well as the moves towards Armed Forces modernization, brought
60o Sbornik Osnovnikh Aitov i Dolcumentov Verkhovnovo Sovjeta
SSSR po Vneslmepoliticheskim Yoprosam 1956-1960 ggo,pgo 51o
61o Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', Vol* 2, pg* 29, Moscow, 1959 »
62o Pravda,15 February, 1956, carried the relevant 20th CPSE
Congress Resolution* And see Mazhdunarodnaya Zhizn', op* cit
65o Tolnacheva, Ad*, op*cito, pg* 51 o
64a M e zh dun ar o dn aya Zhizn’, 1965, N o* 5, pg* 45, pointed out
that over 1000 types of goods were then included on the 
ES embargo list concerning trade with the E8SR*
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closer the prospect of achieving effective nuclear strike and 
war-waging capability* But the prospect remained unrealized 
until some time in the 1960s (see following chapter)* And a 
part-reason must surely be economic, since further obvious 
infusions of funds beyond that of the early budgetary increase? 
and that accruing from personnel limitation savings, did not 
occuro Instead one saw the "deliberate, systematic (and con­
sistent)" deception of the West perpetrated by Khrushchev
6 9between 1957 and 1962 , - a policy made strategically
essential by general budget allocatory decisions*
The psychological effect of the Sputnik successes was
utilized* Thus Khrushchev, vdio in 1955 asserted that^  "v/e
in
cannot be intimidated by fables that/a nevf world v\far civiliza-
66tion will perish" , proclaimed in 1958 that " a future war 
would cause immeasurable harm to all mankind"* Yet in spite of 
the accompanying assertions that war had become "madness"^"^, 
the morale-deteriorating Malenkov corollary that the USSR 
itself might be destroyed was never drawn*
Scepticism no doubt remained as to the extent American 
policy-makers (as opposed to the public) would be affected by 
the psychological up-grading of Soviet Strategic capabilities* 
Their access to reliable balance of forces estimates would be 
presumed; and possibly even relied on as ensuring a com­
promise Soviet force estimate sufficiently above reality to
65o llorelick & Rush, "Strategic Rower and Soviet Foreign 
Policy", University of Chicago Press, 1965a
66o Pravda, 27 March, 1955*
67o Kuusinen, Pravda, 23 April, I960*
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inspire caution, whi le yet sufficiently below the psychological 
mirage to ensure against a catch-up effort such as v/ould negate 
the Soviet progress — - (S). Moscow appeared to succeed, » 
until the feared latter ’backlash’ occured under Kem.edy (see 
below, and Chapter 5)o
In the meantime, excepting occasional hints of hollowness 
such as sounded in ineffectual Soviet threats at the time of 
the 1958 US landing in Lebanon, the USSR did acquire the 
desired super-power aura* And this may not least have been 
due to the encouragement to chance more assertive postures 
which was offered by Eisenhower’s extreme caution during the 
IlLmgarian crisis of 1956o By demonstrating that the aggressive 
Uulles-tone was on leash, it decreased apprehension<> It there^ 
fore encouraged faith in the viability of the psychological 
deterrent as projected, and thus engendered trust in the slow­
paced build-up of a genuine deterrent which Khrushchev’s 
policies envisaged* Temporarily one did have the pleasure of 
both having and eating the calce -— — *
To turn now to the post-Zhukov military leadership? the
’Stalingrad Group’ : The term became current primarily due to
68the work of Roman Kolkowicz, and while he probably over-- 
elaborated on some of his themes - both with regard to group 
cohesion and intra-group and eventual group-party friction 
the concept is nevertheless a useful early focal point*
The group was defined as coming "almost without exception 
from the group of generals who were located at a single frontal 
sector (the Stalingrad'Front) vfhich was under Khrushchev’s 
personal supervision during the six. to seven months of the bitter 
battle for Stalingrad"* The thesis concerning Khrushchev’s
58* Kolkowicz, R*, op*cit*
special relationship with the group was here based on "such
empirical factors as close contacts under stress, opposition to
common adversaries and promotions to positions of influence that
parallelled the Party leader’s rise to power"* Sufficient
evidence is provided regarding Khrushchev’s rapport and
70harmonious working relationship v/ith group members to en cour'-
a.ge credence* Their rise to prominence, which climaxed after
71Zhukov’s ousting? evidently parallelled Khrushchev’s* (And
that of Khrushchev’s old protege, Brezhnev )*
The group is seen as gradually splitting into two factions
during the early 1960s* The one, including Marshals Malinovsky,
Zaldiarovy Grechko and Krylov, "viewed their obligations to the
72military establislrnent as paramount to others"* While the
other, including Marshal Biriuzov, Moskalenko and Ghuikov,
79exhibited over-ri ding Khrushchev loyalties* And there is
evidence for some di vergence between these lines* Thus for 
example (post Gubh) January “February 1963 saw a number of 
articles on the 20th anniversa,ry of Stalingrad in which authors
’ belonging’ to either faction appeared to differ on the relative.
74-prominence of Khrushchev and Malinovsky* ^
690 Ibido, pgo 279 and 281o
70o Ibid., pgo 224-2380
7I0 Ibido, pgo 241”235o They were also certainly not negatively
affected by the purge of 230*000 officers inherent in the 
referred-to demobilizations.
72* Kolkowicz, R*, op*cit., pg* 239*
73* Ibido, pg* 239 and 263*
74o Malinovsky himself wrote a Pebrunry 1963 Pravda article 
which minimized the role of Khrushchev at Stalingrad* - 
ihid one may find contrasts with other articles ’ campaigning’ 
for the Party’s leading role to be emphasized and for the
military to ’kriow their place’. - See e.g* three articles
by General Jepishev, Cmdr. of the Political Control 
Apparatus, du ring the same period*
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Bu-t one ought to he exceedingly wary lest one over­
emphasise apparent debate discrepancies, as this all too 
easily leads to non-credible exaggerations of Party-Military 
and ’factional’ antagonisms (See also Chapter 5, 8 A and , 
especially g 9) o
Assertions such as Malinovsky’s of 1961, that "even if 
atomic weapons will play a prime role in a future war —
nevertheless -— - final victory over an aggressor can only be
79auhieved through combined operations" need not be seen as
anti-Khrushchevo They may equally be viewed- as fully compatible
with Khrushchev’s own thoughts as described above, and as
suggested also by Kolkowicz’ own sections on the original
KhrnshchevvStalingrad group rapport* Black-white distinctions
may be neat, but equally - facile*
Aid one must revert to our previor-S conclusions: the only
issue which provoked ascertainable abiding military oppositional
concern was that caused by Khrushchev’s vagueness: "The Party
Program emphasizes that single command is a highly important
structural principle of the Soviet Armed Forces -- , At the
same time we must always remember that Party leadership and a
greater role and influence for the Party organisations in large
and small uiiits is the basic foundation of our military 
76structure"*
This refers of course only to the period ending in the 
Cuban crisis* After that the military, and especially those 
sections most frustrated with the above, may naturally have
75a Speech to 22nd GPSTJ Congress, October 1961* See also
Sokolovsky, VoD,, Marshal, ed* "Voennaya Strategia"? 2nd 
edo, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1965, pg* 574, and Kozlov, SoK*? 
MajoGen*, & others, "0 Sovjetskoi Voemioi Kauke", 2nd.ed*, 
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1964, pgo 249o
76o Pravda and Isvestia, 6 July, 1962*
tended to svTitcli allegience to BrezhneVo As Khrushchev’s
erstwhile deputy, he was the one other political leader with
presnjiied close contacts with the 'Stalingrad groxip', and,
most important, he was as mentioned considerably more inclined
to tolerate a more consistent sphere of military professional 
77autonomy*.
But by that time the remaining conjuring aspects of
Khrushchev’s deterrence policies had been exposed* The Kennedy
administration’s drastic expansion of strategic weaponry
78oytlays and procurements made any gradual Soviet achieving of 
parity as regards deterrence dubious, at least in the short­
term* The UoS.Ao military budget was noted as increasing from
40*992 million dollars in 1960-61 to 47o655 million dollars in 
791961-62o- Parallel Soviet milita.ry budget increases were 
implemented (See Chapter 8 Pi). Yet these could obviously 
not suffice to secure the desired parity, although they were 
to contribute towards the early securing of some effective 
second strike capability (See below and Chapters 3 and 5)c>
It is to the strategic equation that a preliminary 
snmmary of the Khrushchev years must turn* The economic strain 
remained such as to strongly discourage increased military 
spending, and Khrushchev’s av/areness of this seems in fact to 
have grown towards the end (See footnote 46). There can be 
little doubt that he saw the solution in the utilization and 
advance of early missile technology achievements* The promise
7 7a Pravda, 4 July, 1965*
78o Ekonomika i Ka,pitallsticheskie Strany, 1962 g Moscow,
1965; pgo 18 and 50*
79 a Mirovaya Ekonomika i M e zh dun ar o dni e Otnoshenya,
Moscow, 1962, ho. 2, pg* 90*
entailed both a more reliable de11very“Vehicle and potential 
capabilities offsetting those of the UoSoA* Hence his I960 
espousal of a "massive retaliation" strategy according to 
which escalation of war was inovitable*^^
But the early Soviet missile procurement-program was to 
prove highly inadequate* Missile degradation factors, to 
which we shall return, meant that her damage inflicting capabi­
lity was low* The same factors applied of course to American 
missiles, and therefore in theory led to greater Soviet missile 
first strike survivability expectations* But on the other 
hand, the scepticism emanating from an awareness of degradation 
factor implications may not yet have pierced the awe of missile 
novelty, and anyway the U*8* strategic bomber-fleet alone 
retained sufficient penetration certainty to maire Soviet 
missiles’ survival most dubious* In other words: Moscow may
have entertained overoptimistic expectations of the extent of 
her damage “inf lie tin g capability*^^ But she must have 
realized that any such capability related only to first strike 
calculations - and U.S* superiority and deployment remained 
throughout likely to retain second-strike retaliation means of 
even greater impact* The USSR was checkmated (See Chapter 
5 and 5)o
80o Pravda,15 u anuary, I960* See also Kolkowicz, R*, op.cit*, 
for comparisons with similar doctrine advocated by ‘ , 
and subsequently abandoned by the UtS.A* in the 1950s*
( “ Although this was based on very different and more 
secure capability prognoses)*
81* Although the USSR clearly did realize that even then her 
forces’ limitations were such as d-emanded their use to 
maximum effect, i.e* against cities, if they were to be 
effective at all* -The USSR unlike the USA did not have 
the capabilities to afford contemplation of limited or 
varied target choice and strategy, such as relating to 
airfields and missile pads* See also explicit inference 
in Sokolovsky, op*cit*, 2nd ed*, pg* 84* And compare with 
later more sophisticated capabilities as reflected in 
Sushko % Kondratkov, Metodologicheskie Problemi Voennoy 
Teorii i Pralitiki, Voenizdht, Moscow, 1967, pg* 147o
Considerable advance was made towards the end of
Zhrnshchev's tenure * More sophisticated? better protected,
and in some cases mobile, rockets were finally to provide a
more dependable deterrent with significant first-strike sur-
82vivability capacity* Put the very achieving of this minimum
aim presumably directed greater attention towards that of
parity with the U.S* ? without which military strategists would
not feel at ease* And as Kbrushchev’s final campaign clearly
indicated that other needs precluded the assigning of funds
to this end? and in fact demanded some re-aliocation towards
85consumer interests, military dissatisfaction found open 
84expression*
This late military ’opposition’ was without doubt in part
due to Cuban events. As concerns these, they appear most
logically explained as resulting at least in part from a
Khrushchevian venture ÿo secure a 'cheap' augmentation of
strategic capabilities and thus procure a more credible 
89deterrent* Thus intermediate-range missiles in Cuba would 
have a range covering the U.So heartland and therefore have 
the same effect on the strategic balance as an otherwise fan 
more costly increase in ICBM numbers* Aid there was the 
additional advantage of dispersed of potential targets that had 
to be covered by US-forces* It appears reasonable to assume 
that the non-achievement of such considerable and anticipated
82* See e*g* Glagolev & Larionov in "International Affairs",
No* 11, 1965, pgo 52, and testimony by Brezhnev and Kosygin 
in Pravda. & Isvestia, 4 July, 1965, and the folloviing 
Chapter*
85o Pravda, 15 February, 1964, op*cita
84a See e*g* Grechko, Marshal & ].st Pep*Min* of Defence, ed* 
"The nuclear Age and War"? Voenizdat? Moscow? July? 1964a
85o See also Ulani, op.cito, pg* 669*
Soviet sources in general concentrate exclusively on the 
explanation that missiles were installed at Castro's 
request to forestall perceived UoS* invasion schemes* The 
outcome of the crisis, with the IT*S. pledging not to inter­
vene, is hence seen as a victory which made the missile
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bemefits would, if only by higlilighiing their potential, lend 
greater urgency to the desire for their achievement through 
other means* The fact that the late and apparently extensive 
'opposition' emerged in public may finally reflect equally on 
more general Party dissatisfaction with Khrushchev’s economic 
and political schemes* One might draw a parallel with the 
Malenkov years, v/hen the emerging Party opposition was powerful 
enough to provide protectioiio
One must again caution against exaggerating antagonisms*
There was not to prove much difference between the tv/o admini-»
strations’ defence policies, except in emphasis* Khrushchev's
final envisaged cutbacks were not implemented? and there emerged
relatively more public appreciation of defence needs and
requirementsBut domestic demands were by Khrushchev’s
87successors considered equally acutep and their first military 
budget was in fact cut by later increases did no more than
parallel 1.8. military budget increases* And their achieving oi 
'strategic parity' by 1970 was to be primarily due to the 
'slack' represented by the large proportion of the UoS* budget 
which was to be 'wasted' on the Vietnam war (See end of 
Chapter 3)o
The seeming major military campaign for increased conven-^ ^
SRtional forces was similarly not to result in troop augmenta­
tions following his o u s t i n g , b u t  was nevertheless then
installations superfluous * See also Pravda, 11 February? 
1965; for interesting comments*
86o Isvestia, 20 October, 1964, Pravda, 8 November 1964 and
Pravda,.4 July, 1965, op*cit*
87* See e*go Kuarcz, J.F., "The hew Soviet Agricultural
Program"? Soviet Studies, Vol. XTII, ho* 2, October 1965,
for a thorough analysis of one of their major initial 
civilian economy investment plans *
88* Such as in Grechko, op*cit*
89o Sokolovsky,YoP., Marshal, Press Conference for Western 
journalists, Moscow, 17 February, 1965o
muted. The campaign may perhaps therefore best be seen as 
over-reaction to Kh rushchev's final talcing to extremes (if 
that it was) of his conceptions of both defence aid budgetary 
priorities in g e n e r a l B u t  that is all*
The early evidence clearly negates speculaition of such a 
general Khrushchev obsession with intercontinental missile needs 
as to lead to ignorance regarding complementary conventional 
needs. To the contrary - as seen also in speeches during his 
last years - he continued to recognize that the imperialists 
could not be allowed to achieve the superiority which would 
allov^  them "to impose their will and policy"* And he assured 
that military requirements in general would not be jeopardized? 
nor v^ ould armed forces efficiency be impaired*^^
His tenure of office did from the beginning wihiess efforts 
towards a general streamlining and modernization of forces so as 
to malce them suitable for nuclear war conditions* There appears 
to be no reason to doubt thab he remained fully in accord? at 
least theoretically, vfLth later assertions regarding the 
necessity for flexibility of operations and mobility - "the 
basic feature" of any utilization of nuclear strikes^^ « ? and 
regarding the obsolescence of old defensive concepts*
90o Pravda, 2 October, 1964 - herein Khrushchev published
designs for a drastic shift in resources away from heavy 
industry ( - a last desperate reaction to domestic economic 
di 8appointments ?).
91* Pravda, 15 February, 1964, op*cit*
92* Krasnaya Zvezda? 6 Jun.e, 1964o
95a Kommunist VooruzhienniMr Sil, No* 5, 1965? pg* 27-28*
See also Khrushchev's own comments and assurances above* 
Pravda, 15 January, I960*
And his very reluctance to allocate significantly 
increased resources, together mth his determination that 
the missile forces he given priority, did as indicated spur 
the development * lie ought thus probably to be given prime 
credit for forcing the Armed Forces to recognise and adapt 
to nuclear warfare implications*
This comment ought finally to be extended to a 
consideration of the development of interventionary-type 
forces* ¥/hile their significant emergence was precluded by 
aliocatory priorities, elements thereof were nevertheless 
procured under Kh ruuhchevo And it should be noted that this 
did not occur as a reaction to Cuban events. Although these 
did of course crystalize attention also on the then stark 
Soviet wealmess regarding the ability to intervene or show 
force outside her continental environment *
Thus for example the significant utgrading of the Navy,
of its strategic tasks, and of its commander, took place prior
to the Cuban events As did the re défini, tion of the Navy^ 's
tasks: "to give battle to enemy forces at sea and at their
bases"g - a far cry indeed from the previously unchanged
q 5
limited and defensive naval strategy of world war 11*'
94* Pravda, 2 February, 1962, art. by S„C-o Gorshkov,
Pravda, 29 April/ Isvestia, 50 April, 1962*
95* Sokolovsky, op*cit. The stress is this author's. Compare 
re 2nd world wa.r role, of which Sokolovsky testifies: 
"Maritime operations had no decisive effects on the 
results". See also McGuire, Commander, Brassey's Annual 
1969? for exposition on the limited charcuter of the 
Soviet Navy's tactical mobility at the time - on its 
reliance on short-range shore-based air support*
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One may conclude as follows: Soviet military concepts
and capabilities under Stalin had remained largely conven­
tional and orthodox? with a static continental role* Under 
Khru-shchev considerable global strategic strike forces 
appeared. Aid there is evidence for seeing the general 
conceptual shift from continental restrictions to global 
perspectives as having occured during his tenure and as 
having been spurred by his policies. - Even if the drawing 
of some of the consequences was slowed by his determining 
of prioritites, and for example interventionary forces as 
such did not appear on any significant scale until after his 
ousting*
CHAPTER 2
STRATEGIC TEPllIHQLQGY AID CONCEPTUAL PACKGROPNP.
2A " Period Delineations of Soviet Forces’ Evolution 
from Continental Uimitations to Global Perspectives and 
Capabilities*
A tentative delineation of the post-war Soviet military 
developments must here be drawn* Some aspects have already 
been presented, others will be dwelt upon in later analyses 
and chapters. But clarity would seem to demand some further 
conceptual specification at this stage*
1945-55 was, as indicated in Chapter 1, a period during 
which both Soviet strategic and Soviet non-strategic forces 
were restricted to a continental environment. In other words? 
effective Soviet strike capabilities were restricted to the 
Soviet home area and iiimimdiately adjacen'b territory* There 
was at most an intermediate raicge capability, effective against 
Europe and parts of Asia, but not capable of striking at the 
UoSo home area*
The following years saw some increases in Soviet bomber 
range and capacity, but no assured or confident long range 
strike capability emerged* The limited strike capability that 
did develop is here seen to put the years 1954-57 in a limbo* 
For purposes of clarification however, the period may perhaps 
best be seen as on extension of that of 1945-55* As far as 
cap ability-confidence was concerned, Soviet forces remained 
basically contained within the continental environment*
1958-1961 was the period of initial long-range missile 
deployment* 1958 thus signified the attainment by the strategic 
forces of global capabilities and perspectives* Yet these 
capabilities remained primarily associated with first strike 
calculationso
1962-66 saw the development of assured second strike
capacities. Efforts aimed at decreasing or eliminating missile 
vulnerabj.lity, together with increasing missile number 
procurements, ensured the development of guaranteed strategic 
global capabilities*
1966-70, throughout the period during which the 
strategic forces Eiccpiired global perspectives ? the conventional 
forces had rein aincd confined wiohin their continental environ­
ment* By 1966, however? one sav/ the emergence of naval vessels 
capable of long-range interventionary type utilisation? of 
more advanceli long.-rEinge air transport capacities, and of 
military theory adaptations to global non-strategic considéra^ 
ta* The non-strategic forces were clearly also acquiring 
global perspectives* out a later date, such as associated 
with the world-wide Soviet naval exercises of April 1970, 
might perhaps be preferred as that at which the global 
perspectives became supported by significant and credible 
capcbilities (and therefore as the date by vfnich sophisticated 
General Forces and 'flexible response' capabilities had 
emerged)*
It here seems propitious to present introductory 
definitions of some of the terminology and background relevant 
to strategic arms discussions *
2B - Strategic Terminology and Gonceptial Aids *
Kenry Kissinger’s conceptual schemes,^ and the parallel
p
but more rigorous definitions of Morton Halperin, m i l  be 
used in this section* This author has however in many
1* These are interpreted primarily on the basis of Henry
Kissinger, "The Necessity for Choice", New York, I960, and 
Henry Kissinger, "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise 
Attack", Foreign Affairs, No. 4? July, I960, pg* 557™575a
2o Morton Kalperin, "Contemporary Military Strategy",
Harvard, 1967*
cases modified or extended the definitions in question* hot 
all the defined concepts will reappear in our later analysis 
of strategic developments * These are nevertheless presented 
to facilitate comparisons and discussions* Those that do 
occur in our analysis should concur with the following 
definitions. Those of them that are not defined here are 
considered either non-essential or sufficiently defined, 
expressly or by implication, in the text in which they are 
found*
Stability: Technical'^' stability is a favourite concept
of -1. Kissinger's. It is produced by missile systems incor­
porating sufficient missile nw-bers, locations and protection 
(and consequent capacity to survive assault), to counter^* 
balance eacn otlier due to a teciurological certainty that 
neither system’s controlling power may achieve "victory" by 
initiating an attack* Political^ stability is a strengthening 
of the above through the adding of credibility and acceptance* 
This is brought about with the emergence of stability-inducing 
strategies incorporating a decrease in belligerence and 
suspicion-producing postures - in other words, strategies 
probably of necessity based on mutual or uni lateral arms 
control measures*
Deterrences This is defined by Kissinger as requiring "a 
combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of
5o This analysis closely follows a memo received from, and
discussed v/ith, Per Ovcrregn in May of 19^9? during which
time he and this author worked together as members of the 
Strategic Research Group of the horwegian Defence Research 
Establ i s I'lm en t *
4. The term is Mr. Overregn’ s (ibid).
5o Kissinger emphasises the c m  cep u bub his definition of it 
is not as precise as could be thought desirable*
6. other of M?-. OverreguR s terms, (op. cit.)
7o Kissinger, "'i'he necessity for Choice", op. cit., pg* 12*
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these by,the potential aggressor"* Deterrence is a product
of these factors, all of which must be positive for it to be
effective* The last factor, the credibility in the eyes of the
potential aggressor, is obviously essential* Deterrence is
aimed ah dissuading an opponent from a course of action by
making that course appear the worst of all alternatives* One
may call it credible only if it comaands attention g, appreciation,
and acceptance on the part of on opponent *
Vifbjer£10i 1 ity of weapons affects botii the stability and
credibility of v/eapon systems* It relates to the combined
effect of such factors as a missile system's number of missiles,
their spread, and tJieir mobility, as well as possible protective
strengthening of silos ouid other technical and technological
measures* A vulnerable missile does not bave secure prospect
of surviving, an enemy strike, - neither docs a vu_lnenable
missile system as a whole*
First and Second Strike: The definitions of these concepts
need to be paused on, as misconceptions are all too frequent,
not least because the definitions have evolved considerably
since first introduced* First strike was the term assigned to
vulnerable missiles whicli one could not expect to survive a
hostile attack* 'i.'liey would, therefore, liave to be used first
to ensure offectivenes* Second striJve missiles, however, were
those sufficiently non-vuliiorable to warrant expectations of
efficiency even after hostile a,ttacks * These definitions were
later altered through the addition of the term "credible" to
the origina] concepts* Halperin was thus to define credible
first strike as a force "capable of destroying most of the 
enemy's stra,tegic forces*"^
8* II* Halpc^ rizi, op* cit*, pg* 27-28,
A' credible first strike force may comprise both 
vulnerable and non-vn'b'icrable delivery vehicles, the condition 
being only that its utilisation will cripple the enemy's 
potential second strike forces* A credible first strike, 
therefore? entails that the opponent's second strike capability 
is not credible* While individual missiles may be deployed in 
such a fasliion as to be considered either vulnerable (first 
strike) or non-vulnenable (second-strike), tlie over-all 
credibility will yet depend on tlie relative position oetween 
the super powers' forces* A credible second strike is? there­
fore, a force oompri::ing a sufficient number of second strike 
missiles to ensure the capability to inflict unacceptable 
damage even after absorbing an attack*
A power v/ith a credible first strike force need not, 
of course, also have a credible second strike, this being 
dependent on how big a percentage of the first strike force 
is composed of second strike missiles* It is furthermore cleaz 
that a first strike is not credible if the opponent possesses 
a credible second strike force. Where both protagonists 
possess a credible second strike force, neither can possess 
a credible first strike.
There arc tv/o primary confusions surrounding first and 
second strike definitions. On tlie one hand, there was the 
potential first strikC’ utilisation of second strike missiles? 
but this has been treatsufficiently above* On the other 
hand there were the difficulties leading to the affixation 
of the adjective credible* This has also been sufficiently 
explained. .iDur then yet another difficulty develops. As v/ill 
become evident in our more basic atralysis of strategic 
developments and capabilities (see following chapters), the 
late 1960s saw the emerging use of "first strike" as meaning 
"credible first strike". Alternate terminologv such as
’'initiatinstrike" was introduced to replace the rigorous 
original "first strike" definitiono
Now, the preconditions for credible first or second 
strike forces do, of course, cLiange as technological advances 
alter the defiu.itions of VLilncrabilityo fhic, is usefully 
demonstrated by the following survey, which serves as an 
illustrative introduction to our later analyses*
Thus, the hoSo nuclear forces all retained non­
vulnerability until the U33.R developed sufficient quantitative 
and qualitative delivery vehicles to endanger NoS* ground^^based 
missiles (and strategic bomber forces)* During most of the 
post-war period the U*S*Ao therefore retained the ability to 
deliver a credible first strike assault on the USSR, first 
with planes and later with missiles — first aimed, at atomic 
instal1ations and arsenals and later at missile sites*
(Although in reality of course most of the Strategic arsenal 
remained targeted on populated areas, in accordance vrLth 
Eisenhower-Dulles creeds on maximum deterrence value based on 
second strike option choices*) The USSR remained vulnerable 
throughout *
a
But the development of/Soviet missile force after the 
mid-1950's entailed the possibility that UoS* strike forces 
were becoming vu.lnerable* Hence the original concept of first 
strike became relevant, as some of the forces became vulnerable 
to a hostile (initiating) strike*
It was only in the late 1950's that there appeared 
recognition of the fact that the UoS* homeland was itself 
becoming exposed to potential threats* It was then that the
famous article "The Delicate Balance of '"error" (bg
Uohlstetter)^ appeared, showing that developments were m 
9% TrT'Doreign Affairs No* 2, January, 1959, pgo 211-234*
the missile balance precarious due to the emerging state, or
conditions, of vulnerability* Under such conditions numerical
parity alone was shomi to be irrelevant; for numerical
comparisons to have siguificajice, they must be restricted to
dealing with second strike missiles* A number of books and
articles soon appeared dealing especially v/ith surprise
attacks and pre-emptive attacks (initiated by a power which
considers an attack from an opponent as imminent, and therefore
decides on the necessity of anticipating such action)* It
became clear that the balance of terror in an era in which
the protagonists only possessed (winerable) first strike
missiles, was most un satisfactory*
Consiu.erable intellecfual effort became devoted to
finding more satisfactory solutions* kissinger^^ was, in
clarity and conception, in the forefront of such efforts* He
advocated the development of non-wlnerable missiles and a
changed UoSa strategy* Both concepts were adopted by the
incoming Kennedy admini strati on * As regards strategy, this .
involved the replacing of the (in his opinion) no longer
credible all-out retaliation deterrent, with a strategy
11encompassing flexibility and escalatory capacities*
We shall not pursue this further here, but concentrate 
rather on :iis other advocacy* He saw that not only was a 
credible second strike capacity necessary, but a nation*s
9.
10o Kissinger, op* cit* (especially in "The Necessity of 
Choice")o
11* Ibido, pgo 46* He explained thet "if the threat of
all-out war is to deter, it must produce the following 
calculations on the part of the aggressors 1) that the 
UoSo would prefer to strike an all-out blow rather thon 
acquiesce in a Soviet gain, however smalls 2) that it Iz 
vnlling to suffer a Soviet retaliatory blow: 3) that
despite its readiness to l.aunch all-out war in retalia­
tion, and despite the certainty that this would produce
V J -J L .L
power would lie better judged by its possession of such* first
strike capacities alone were both crude and irrational, and
it v/as obvious that inter-super power stability depended on
both having credible second strike forces (and thus foregoing
attempts to achieve credible first strikes)* Kissinger's main
12work here referred to is now somewhat outdated, since it was 
written in I960, and he male es some mistakes* Yet a considera­
tion of these in the light of later events only increases the 
book's int r0 due t o ry value *
kissingcr conceived of four phases in the development of 
nuclear weaponry: 1) The period of UoS* monopoly both of
weapons and delivery vehicles: 2) The period in which the
USSR acquired nuclear weapons, but the UiS* retained over­
whelming superiority in delivery vehicles: 5) The period in
which the UboR acquired delivery vehicles, but in which the 
UoS*Ao nevertheless retained quantitative and possibly 
qualitative superiority: 4) The period in which the powers'
contdo
vast devastation, the UiU* is unlikely to produce a pre^ 
emptive blow or to be so "trigger-happy" as to start an 
accidental war; 4) that consequently the Soviet Union 
runs no risk if it does not launch a pre-emptive blow 
itself”o Kissinger considered that this demanded a 
combination of combat preparedness and subtlety impossible 
in practice* The Xhoo would either not be believed or 
would appear too belligerent* Deterrence must, he 
claimed, comply with four conditions (pg* 40-41)s ”1) The 
implementation of the deterrent threat must be suffici<^ 
ently credible to preclude its being taken as a bluff;
2) The potential aggressor must unnerstend the decision 
to resist attack or pressure; 3) The opponent must be 
rational, 1*0* he must respond to }iis self-interest in a 
manner which is predictable; 4) In weighing his self^ 
interest, the potential aggressor must reach the 
conclusions which the ”deterror” is seeking to induce *
In other words, the penalties, of aggression must outweigh 
the benefits*” He deemed those four conditionS/suffici-- 
ently met and advocated "flexible response" capabilities 
so as to provide an alternative to the 'all-out or no^ 
response dilemma, an al lemative the acceptance of which 
by the UoS* might be more credible than the ultimate*
See our ii ain analysis for actual and later developments, 
aj.id further conclusionso
stocks of weapons and delivery vehicles were near parity - 
and in which the USSR achieved superiority in certain aspects*
The work was written under the influence of the totally 
fictitious or misleading "missile gap" period, and he therefore 
considered phase 4 to have evolved hy 1960* hince the Soviet 
missile strength conceived of hy the "missile gap" was a myth, 
this placing of phase 4 was obviously incorrect* However, his 
scheme is. useii.l if one alters his timetable, anc. considers phase 
4 to have appeared in 1966 or thereabouts*
The following sketches arc presented as conceptual aids*
The details, as well as further-ranging discussion and analysis, 
will be returned to la/ber* Some might oppose the arbitrary 
dividing into periods* .Gut these are thought to represent as 
accurate a relative picture as is possible in this form and at 
this stage*
InPursuing our definition of vulnerability, in which it 
represents the lack of a credible second strike capability, 
while non-vulnerability represents the possession of such:
UoHo
Yuln e rabi li t y n on-Vuln e rabi li t y
USSR
vuln e rability 
11 on-
vuPn e r ability
1958-1962 1945-1957 
1963 — ^
1966
VFÏ
_L-
12* lbid(
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When conside:'.ru.ic‘ tliis and the presented graphs, it should 
be noted that bhc superficial facts man; have been mis­
leading* Thu'-- it may be that the great inaccuracies of 
early ICfks offset their apparent total vulnerability, sn" 
would have ensured the survival of a number of the "target" 
missiles and installations* If so a case coulc' be argued 
according to which the UoS*A* had never been in a position 
of real or extensive vu.lnerability, while the USSR emerged 
from such a position as early as 1958*
The period of UoS* vulnerability represents the period 
following the Soviet acquisition of a certain delivery capacity, 
and prior to the conversion of missiles from first strike
to (non—millier able) second strike types * This conversion is 
postulated (hypothesized) as sufficiently completed by 
1963, while it is suggested that the equivalent USSR,
c on version bee am e suf fi ci en t in 19 6 6 *
The other suggested sketch:
measure of the, USSR I^tlie longevity of
vulnerability \ | ; the miss fie gap
strategic : I (KIRT,
systems* 1943 1930 1933: I960 1963 1970
increasing : high in- less stability?
instability \ stability ins ta- (muirual
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: second
( bility credible
' strike)
An answer to the question mark will be attempted 
following our main analysis, to which ib will be appropriate 
to turn after a final commento
The above analysis of the emerging condition of stability 
and assured second strike forces of the la.te 1960's begs one 
question* The "missile" gap prognostications of the late 
1930*8 and early 1960’s having been proven misleading legends, 
v/hat assurance is there tliat later data will not suffer a 
similar fate? Aid what are the chances th.at a determined 
effort by one power might not upset or revert the calculations 
arising from the presented statistics, as happened consequent 
upon "the myth"?
The ansv/er, as v/ill emerge from our later analysis, are: 
lo Present intelligence gathering means, Gog* satellite 
photography, are seen to be far advanced of those prevalent 
at the time* An associate factor is that cnlculations at the 
time were to a large degree based on hazardous projections of
such flimsy data as existed, while such projections are not 
relied upon in our analysis: 2* Related to the latter mil
be our conclusion, which indicates that neither power can 
hope significantly to upset balance calculation in the fore­
seeable future, due to present technological and strategic 
sophistications* The 1960's saw the conversion to assured 
second strike capabilities such as could not become vulnerable 
under foreseeable conditions (whereas, to reiterate, the 
first strike t^/dpG missiles of a g one red: ion earlier were all 
too vulnerable to liostilc^  offensive increments of any sizeable 
order*)^^ Or, to put it another ways either power is now 
believed technologically able to ensure the continua bien of 
the state of "second strike" for a sufficient section of its 
offensive forces, and this capability is likely to remain 
through at least the foreseeable future *
14-0 Our analysis thus expands and strengthens Secretary of 
befence McNamara's reported assertion (New York Times,
11 Rebruary, 1963) that the approaching era woud.d make 
it "increasingly improbable that either side could 
destroy a suffi(iently large portion of the other's 
strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, 
to preclude a devastating retaliatory load*"
cii:ùTBR Tü RTE
The 'khiuoiichev Jji.gacy: . c terrer ce vs* Genera.t Purpose 
Forces Debates. (3ce also Cire ter one).
Dis eus ci on and .Lialyscs of the Deb; tes follows. But 
first it up ear s propitious to return to a misconception 
referred to in Chapter 1, not least because of the general 
credence it has long been accorded.
Even the otherwise admirable 1964 analysis of the 
Khrushchev cebates by T.W. V/olfe'^ ' exemplified this. Against 
the background of definite Soviet inferiority in missile 
capability, end remaining continental restrictions to Soviet 
conventional forces, he interpreted the Khiushchevian 
notions of the inevita.ility of war escalation and "massive 
reto.liation" to mean tacit Soviet acceptance of their 
strategic inferiority, and thod Soviet ambitions did not 
extend to tne creation of counter Force capabilities. He 
believed that fin nciou and other considerations iiL.d forced 
Soviet leaders to accept the sufficiency of an ultimate 
deterrent.
The extent of Western credence for this theory is
2
indicated further by a 1967 h udsoo Institute Report , the 
relevant section of vjhic.li had the title "Exploib the Present 
United States - Soviet Union Strategic Position". It 
contained this paragraphs "There is reason to believe that 
the Soviet Union/
1. j'olfe, Thomas UK, " uviet Strategy at the Srossroads", 
Harvard University Press, 1964, See also Aolfc, T.U.,
"Uovi.et Strategic Thought in Transition" , Rand Corporation 
P ap e r, k Liy 19 6 4-.
2. Rockett, Rrederick C„, "An Illustrative Study: Strategic 
Evacuation Plan", Ch.Y. A Report, The Hudson Institute, 1967
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the Soviet Union is in the process of trying to match a 
comter-force strategy of ours with a iiiiniinusii deterrence 
position* This may be for reasons of economy, doctrinal trust 
in our restraint, an inclination not to make major 
provocations, a he si ten ce to indi3g:e in an expensive or 
hopeless arms race, a belief in the efficacy of secret 
or for some other reasons. In any case this may represent 
a mist aloe on their part" *
But there is no reason to doubt that Moscow was aware 
of th.e last point. i:y 1967 hardware uid other evidence was 
already appearing as visible rebuttals to the above tenet * 
Lead-time considerations (the time needed for the research 
and development of new systems) alone were strongly to 
inuicate that the tenet's rejection had occured already 
under Khrushchev.
:'.s regards Wolfe’s conclusions, they represented also 
a rather hazardous inference frojn Kliimishchev's actions frid 
speeches. As shown in (' hc.pter one these might equally, 
and as it proved more justly, have been interpreted very 
differently* Economic necessities were certainly judged to 
preclude any concentrated early dnu'e towards general forces 
capaoiiitieso dut this reflected economic priorities and. had 
no necessary causal connection with long term policies in 
the strategic field* The moves that were made towards 
enabling Force units’ mobile, flexible and independent 
operations under nuclear conditions, and towards reviving 
and expanding haval capabilities, supplemented the securing 
of a reliable deterrent. ' . They furthermoxu created the
practical and theoretical nucleus on v/liich more extensive 
General Forces would rely, ,nd from which they eventually emerged
Ill
Lne line of inqniry siifiicos to d-moiiobrate why no
other long-term ....im could he ascribed to Soviet (super-power)
policy-iiL-,..kerso It relates to the credibility of a posture
%
permitting only all-out strikes or comtcr-btrikes *
piiite ap art from the sup sorting ihipetus of c;h; uvinistic 
Ü en de a cl es or desires: If your forros ■; re such the.t only 
an all-out utiliac.tion of capabilities cui enoure success, 
then how coupable or vrMlinp: can you be in de uerring minor 
aggressions or tajcinp, initiatives? The knowledge that you 
can only inflict a maximum puiiisliment in retribution for 
vj!ii(;h you will yourself be destroyed does per defiib’tion. 
c:cuciol...y ii dii :r L your freedom of im nouver, while ( unending 
your opponent great low-risk freedom to initiate minor 
hostilitieso
ibid tne latter freedom can only be inhibited cy fear 
th:,.t you will over»react to the minor hostilities, jin 
exaggerating of their ration, le or aim wliicii led to fear for 
an all-out hostile strlize might oblige you to 1 run eh a 
pre-emptive strike while your lumited capabilities were 
still intact* The opgonent might of course further feel 
forced hi me, elf to escalate to all-out octicn fro.i. f ecu 
that yuur fear mig:ht di ct; le such a pre-emptive strike . . .
3. The early po - 1-war and later .iseiihowcr-j)u;..,es deterrence 
postures were never as fragile, since bhe Goviot-Union
did .lot of course ab the time have sucli coiuiter-forces
s would 0 I .tail the suggested ’ i.rnugl., alablo I'e^ir' syndrome.
- either wai- there ever as equal ct ,arth of intermediate-type
we ap o.n s y s t ems *
4o larder, rich el, "u his bory of the Goviei; .Irmy", r;-ll
jv'all frees 19^6, pg* 207 - asserts: "There is no doubt 
that obsession with preventive attack , y tlie bb niist 
be very real in the 13311, which still has visun.s memories —  
of 1941 - —
.1. V
This :iiiiLrl Ion imsi oleariy oo ui hu"ntoiy intolerable 
for o l,r Lerio ;)Oii cy-nr.iLors, he u-o line Soviet p re son row 
for th.e acqih sition of ooi.viror-forcc capabilities. Such 
capab ! uiti os were r r-n'c.. ary both to ensure again at the 
coneeqnenr-es or irratiun;uit-l. os of thu above-a j-’ticned leer, 
and to provide trie Soviet loion wiih , ore rcaLis ,1 co freedom 
of manouver ana initiative.
The neba.tes.
chapter one -autioneb anai?a,t surii an eaage eratea 
estipi x,to of ueie,.tes’ value as .ani to non-cmdi die 
con cliecions ■peaardinn group ant: .aoninns. ihiero are thus 
vital unestiouc that need aunweTU before proceeding to reviei'S 
of deb a Le c-on trà butionc* Tiiey isay e sum' ed up as 'hov; 
real are t'oc ùibates?' ...no 'bo cf.aitrioutione represent 
"0.,luiu- differences .reseated prior no, uni tiii-n meant to 
influence policy (iec niions? Or ao they r cure can t _ecc iuj^ ortant 
reflections of aspects of luev'.ou.iiy t;h en noli> y-ciecisions? ''
ho absolute ansner can be prose ton, but t; ere aov 
strong i ;oi cacti O' " , t'l t iau latter iuinrpretnti cn is the 
correct one, fu rosearan and devclornent (lead-time) 
a G; .yes of \;e<.uon-sy stoD’Pî nro cur erne:'t arc difficult to 
qua-'tify into act per.i ods. but the lead-time ..ctiv:.ction, 
and therefore the time of the or:lginal ■ e cl si ou-nianein g, may 
mo31 often be judged as preceding tlie appear.'.uce of relevant 
debates (even when these debates oiguificrvntly preceded 
the first visible results oi' the pro<uremont decision).
One G::a.];iple: major coverage cf tiio in>Initial ,u .efi.ts of
: ■cierve :tioncu,v mu li. :j ted war-.n.ri .a caparj:.lis, as v/el _ -.s
n
of d'un-ooat dl;. J or .cy • , only re; I'- y im--rped aft'-r the 
appco.ru-'CO of t> > nuci eus of the cocos .nary u ■•'.-.•-•i hle/f^ .
VThese appearances could admittedly again be traced back,
for example to Admiral Gorshkov's 1963 references to US
Naval capacities and his hints regarding the necessity 
7to counter them * But then Gorshkov's own efforts might 
be traced back to yet earlier evidence, such as for example
the upgrading of the Navy by 1962^--
One might here comment that the decision to assign the 
Navy a definite strategic role, and therefore the decision 
from which all of the above flowed, must in fact have been 
ÿalcen at about the time of Khrushchev's crystallizing of his
Q
'deterrence-doctrine' o And prior to this one can certainly 
not find published evidence of any significant naval campaign.
5* See Krasnaya Zvezda issues the fortnight following, and 
referring to, the mid 1967 7-day war in the Near East*
And see Timofeev, K*, "The Role of Navies in Imperialist 
Policy"’, New Times, 28th November 1969*
6o Ogoniok No* 25, June 1965,
The Military Balance 1968-69, ISS, London*
And Chapter 6 A*
7o See e*g* Isvestia, 19th May 1963*
8o Pravda 29th April 1962*
Gorshkov's testimony regarding some emerging Naval 
strategic role and capabilities in Pravda 2nd February 
1962 pushes the time-estimate of the political decision 
back even furthero
9o Pravda 2nd February 1962, Ibid* Compare the implications 
of this to earlier conceptions, as typified by Sokolovsky*'s 
reported earlier comment to Gorshkov that the Navy had 
become a "totally obsolete" service branch under modem 
war conditions * -
See Giese, Fritz, Lt«Cmdr*, October 1959 'Wehrkunde' 
arts, reprinted as "Behind the scenes of the Soviet 
Admiralty", Military Review, Fort Leawenworth, May I960*
nMuch has at times been inferred from the recurring 
military (Krasnaya Zvezda) pre budget-time articles on the 
importance of and needs for heavy industry* But with regard 
to no budget can causal connections be drawn between such ■ 
articles an.d budgetary allocations as finally published*
Or: if one for ex rumple interprets the mentioned late 
Khrushchev militaryàrticles demeu ding "multi“million-armies" 
and conventional force increments, as a campaign hostile to 
the political leadership, then the post- Khiushchev developments 
could only be seen as a political over-ruling of military ;
aspirations* Similarly: credence might be given to rumours 
that the military desired a preventive strike against China 
in 1968-69 (See Addendum 4), - on the basis that; a strike 
would be easy within the near future, but possibly far more 
problematic in later years* But again developments would 
have to judged as having demonstrated the finality of a 
political veto at the time* And the conclusion must be that 
the political authority remained absolutely paramount (See 
also Chapter 8 A)*
On the basis of discrepancies and occasional 
inconsistencies between articles, one c m  sometimes present a 
case for the existence of factional splits within the Party, 
as between 'moderates’ and ’conservatives'One could 
then with theoretical profit co-ordinate such inconsistencies 
¥/ith like variations as between various military articles 
and/or as between military and Party articles* But there is/
10* See Chapter 10 B* - i\nd see e*g* Michel Tatu's
admirable "Be Pouvoir en l’URSS", Bernard Grasset, 
Paris, 1967o
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is grave danger that the comoiniiig of too many inferences
will emasculate them of their possible value *
The main intent in pursuing debate contributions ought 
therefore not to be the unearthing of policy differences, a 
task perhaps made impossible by ooviet censorship practices, 
It ought rather to concentrate on the extent to which the 
the articles help to explain and elucidate policy decisions 
already taken and procurement programs already evident *
Not least since such a course minimizes liIso the danger of 
confusing 'declaratory' policy with 'action' policy*
The type of article justly demanding atbention may 
be-exemplified by Marshal Krylov's of 1966^^* He then 
testified that it was only recently that the Soviet Union 
had acquired the sophisticated means necessary to out to a 
minimum "the time reqiired for putting missiles into combat 
readiness" * Mow if previous commiud and cont-rol pcroceduresi 
techniques had not been sufficiently advanced to permit 
missiles’ preparation aid dispatch within comparatively 
limited time conceptions, then *****.*:
a) The soviet deterrent must have been even more 
vuln.erabie to extinction from hostile strikes than anybody 
might assume;
b) It furthermore casts even greater doubt on 
speculations that the Goviet Union might have contemplated 
embracing first strike conceptions; under those conditions 
the USoR would have to expect that the US intelligence/ 
inf ormati on-pro ces sing/re acti on times correlation would, 
at least in theory, permit a countering strike before the/
11* Pravda 19th November 1966*
Till
the contemplated Soviet strike ever got off the ground .
The debate contributions surveyed below are therefore 
approached primarily with a view to their relevance to :
a) The historical acquiring by the UoSF of global 
perspectives and capabilities as concerns both strategic 
and interventionary-type forces (procurements and processes 
otherwise investigated in bhapters 5 - %  and b) The 
evolution of the: military's role in society and its 
relatioiisiiip vis a vis the Party; (dee Chapte% 8 ^ 9) «
For purposes of simplification they will both here and 
in the following chapter be divided into the following '■ 
headings: The Strategic Missile Forces; Kuclear-oriented 
Land and Air Forces; Naval Developments; The Military^ 
in Society.
The Strategic Missile Forces*
12The priority development of these under Khrushchev 
may; be divided into two periods, prior to 1961-62, and after 
that date*
The first period may be seen as that of possibly; too 
extensive missile research m d  procurement * The degradation 
factors detracting from jaissilo effectiveness aid reliability 
were, as intimated, such as may not have been fully appreciated 
at first, thereby leading to over-optijriistic expectancies* 
Nevertheless, as made clear in other chapters, even such 
expectancies had to acknowledge tne limited capacity of early 
missile procurements vis a vis American capabilities* As a 
consequence there resulted the partly; illusory strength 
assertions which served to psychologically augment the 
deterrent image*
12* Pravda 13th J :.nunsyy I960* 'vote: The Strategic Rocket 
Troops became a separate eerice in december 1939*
Ia
Meanwhile research was extended to the field of anti-
ballistic missile development* Again over-optimistic
prognostications might well have led to this being seen as
providing the missing link in the drive towards an imminent
secure deterrent   iVnd if one considers the reported
Idtentative BUD deployment of 1962 , and furthermore
remembers lead-time considérakions, then it becomes reasonable 
to assign to Khrushchev considerable realistic expectancy 
by 1961o Especially vdien considering also the supplementary 
benefits hoped for from the Carribean missile installations 
shortly thereafter* One might see evidence for such an,^ ex­
pectancy in an early 1962 Sup?:*eme Soviet decrees ” (article 
1) s Starting in the aca.dimic year 1962-63 preconscription 
training for students in secondary schools and specialized 
secondary educational institutions is cancelled*"^^ This 
couid thus be interpreted as reflecting (also) some 
satisfaction with military achievements and as indicating the 
first steps -bowards mop or re-allocations in favour of the 
sluggish domestic economy (along the lines of Khrushchev’s 
late 1964 efforts)
13c. Dr* JoOo jfosber’s (LKSo Defence Dept*) 5th .August 1969 
testimony to the House of Representatives Foreign 
Affairs Subcomriittee, revealed that the D *3* had evidence 
Èf tentative Ailî deployments around Leningrad as early 
as 1962, Dee also Krasnaya Zvezda 13th November 1963°
And Pravda 19th November 1964 for premature but interesting 
capability-claims *
14o Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Gove ta ]{o* 7? 16 th February 1962, 
pgo 195Î Isvestia 15th December 1963*
15o Isvestia 15th December 1963 and iravda 2nd October 1964*
One ïaust note the effects of the drop in birthrates during 
the war and the consequent decrease in the number of 18 
year olds availab '.e through 1960-70. ; tit the resulting 
premium on m; up owe r did of course eqiud.ly affect the 
military. And one mu h; lien ce caution against the view that 
civilian economy demands alone constituted sufficient 
reason for the development*
XBut complacent estimates of the Soviet deterrent value
were already being challenged by increasing awareness of the
greacfc early 1960s US strategic procurement increments *
Tr.d if the above inference is valid, then the scheme must
at the latest have foundered when the 1962 Cuba'' events drove
the point home * hence the second period, which saw prime
atten kion directed at increasing the survivability prospects
of the existing missile strength, through silo hardening,
launch mooility cud dispersal schemes, and through
17perfecting control pro(Ucures * The correctness of this 
evaluation as well as the evtent of tlie effort is indicated 
by: a) The lack of ; ny evident major fund-diverting in 
favour of o cher military ejidoavors, combined with b) The 
increased military budget allocations of 1963 and 1964- (See 
Gha..pter 6Bi), ■ nd c) The apparent hiatus in IIU) deployment 
following the initial procurements^^o This latter hiatus 
did of course probably also reflect xqjpreciation of the 
unfavouralile early cost-exchange ratios of relative defensive-' 
offensive systems' offsetting: values* And triis appreciation 
must have provided a supplementary factor in the determining 
of priorities* lut as it is the BliU hiatus only serves to 
highlight Liie centrcT. interest of the later Khrushchev period*
16, Fiirovaya UhonoDiiloa i Meidunarodnic Qtiioshenie, Moscow 
1962, do* 3, pg 90*
Ukonomih' i Kapitalisticheskie Gtrciii 1962* Moscow 1963, 
pg* 18 and 30*
The Military Ikilruce 1969-1970, IS -, London 1969, presents 
a historical table of the qi‘.u_titative growthi of respective 
strv tegic missile strengths*
17o Gee Glagolev L Lc-rionov, International Affairs, ' o* 11 
November 19o3, pg* 32, and assertions cud retroactive 
implications of:
Pravda/lsvestia 4-th July 1965, and l:ravda 19th hovember 1966
18* dee testimony by Ur* Foster, op.cit. and Chapter 55 - 
for extensive, treatment*
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His Irte 1964- espousal of a drastic resources shift in
favour of the domestic economy must hence in part indicate
his belief that the deterrent had finally been secured* Buty
as has Been indicated^ this does not vnlidate the belief of
7/olfe end others* C..-oniestic needs were clearly such as made
Xhiushchev intent on their satisfaction* ,'ut it was an iniait
based on temporary contemporary necessities as he saw them,
and not representative of bas_Lc satisfaction regarding the
lack of more genuine counter-force capabilities* This
certainly appears the more logical inference from a.
consideration of his early speeches and associates, as well
as of his later articles an d procurement authorisations *
The first period im y be symbolized oy the following
Malinovsky quotes* In 1959 he described as "twaddle" the
contention that war between mc.jor powers could be "limited"
or "local" A n d  in I960 he elaborated on the complementary
20theme of the great destructive power of Soviet-missiles*
It was contended that the Soviet Union "could literally wipe
off the face of the earth any country or countries attacking" 
21her* Or, as formulated oy the 21st CPoU Congress: "The 
traditional in vuln e r a ui li t y of Aiieri ca is liquidated for all 
time"o
19* Pravda, 4-th February 1959 - Quoted also by Jacobs, W*B*, 
"Marshal B.alinovsky and Missiles", Military Review, Port 
Beavenworth, June I960, pg* 15-20* Jacobs' article ah so 
provides evidence furthering; scepticsm concerning Holkowicz' 
classification of b.alinovsky as not in rapport with 
Khrushchev (_see Ohcpter 1)*
20o Pravda 23rd February I960*
21* Krasnaya Zvezda 20th Janu-ry I960*
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There was Khrushchev's I960 assertion that the USSR had
achieved a nuclear balance of ^acaclysmic implications, and
that she could now afford and would henceforth pursue the
22policy of "maximum retaliation" as her deterrent* And
ihhinovsky followed up by cxibiting the confidence in this
deterremt inherent in acceptance of US theories: "the best
means of defence is warning the opponent of our strength Emd
readiness to destroy him at the first attempt to commit an
2 bact of aggression"*
but the flaunting of Soviet capabilities subsided as
its implicit claim to pcrity mid part-superiority began to
look more ond more suspect * McTKmiara' s calm assertion to the
Senate Armed Service Committee of early 1962, that the US
was"fully capable" of destroying such "Soviet targets" as it
might select, carried considerably more conviction than
24-Malinovsky's riposte: "Such boasting is to say the least
reckless* - Let us go so for as to grant that the forces are 
equal* 7/e are prepared to agree to this in order not to fern 
wjar psychosis* Bu.t. if our forces are indeed equal, the 
iVmericans should draw the correct conclusions from this and 
pursue an intelligent policy"* The USSR was still declared able 
to "wipe out any target" and to possess forces "sufficient to 
destroy any potential enemy"* And he shortly thereafter 
felt compelled to return to the point: "Lo not touch us, 
imp e ri allsts/
22* Pravda 15th Jcnuary I960*
23* Malinovsky, '13ditel.no Stoyat na Strazhe Mira', I"'os cow 
1962, pgo 25o — See also Garthoff, R*Lo,op*cit*
24o Pravda 24th January 1962*
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imperialists, and do not threaten us, because you will fall
into the pit you are so carefully preparing for us and will
2bbe consmed without trace in a nuclear hell" *
de “
A subtle difference could be/tocted between the
uneasy contemporary demands for peaceful co-exisbence
"which precludes w a r " a n d  the more confident later
assertions like (196b): "peaceful co-existence --  is---
an objective necessity resultijig from the contemporary
27relation of forces between the two systems" * Ib is the 
same subtle difference as one might infer from the 
disparity between the blustering Soviet Reaction to the 
1958 he ben on events and the more purposeful response to 
the 1969 events in i;h:,,t country*
Rut. whatever the value of this inf c m ' ce, public pré­
occupait ons were certainly to change with the crumoling 
of the camouflage increments to Soviet capabilities*
Tlie mid-50s has, as mentioned, seen public hints that
the USSR's strategic inferiority was of e. scale to demand a
28first strike for any success to oe envisaged* And as late 
as 1962 there were warnings of US military threats to strike 
first, v/amings which invited the inference that the USSR 
might not survive such an attouk and might therefore have to
29strike first herself if she received relevant intelligence * *
25o Iravda 23rd lebxuc.ry 1962*
260 Pravda 17th dhinu;,ry 1962*
27a Rocldcarov & Siuelnikov, Irasnaya Zvezda, 21st Jumary 1965 
28* Emelin, opoCit*, pgo 131o
29o Krasnaya Zvezda 11th Kay 1962* - Article by Col* I* 
Sidekiikov which is considered to contc-in also an 
excellent summary of Khrushchev's doctrine*
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30There was also Sokolovsky's pointed comment to US 
discussions of counter-force and city sparing strategies : 
lie declared that such strategy and target choice discussions 
depended "to a considerable extent on the delivery systems 
available, and their numbers"* And he explained that 
systems that might be inaccur;te were ineffectual "against 
small targets like missile launch pads or airfields"* 
Furthermore systems limited in nunbers (of delivery-vehicles) 
could ynyway "only be used against large targets like cities" 
This is of course a concise charactersation of Soviet 
capabilities prior to 1961-62*
how with regard to the endeavors directed at securing 
the deterrent^^, Sokolovsky himself provided evidence of the 
more recently achieved (or still aspired to) designs?
H e thus stated that "missiles, ahich uncier to-day's 
conditions are absolute weapons, are emplaced in nearly 
imuLlnenable undergrouid bases, on submarines etc*", and 
noted siguificautly that "the trend towards increasing this 
invalnera .'ility is grovaing all the time" *
Previous admonitions on the need to protect against and 
prepare for nuclear war conditions had related primarily to 
land forces, and their requirements for mobility and 
flexibility * The specific stress on the need for this with 
'.regard to missiles was novel*
30* ookolovsky, op* cit., 2nd edition, pg* 84, see , .Iso 3rd 
edition, pg* 233o u^id compare with Susliko & kondri.tkoy, 
op*cito, pgo 147 Regarding the time whe.ii the UG8R RAP 
finally acquired, the capabilities necessary to permit 
such lu'Oiries*
31 o Gee Iravda 11th Feoruary 1963 for interesting^ Post-Cuban 
comment by Y* Zhuloov which clearly reflects (enforced) 
awareness of TJ3 strategic power nd capabilities *
32* Cokolovsky, op*cit*, 2nd edition, pg*84o
33o Thus also those con Laiiuwj in hiiiel:iv., op*cit*, pg* 131°
And the new orientation was soon followed ups "Foreign
military analysts" were said to be "talking through their
hats" when they claimed that "Soviet nuclear rockets are
highly vulnerable and (therefore) designed for a first and
not a counter-strike"; "An aggressor would be unable to
destroy all the counter-strike means with his first salvo, for
these means ----  are dispersed* A considerable part of them
is constantly on the move* Another, even greater part, is in a,
state of almost instant readiness to taJoe offo It is physically
impossible - to Imock out all the counter-strike means
34-simultaneously" * ^
It remained of course doubtful that all this had yet been
accomplished* Thus for example the previously referred^to
1966 article by Marshal Krylov clearly indicates that "instant
readiness to talce off" was not a quality the missile forces had
3bacquired by 1965*
But although articles a few years later were to carry 
greater conviction in assigning second-strike qualities to the 
missile forces, articles such as the above neveftheless serve 
as focussing the then current concern and endeavor^
Kuclear-oriented land and air-forces* Previous sections 
invited considerable scepticism regarding exaggerated infer­
ences from the differing emphasis of various articles* By 
assigning some credit to Khrushchev for re-organisation schemes 
implemented during his tenure of office, and by granting some 
credence to his statements of concern for general armed forces
54-0 Glagolev & Larionov, opoCit*, pg* 32 (art* on "Soviet 
Defence Might and Peaceful Coexistence")*
35o Pravda, 11 November, 1966, op.cito
efficiency, our investigation tends to minimize contradictions* 
The apparent differences, such as betv\jeen the 1963-64 mass 
armies advocacies and Khrushchev's late 1964 contrary endeavors, 
may be said to reflect primarily on the difference between 
purely military considerations and considerations based on the 
mder concerns of the economy as a whole* The military emerges 
as a most powerful interest-group, but as contained within the 
Party-dominated hierarchy and with ultimate aspirations that 
are basically complementary to, rather than contradictory too 
those of the Party establishment per se (See also Chapter 8)*
The approach here pursued leads as indicated to assigning 
much of the credit, for the transformation of the forces' 
perception and capabilities from traditional to nuclear- 
oriented, to Khrushchev* And the restrictions aid priorities 
asserted by him, on the basis of his wider-raiging considera­
tions, are in fact seen as resulting in a faster transformation 
than would have been possible on the basis of traditional 
partisan military considerations* By removing the cushions 
inherent in these, by cutting back force levels and re-alloca­
ting funds, he enforced a stream-lining and modernisation 
process which might not otherwise have o.ccurred with the same 
pace and urgency*
He had enjoyed considerable military experience, and he 
had apparently established good rapport with military commanders
from which one infers an understanding of their requirements 
36and needs = * And it was with his rise to power that one
saw the first moves towards the building of mobile and flexible
36* Kolkomcz, R*, op«cit*, pg* 224-238 (See also Chapter 1) *
forces with considerable independent nuclear survival prospects
and capacitieso
The early re-orgaiisations of the air defence forces and
of the transport and. logistics services have already been
mentioned* Testimony with regard to armour further illustrates
the efforts: "The Soviet High Coimnand apparantly has proven to
its own satisfaction that armour and the Guderian designs of
battle are ideal for fighting a vjar under nuclear and non—
37nuclear conditions" * As evidenced in Chapter 6, the apparent
factor of tradi'ion is in this context superficialo The
operative word is "nuclear"* And the crystallizing of this,
and the inherent awareness of the need for dispersion and
mobility, was to become more pronounced as the 1960s progressed;
The military concern may be seen as epitomized by the
30following quote, cited by M* Mackintosh: "Even the
appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons a n d  —  rockets
cannot ensure the swift destruction of the armed forces, and
consequently a swift conclusion to the war, A war cannot
and will not be fought with these means alone";  ---  Such
weapons might in fact, it was declared, "prolong" rather than 
shorten a war's duration*
Aid while such expressions became more scarce during the 
following years due to the emphasis on missiles and deterrence 
needs, they were yet to be reflected also in Khrushchev's 
crucial I960 promulgation* Thus (as quoted in Chapter X) his 
espousal of a massive retaliation doctrine was followed by 
explicit commitments to the qualitative improvement of the 
older service branches, - qualitative improvements which
37o I’Heretique, The British Army Review, September, 1959,op* 
ci to
58„ Quote talc en from the Military Herald, June, 1958; See 
kackintosh, IVu , "Soviet Strategy in World War III, 
Survival", July-August, I960, pg* 149-158*
would more than offset quantitative restrictionso
These efforts could only gain impetus from the Kennedy 
administration's acceptance of McNamara's 'flexible response' 
doctrine end the consequent augmenting of US conventional and 
intermediate range capabilities * If only because of the 
resultant posture of US * forces, one could not xule out low- 
scale aggression* The argument that any dnrect confrontation 
between the super-powers would inevitably escalate to a nuclear 
conflict left considerable conceptual flaws as to the initial 
stages of the confrontation, — - at least as long as one did 
not care to admit that one's own side might feel obliged to 
initiate the actual nuclear exchange — — * Aid this odious 
implication could only really he circumvented by securing, on 
the UoS* pattern, forces capable of lower-scale responses* 
1962-63 articles clearly reflected this need* Aid they also 
reflected the complementary if theoretical need to be capable 
of rendering assistance to favoured national liberation 
movements (however carefully one refrained, from specific 
c ommi tment s)*^^
The logical conclusion(s) could nob be brought to fruition 
while doubts remained concerning the efficacy of the essential 
shield of a visible secure deterrait, and while economic 
restrictions remained necessary. The 'odious implication', all 
the more odious for its inhibiting of freedom and flexibility 
of action and response, had to be tolerated -—  until the 
visible deterrent became such as to inspire confidence that it
39o See e*go Kazakov, U*, Major, in Kommuiist Vooruzhiennikh 
Sil, No* 10, May, 1963o
40* Isvestia, 11 December, 1963 (illustrative article by 
Chief of Geiio Staff, Marshal Eiriusov)^ .^
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could not be challenged* A capacity to engage in medium-scale 
conflicts not supplemented by an effective deterrent could not 
be utilized without inviting destructioiXo An. effective de­
terrent without a capacity to engage in lower-scale conflicts 
is inimical to your interests but does at least guarantee 
against destruction* The priority concern defined itself& But 
one v/as clearly aware of longer term requirements, and the 
groundwork was, as indicated, laid*
A report of the principles of nuclear war, as approved 
by the Khrushchev-dominated 22nd Party Congress,is worth 
quoting:
lo "War — --- will inevitably assume the character of a
nuclear missile war"* Consequently "nuclear missiles constitute 
the basis of the fighting; power of all branches of the USSR 
forces"o Therefore "we have created a new type of troops, the 
Strategic Rocket troops"*
2* "Nuclear weapons  —  make it possible to achieve
military results in the briefest time at any distance and over 
a huge territory"*
3o But "the decisive role of nuclear missiles in war does not 
lessen the importance of other types of weapons* Complete and 
decisive victory can only be achieved through joint actions; 
nuclear missile warfare will be waged by mass armies of many 
millions"*
4o "The very first mass nuclear strikes are capable of 
determining to an extraordinary degree the entire course of 
war" o Hence constant preparedness, intensified training and 
mobility are seen as becoming essential*
41* As per Sidelnikov, I* Colonel, Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 May, 
1962 (stress added)*
42And this may be supplemented by the following q_uoteSy
judged to be equally representative of the Khrushchev»-
dominated concensus:
On the one hand v/hat counted was "not the number of
soldiersj but the quantity a-id q^ uality of missile-nuclear
weapons y rocket artillery? mi s s i1e-1aun chin g aircraft and
ships? especially atomic submarines? and also other technical
means of combat"? as well as "nuclear stores in general"
On the other hand? while the "strategic meais will play
the decisive role in the defeat of the enemy”? there will be a
"theatre offensive following nuclear strikes ----- airborne
landings in great depth and rapid advances (of infantry and
armour) with the support of the air force (will) complete the
4bdestruction of the surviving armed forces of the enemy"o
42o from Sokolovsky? opocites and
Kozlov? SoKoy MajoGeno (with Majo Geno Smirnov and GoloS 
Baz and Sidorov)? "0 Sovetskoi Yoennoi Kaulce"? 2o ed*? 
Voenizdat? Moscow? 1964o
45o kvidenCO for this may be seen in the wide publicity they 
were accorded» Thus e.go Colo Korotkov (in "The 
Development of Soviet Military Theory in the Post-War- 
Years"? Voenno-Istorichesky Zhumal? Koo 4? April? 1964? 
pgo 59-50)? who described Sokolovsky*s book as "the most 
fundamental one" « - Quote found (also) in Wolfe? "Soviet
Strategy " ? opoCito? pgo 268o And see same for
treatment of the process: Kozlov*s book*s l$t edition 
evinced lingering scepticism rco Khrushchev's deterrence/ 
strategic supremacy doctrine; it was criticised for this 
by Sokolovsky; it thereafter soon re-appeared in 2nd 
edition evidently more closely reflecting the operative 
concensus*
44o Kozlov et all? opacity, pg* 297 & 590*
45o Sokolovsky? op*cit.? 2» ed»? pgo 574o
And "the offensive constitutes the basic method of warfare — * 
only a decisive offensive can. bring victory"*^^
The inherent need for flexibility of operations under 
nuclear conditions? for mobility? is a recurring themes
anouver has become the basic feature" of any utilization of
A 7
nuclear strikes* An other inter-related theme is the 
championing of more offensively-oriented thinkings "in
view of the striking power and range of present day weapons 
Soviet military doctrine regards the strategic defence as an 
unacceptable foimi of strategic operations in modem war*"
however? such quotes do not only reflect on the stream­
lining and modernization of the Armed forces» They certainly 
illustrate the development of a basis for flexible operational 
concepts and patterns? and thus for conflict varieties outside 
the restrictive all-or-nothing mould» But they furthermore 
reflect tendencies not consistent with the then still prevalent 
non-nuclear views of interventionary and flexible response 
forces*
The operative criteria may thus be summarized as
a)g An emphasis on nuclear capabilities not restricted to 
a strategic context and. in fact intimately associated with
b) g force units flexible not only with regard to indépendant 
survival capabilities but with regard to inter-service combined 
action potentials*
With the apparent support of both Khrushchev and his 
Minister of Defence? the Armed forces were forced to transform 
themselves from World War II conseptual hostages to smaller but 
far more potent service branches and units totally oriented
46o Kozlov? opoCito? pgo 249o
47o Krasnaya Zvezda? 6 June? 1964 (Colo Vorobev. - Stress 
added)»
48* Konmiiurist Vooruzliiennikh 811 ? No»5? february 1963? pg, 
27-28 (GoloGeiio Schtemenko) *
towards■ the task of combat under nuclear condltions*^^ Andj, 
as clearly demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 6? these operative 
criteria of a) and b) were to gain rather than lose in 
emphasis during the 1960s? - until by 1970 the Soviet 
interventionary and other forces had acquired considerable 
and varied flexible response capabilities? but near-exclusively 
within a nuclear context* This vnll be treated more extensively 
in later sections» hut one ought to mention that the deterrent 
is then? after a thorough analysis and examination? judged as 
'secure*? and that this is seen to lead logically to the 
conclusion that potential local conflicts between the super­
powers will most likely see the utilization of nuclear arms? - 
but wit il out the previously envisaged escalatory repercussions 
(See also Chapter lOA)*
It here suffices to follow up a point previously mentioned* 
Khrushchev’s policy of extensive personnel-cutbacks and cost- 
consciousness did? in the context of his ovn emphasis on 
increased fire-power and combat capacities? inevitably result 
in the squeeze which forced the drastic modernisation process 
indicated above* — And one might further judge the 
resultant squeeze to have been so severe as to necessarily 
entail the early nuclearisation of the non-strategic forces? 
at a time when the eventual inevitability of this process 
appeared not yet to be generally realized»
Kaval deve1opm ents» Early 1962 had seen confirmation
of the Navy’s definite upgrading and of her inclusion simong 
60Services assigned nuclear capabilities. (See end of Chapter 
one) o The fact of the Nair/’s emerging with strategic capabi­
lities was presumably connected with the described contemporary
49o Pravda? 15 february? 1964 (Khrushchev)»
F-Q Pravda? 25 february? 1962 CMalinovsky)*
See also Air Marshal, Vershinen’s Pravda 19 November? 1964? 
article? for more specific references concerning the air
force*
awarcnesG of deterrent-credibility deficiencies* It thus
furthered the efforts towards dispersal which were component
parts of the assigning of second-strike qualities to the
deterrent» But it was not merely a reflection of temporary
necessities* It soon became evident that it represented a
more far-reaching awareness of naval potentials*
With regard to strategic implications? the subsequent
period saw a nuj'iber of pointed as sériions and intimations
regarding the value the IJoS» derived from her fleet» A post—
151
Cuba article? relating to "the Turkish-US accord at the end 
of January to liquidate nuclear bases on Turkish soil? and 
similar developments with regard to Italy" ("following the 
settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean")? is illustrative*
It went on to emphasize that in fact the partial US withdrawals 
"by no means" signified "the first stage of disarmament"? but 
to the contrary "a process of modernization of NATO’s 
armaments"» The forces involved were declared to be more than 
offset by the new world wide "sea-based mobile launching 
sites" (Polaris) then being build» /\nd these were explained to 
represent not only an augmenting of US strategic power but a 
securing of this by malving it less dependant on the whim of 
political allies»
S2And the implications were pursued, by Admiral Gorshkov* 
After lampooning some US naval policies? such as the construc­
tion of aircraft carriers vtiich he evidently considered as 
sitting ducks? he went on to warn that: "When Kennedy took over? 
the target date for building forty-one rocket-armed submarines
5I0 Pravda? 11 february? 1963 
52* Isvestia? 19 Kay? 1965»
was moved up three years* The iimher of submarines under 
construction in 1961 and 1962 was increased from 5 to 10* 
beginning late in 1965 it is intended to commission one 
submarine every month» At the same time the cojistruction of 
atomic anti-submarines is under way at an accelerated rate» 
Whereas previously three such craft were started a year? in 
1962 eight of them were started"* He noted that "the Soviet 
homeland" had giv6]i the Navy "the best rocket aid nuclear 
weapons" (vis* above)» .i.ut there remained a clear implication 
that more would have to be procured*
The previous ignoring of naval potentials? presumed due 
to a combination of strategic conceptions and economic 
necessities (Sec Chapter 1 and 6)? was thus at an end» And 
the indicated using of the ho îTav/'s dispositions as a guinea- 
pig qualitative yardstick for decisions of procurement 
emphases and priorities not only reflected her status as 
opposing super-power» It also reflected on the scale of the 
naval efforts initiated and contemplated in Moscow*
These are treated more thoroughly in later sections? but 
it is proper here to mention also the complement to the building 
up of naval strategic capabilities » This is the mmergence of 
interventionary-type forces? - a development which may 
of course equally be seen as a complementary to the previously 
treated general emphasis on developing mobile independently 
sustained units? wi th maximum operative flexibility? and 
attuned to the needs of potential nuclear conflicts*
On the one hand Sokolovsky proceeded from the afore­
mentioned dismissal of the Navy's effective role during world- 
war II to define the tasks of the 'new' Navy: "The missions
which the Navvr will be assigned to perform in a future war" are 
identified as long range: — - "to give battle to enemy forces
at sea and (at their) bases" and "to disrupt enemy ocean and
sea transport" o On the other hand there v^ as the appearance
soon after Khrushchev’s ousting of "high-speed landing craft",
54and "marines" whose equipment "included missiles"* The 
inter-relationship betwoen the new strategy envisaging action 
against enemy bases and the appearance of amphibious capabili­
ties is self-evidento
All in ally it is difficult to see Marshal Ghuikov's 
assertion, - that Western powers had a d m  owledged the 
ruinous effects of "one-side" military theories and were 
hence building up their ground forces together with their 
strategic capabilities, - as reflecting more than at most 
a prod relating to allocatory decisions* I\nd it may in fact 
merely have reflected Party convictionSo Thus Khru.shchev’s 
orientation must despite its over-riding priority surely be 
seen as moving away from rather than establishing stereotyped 
dogmas   —— ?
The Military in Society* Considering the survey of 
Khrushchev-related data in Chapter I, as well as the extensive 
treatment of post-Khrushchev changes and developments in later 
Chapters (IV and VIII), there is no need to dwell long on the 
theme here also* but it must again be noted that it 
represented the most visibly sensitive military-oriented topic
53o Sokolovsky, opocit*, pg* 242-243, 3» ed* See also 
pgo 344o
54» Ogonyok, ho » 25, dime, 1965, pg» 47.
J \ n d  see Chapter 6 »
NBo NATO Letter ho* 9, September, 1970, pg* 20-22, 
asserted thrt the initial tentative procurement of 
Alligator and Polosny class landing vessels (as well 
as the initial marine infantry formations) could in 
fact be dated to as early as 1963o This of course more 
than confirms our dating of the origin of the Naval 
expansion effort, as well as our assigning to Khrushchev 
of credit for its orientation»
V X
of the Khrushchev years* Attention ought to be redirected to 
the developing military frustration and concern regarding 
Khrushchev’s reluctance to delineate clearly the admitted 
necessary ~ if limited - field of professional military 
autonomy* And in general it must be re-iterated that the 
vagueness of the Kh^mshchev-assoelated aspirations towards a 
more egalitarian yet Party dominated society could not fail to 
cause unease in circles in which the professional desiderata 
affecting policy decisions were judged paramounto
Economic Considerations* These have been mentioned above 
as providing a main rationale for Khrushchev’s emphasis on 
deterrence and strategic sufficiency* We shall return later 
in more detail to the military’s involvement in economic affairs 
and related considerations (Chapter 8), but some evidence must 
here be presented*
Khruuhchev was himself to admit, quite explicitly, the
"guns and butter" quandary; most notably in a speech in
february 1964: "If we accepted an unreasonable reduction of
military expenditures, if we started to build more housing and
forgot about defence, we would be like blind men who cannot
assess the real situation correctly"* The implication worked
both ways, and it was clear that while an "unreasonable"
reduction in military outlays vras unacceptable, so also was
any "unreasonable" reduction in housing » Thomas Wolfe, who
quotes the same speech, put it this way: "In light of these
words there was a palpably hollow ring to Khruslichev's denial
in the same speech that the Soviet Union was being "forced to
reduce armaments and armed forces because of difficulties in
56economic developments"."
55» Pravda, 15 February, 1964»
56o Wolfe, ToWo, "Soviet Strategy  -- ", opucit*, pg* 152»
One. may further point for example to Sokolovsky’s
assertion that even the greater powers could not afford to
keep such standing forces in times of peace as would he needed
57in times of war* In other words: while one would of course
ensure the existence of a strong professional core, one would 
have to rely on mobilisation and extraordinaig^ allocations to 
bring the forces up to a full-war standard* The inherent need 
for civilian training and civilian preparation for war-time 
roles and mobilisation was, as will emerge in later chapters? 
not resolved to the satisfaction of the military during 
Khrushchev’s tenure* And it was hence another factor working 
against their acceptance of his tenets*
Buk as concerns the burden of the military on the 
national economy? it was, as our quotes have indicated, clearly 
admitted by Khrushchev and his associates* This leads naturally 
to the question as to how the Brezlmev-Kosygin regime later 
succeeded in closing the US-USSR disparity without resorting 
to drastically increased military budgets ; why they succeeded 
when he did not? The answer may tentatively be indicated by 
the following:
On the one hand there were no immediate changes regarding 
the strategic balance? ABM developments remained in abeyance 
until the forthcoming event of more favourable cost-exchange 
ratios* And allocated funds continued to be diverted to a 
higher priority ICBM procurement program aimed at parity with 
the US*
At the same time, as regards non-strategic systems and the 
development of interventionary-type forces, the lack of obvious 
increments in funds may be seen to indicate that the basic
57o Sokolovsky? 2„ ed*? pg* 410*
necessary, research allocations had already been enacted by 
Khrnshchevo One must remember that the program was never 
precipitate, and what may be termed sizeable interventionary 
forces did not really emerge until 1970, although the first
procurements had been secured by the mid 1960s* Yet here 
continuing research and deployment (however gradual) considerata 
may be judged as financially demanding as the initiating 
efforts*
And if one finally views the effective procurement 
potentials of the respective US-USSR military budgets as being 
of similar orders - a conclusion which will receive support in 
our later analysis - , and aclcn owl edges that no significant 
Soviet military budget increases have occured - this will be 
supported in the same analysis - , then only one factor remains 
to account for the closing of the disparities* And that is the 
Vietnam War*
Sources close to the US Administration have calculated the
cost of the Vietnam War to amouit to 3/ of the Uo8*G*N*P* and
nearly one-third of the military budget. And they have shown
that force personnel augmentations necessitated by the war
amounted to between one-third ar^ d one quarter of the total,
depending on whether the basis excludes or includes the troops
58engaged in Vietnam*
There cui be little doubt as to the relative correctness 
of these figures* Aid there can therefore be litble doubt 
that in her so-called "fight for -freedom" in Vietnaiii the main 
UoS* achievement was the final uestruct!on of her own
38* Enthoven, A.G* (Ass* Secretary of Defence for Systems 
Aialysis a.tid other Defence Department posts 1960-1969) 
and Wayne Smitli, K* (Staff member Rand Corporation and 
Special Ass* to Secretary of Defence 1960-1969): "Vthat 
Forces for NATO? And from Whom?", Foreign Affairs, 
October, 1969»
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imchalD.engable world military superiority» Henceforth the 
fiction of comparable Soviet power was to become a reality* 
And, as will be later demonstrated, this reality of compara­
tive parity was not of a kind which could be altered with 
ease by either side during the immediately following years*
CT-IAI^ TER 4.
The Acquiring of Extensive Counter-Force Capabilities »
The Military Debates 1965--197Q»
These years may vûth profit be divided into two periods^
with the first running through 1963-66o This period
especially, as previously mentioned, demonstrated the extent
of th 3 general acceptance of many of Khrushchev's basic
premises* Not the least of which concerned the economic
obstacles to amibitious military procurement increments»
Thus while the new regime pledged to "strengthen the
1country’s defence capability", and to arm "the Army and the
2
Navy with the most modem weapons of warfare", it neverthe^
less soon aclonowledged that there was in fact a. need for
further if temporary financial cutbacks» A main rationale
may be seen in the need for ambitious new civilian economy
investment plans ( - with agricultural necessities commanding
%
the most acute concern )» The 1965 military budget was cut 
by about 4/L And it was made clear that Armed Forces personnel 
increases would not be contemplated»^
The limited savings may have been secured through 
administrative economies resulting from the centralising of
g
defence industries» Or they may have been effected through 
further cuts in research allocations to uncertain projects»
1» Izvestia, 20 October, 1964»
See also 23rd Party Congress’ (1966) assurances as pr» Col» 
Larionov in Kommunist Yooruzhiennikh Sil, No» 22, 1966, and 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 September, 1965o
2o Pravda, 8 November, 1964 (Kalinovsky’s 7 November Annivero­
sary Speech)»
See especially Kuarcz, derry, in ’Soviet Studies 
October, 1965, op»cit»
F
5
4o Sokolovsky, V»D*, Marshal, Moscow Press Conference for 
Western journalists, 17 February, 1965o
5o Izvestia, 4 March, 1965o
J-aJj
Here one thinks of such as the perceived post-1962 hiatus 
in BKD developments, which was seen to reflect a combination 
of deterrent priorities and initially unfavoura.ble cost- 
exchange ratios (See Chapters 3 and 3) * Or? .of course? the 
saving might have been quite illusory, and compensated for by 
increments of ’hidden investments’  ^ - that is, military
research allocations under other budgetary he a, dings ( See 
Chapter 8, B) » But no concrete evidence can be found for this 
supposition*
As will also be supported by later quotes, it therefore
appears that Khrushchev’s basic policies were kept intact»
Thus also the gradual nature of the further expansion of
interventionary-type forces after 1965 indicates a natural
progression from initial investment efforts under Khrushchev,
and no qualitative change or innovation*
The only immediate changes affecting the military lay in
a bridling of the Party's tendencies towards a too pedantic
and possibly counter-productive supervision of military
professional concerns (See below), and in new ëfforts aimed
at decreasing international tensions» (Shades of previous
efforts ^ See Chapter 1 « to engender such an international
atmosphere as vrould minimise the sacrifices inlierent in
strategically-judged necessities; - an atmosphere entailing
hopes f 03: a minimum cost gradual approach   ) »
As concerns the latter there was the Soviet proposal to
reduce east-west arms budgets by 10 - 15^^^ The planned Soviet
budgetary cuts were pointedly alluded to, and it was suggested
to
that some of the savings might be diverted to aid/under- 
developed countries: a withdrawal of troops from foreign soil
6» Pravda, 8 December/ Izvestia, 9 December, 1964»
was recoiniiiended, with asserted Soviet vd-13-iiigiiess concerning 
the Warsaw Pact - on condition (only) of reciprocal US 
willingness as concerned NATO; and it was suggested that 
foreign bases be liquidated, nuclear proliferation be prevented 
zones be denuclearised? troop reductions be initiated? and a 
NATO-War saw Pact non-aggression treaty be signed (vfith 
observation posts in the respective territories to secure 
against surprise attacks)* There was of course furthermore 
the complementary ending of polemics against China? and the 
initiation of Soviet-Chinese border talks*
When the significcint military budget increases of our 
second 'period' were finally initiated in 1966 (See Chapter 8)? 
it was at a time when such increases seemed justified, both by 
the increased American commitments in South-East Asia (Soviet 
allocatory increases parallelled those of the UtS»), and by 
the renewed Chinese anti-Soviet bellicosity»
Put they also coincided m th the apparent securing of 
the deterrent and the therein inherent natural increase in 
determination to close the sti-ll-remaining 'strategic gap'»
And they coincided with a probable yearning for increased
development and procurement allocations for the non-strategic 
forces, so as to hssten the acquisition of the advantages they 
entailed* There was presumably less fear of a back-lash
offsetting increment of U*So allocations; the Vietnam expendi*» 
tures were so high as to make potential IkS» legislative 
approval of further allocatory diversions in favour of the 
military most unlikely (excepting situations of too obvious 
challenge), - while at the same time they entailed that the
military budget percentage that could be allocated to more 
future-oriented research was that much smaller than in the 
USSR (See also end of Chapter 3). Aid It must be noted that 
the more steady post 1964 Soviet economic growth and the easing
of the agricultural situation made military demands more 
tolerableo
There might hence be reason to credit Suslov’s apparently
7confident assertion of 1970* The emergence of counter-force 
capabilities durijiig the intervening years and the then evident 
assertiveness of the Armed Forces (See below and following 
Chapter)? clearly indicated such confidence as decreases the 
propaganda-vaiue that one may impute* He stated : "We believe
wj-th legitimate pride that the mighty Soviet industry is now 
capable of solving the most difficult technical problems of 
our time, and of guaranteeing reliably the steady and rapid 
growth of our homeland’s economic potential and of strengthen­
ing dependably its defence capacity"*
The following analysis of debates and developments vd.ll 
adhere to the scheme of Chapter 3* It must be noted also 
that that Chapter’s comments and cautions regarding debate'-? 
contributions’' relative value remain of utmost relevance*
The Strategic Missile Forces* Here developments of our 
first period were referred to in Chapter 1, and the develop­
ments of the second period are treated extensively in the next 
Chapter» A comparatively brief synopsis will therefore suffice*
The first years saw the rounding off and satisfaction of 
the late Khrushchev concerns» The strategic Rocket Forces 
remained preeminent,^ but quantitative developments still
7» Rravda, 7 November, 1979 (stress added)»
8-0 Pravda, 19 November, 1965o This article also expounds on 
some of the operative characteristics of IGBM’s: Their
reliability is thus explained to be "a function of the 
flight altitude measured in 100s of loHoS and the speed 
permitting a rocket to cover a distance of more than 
10o000 km* 8 in 30 to 35 minutes"*
awaited their qualitative transferral into forces incorporating 
secure second strike characteristics or prospects*
The essence of the process was spelt out in emerging 
claims regarding its completion* Thus Brezhnev’s mid-195 3 
assertion that one now utilized: "The most diverse types of 
launching of strategic rockets - surface, underground and 
underwater? both stationary and movable, including self- 
propelled — —  ", and that this ensured "the maneuverability
and imnilnerability of our Army’s missile forces’h,^  It was 
elsewhere elaborated that: "The underground silos are care­
fully concealed from air and space reconnaissance and are 
securely defended against nuclear blows"*^^- And? no less 
importantly: "missile launching controls are in underground
11command posts equipped with the latest electronic appara'bus"*
The latter related to often expressed fears of acute
accident dangers resulting from command- and control proce^
dures not having kept pace wi.tli the sophistication of the 
12equipment, hut the implied accident proneness was not the 
only dangerous consequence of the early ’sophist!cation-gap’ 
as between controller and controlled» There v^ as also the
cont do
One might further point to Krylov’s as yet somewhat 
premature claims regarding BMD capabilities? in Pravda 
19 November, 1964, and the accompanying belaboured true 
but still rather hollow assertion that"the creation of 
the Soviet strategic rocket troops has put an end for ever 
to the trans-oceanic imperialists’ reliance on the 
inaccessibility and invulnerability of their territory»"
9o Pravda, 4 July, 1965 (Speech to Military Academy 
graduates)*
10o Ogoniok, No* 2, 1955, opocit*
llo Ibid*
12o Expressed strongly Cog* by Herman Kahn during his 1969 
lecture tours; this author was a guest at his seminar 
with Norwegian international affairs specialists in Oslo 
on 9 May, 1969 (arranged by NoUoPoI»)
inlierent dilemma that either one facilitated early weapon 
utilization and thereby tolerated greater accident risks, 
or else one added cumbersome extra control procedures which 
militated against fast reaction prospects and therefore en­
tailed a greater risk of extinction on the ground by an 
enemy strike*
That such a sophistication gap had existed, and tha,t: the
Soviet Union had chosen to counteract it through the lesser
evil of extra control procedures - with all the implicit
ramifications for second strike confidence predictions ,
was, as Chapter 3 mentioned, indicated by Marshal Krylov in
19660 The news that the USSR had by then acquired more sophis»^
ticated and secure launching control and command apparatus
13was thus followed by the statements "Important changes
(have now) occurred  ---  the time required for putting
missiles into combat readiness has been reduced to a minimum*"
The accompanying confirmation that the USSR possessed 
"missiles which can be launched from mobile installations"^^ 
again re-emphasized the related programs of hardening and 
dispersal of launch sites* And the composite picture which 
emerges clearly tends to confirm the acquisition by 1966 of 
a secure second strike capability*
There remained the question as to whether secure was 
sufficient» And the answer was evidently no» Previous 
Chapters presented evidence why a progression from the 
securing of the deterrent to the acquisition of counter-force 
capabilities must long have beer considered by Moscow as
13o Pravda, 19 November, 1966»
14* Ibido
inherently necessary* '.But one might perhaps also assign some 
causal effects to the noted ever-increasing US embroilment in 
Vietnam and/or to the once again deteriorating relations with 
China»
Certainly it appears that the decision to match US 
capabilities and operational flexibility must have been taken 
by 19660 This conclusion is supported both by the increased 
military budgets and by the great missile procurement incre­
ments which followed* (See Chapter 5 and 8, Bi»)*
The thereupon changing strategic equation was dramatised 
in 1967, vrhen there appeared a book which seriously discussed 
various selective strategic target theories»^^ The ti'SSR v/as 
evidently no longer forced into a all-or-nothing dilemma, (with 
the ’all’ having to be targeted on cities for even that to be 
effective)^^ due to inferiority* She could now afford the 
luxury of entertaining more sophisticated scenarios, (See 
Chapter 3)*
And it was no less dramatised by emerging assertions
that the maintenance of the technical—military "superiority"
required that quality replace (and not merely complement) cost
ITas a, selection critérium relating to advanced weapon systems;
- by cautions lest "political organisations and their leaders c* 
— fail to use the emerging possibilities" inherent in the 
revolution in military a f f a i r s a n d  by tentative assertions 
(all too reminiscent of the aspirations of American conserva­
tive quarters) as to the necessity to possess arms offsetting
qo
not only actual enemy capabilities? but also potential such* ^
15c- SusM^o & Kondratkov? opoCit*, pg* 147*
16» Sokolovsky? op*cito, pg» 84a See Chapter 3&
17q. Koimnunist Vooruzhiennikh Sil? No* 18, August, 1969 
Article by Maj»Gen» Cherednichenko) »
18» Colo Bondarenko in Koimmunist Vooruzhieimikh Sil, No* 24, 
December, 1968, and ColoS Bandarenko and Rybkin in same, 
April, 1969 issues (No, 7 & 8) »
v±±±
The problems of strategic parity were replacing those of
inferiority; bat however gratifying this premise? the new
problems were to prove as grave*
Prime among these were the over-simplistic military
aspirations for superiority, - over-simplistic because they
appeared oblivious to the implicaiions of their previous
inferiority having per definition mirrored the discrepancy
between American second strike capacities and Soviet lack
thereof* The extent of the late 1960s' offsetting second
strike capabilities, together with the sophistication of the
respective technological bases, made aspirations by either for
the re-establishing or establishing of superiority illusory»
The only ascertainable result from further sizeable arms
increments had by then bacome a mutually off-setting arms race;:
any other envisaged result had become most dubious* (See end
of following Chapter? and also Addendum B? for 'Ifew Weapon
20Systems’ implications)»
There furthermore appeared also military pressure for 
greater influence as affecting the extensive new military— 
political action options made possible by the new capabilities» 
The greater the emerging options for political utilisation of 
military-strategic facilities, the less could the military 
remain satisfied with their traditional concern for autonomy 
only in matters relating to organisation and the instilling of
19o Krasnaya Zvezda? 25 September? 1969 (Article by Maj * den»
doktor naudc? and Professor lagovsky) » There had been 
previous admonishments that "the stern dialectics of 
development are that the struggle for superioidty must 
be waged continually" (Bondarenko? in Kommunist Yooruzhi— 
ennikh Sil? No* 17? September? 1966), but Lagovsky’s 
pregnant implicaption had not been spelt out before»
20» Exliibiting awareness h ereof? Pravda, 20 January? 1969? did
in apparent contradiction to Bondarenko’s implication 
(above), affirm Soviet interest in Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks»
Note also pregnant assertion in Kommunist, No*14?September 
1970? pgo 11: "Maximalists" who refused to acknowledge the
martial.values *
The need for "correct and timely" evaluations, and the
21increasing importance of "initial decisions" was seen to 
demand the erection of a new "supreme military-political organ"*' 
And this organ would further have to concern itself also vùth 
economic matters* As there were more extensive military 
implications inherent in and affected hy more and more 
'political' decisions? so there were of course military reper­
cussions from economic decisions which affected the 'political' 
ones* The most obvious of such was followed up by ColoG-en* 
Shtemenko:
"The National economy will not have mueh time to
reorganize during the course of military action — - every tiling
needed for work in wartime conditions must be prepared in 
23advance"*
contd*
potential benefits or usefulness of partial measures and 
who insisted "on a futile all or nothing formula", were 
"doing a disservice to the cause of peace"" 5»)*
21* Grechko, in "Yoenno-Istorichesky Zhumal", No» 6, June 1966
22o See Krasnaya Zvezda? 30-31 March? 1967 (article by Iit*G-en». 
Zavyalov) y and Kommunist Vooruzhieimikh Sil? No* T, April,- 
1966 (Article by Marshal Sokolovsky & Ma j * Gen * Chere dni^ => 
chenko)»
23 o Ne deli a. No* 6? January - 6 February? 1965»
There had as early as 1937 been assertions that the 
strategic leadership was "duty-bound to act as consultant 
in questions concerning the state’s economic life which —  
influence the nation’'s defence capabilities"? and it vfas 
then also stated that "military economists" must in fact- 
be added even to regular "planning organs within the
state's administration" (See Chapter SB)*
But the post late-60s strategic equations obviously added 
further aspects (and hence greater urgency) to the basic 
motivating factors ------  *
And while this? an.d further implications, will he 
returned to 1t\ later sections (’The Military in Society' 
below, and Chapters 5 and 8), the Party attitude must here he 
indicated* There was, interestingly, implicit acluiowledgement 
that military and political policy repercussions were becoming 
increasingly intertwined, although the implication dravwi 
appeared diametrically opposed* Thus : the tasks involved in
modem war conceptions were seen to be so complex that their 
solution had to "fall completely within the competence of the 
political leadership"; — - "modern weapons are such that
24the political leadership cannot let them escape its control"*
But this dud not necessarily entail acute mi1itary-Party
frictioiio There were warnings that separatist tendencies
could not be condoned due to the political and economic
25consequences which they would involve* Yet these might
equally be seen as preventive, or as reflections of the
traditional Party jealousy of its prerogatives* The extent
of the 8.1 ready existing integration of the higher military
leadership within the Party-dominated hier achy (See Chapters 
and 9
8/A) encourages the caution of the previous chapter?  -- -
against inferring too much antagonism from apparent contra­
dictions „ It is thus relevant to note that the above
'Party' reactions were presented by Military officers* Aid 
that they did furthermore also concede the need for improved 
military-political policy co-ordinating facilities»^^
24o Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 Janus.ry, 1967 (article by Maj*Gen* 
Zemskov) *
25» Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 April, 1967 (article by Col*A* Babin)» 
26» Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 January, op*cit*
But the-non—appearance of any new official body indicates that 
more informal arrangements or presumably increased consultations 
continued to be considered preferable and adequate*
In other words: apparently irreconcilable military—Party
articles might well reflect at most differences in motivating 
rationale? or else the different scopes of inter-acting factors 
eith er had to consider* To the extent that policy-making 
(as opposed to executional or operational) decisions were 
arrived at within the integrated hierachy? and to the extent 
that basic conceptual or progranmaatic differences did not 
appear to exist? to that extent must one caution against 
inferring antagonisms*
Nuclear Oriented Land- and Air Forces » The operative 
criteria of efforts undertaken during the Khrushchev years were 
in Chapter 3 defined as evolving towards:
a) An emphasis on nuclear capabilities not restricted to 
a strategic context? and in fact intimately associated with
b) Force units flexible not only with regard to indepen^^ 
dant survival capabilities but with regard to inter-service 
combined action potentials*
Developments during the latter sixties may be seen as a 
natural progression from? or evolution of? these criteria*
They were thus based on the squeeze between economically^ 
determined personnel stringency? and political acceptance of 
the need for improved capabilities and greater flexibility*
And the sqeeze was seen as necessitating concentration on 
versatile forces utilizing the potentials of nuclear 
technology*
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There was the straightforward following up of previous
efforts. As to firepower within the Air Force? for example?
there was tlie assertion that missiles had by 1965 become "the
basic type of weapon of the strategic bombers, fighter-bombers?
2Tand all-weather fighter interceptors"»
And there were such emerging claims as: "all branches of
the Soviet Armed Forces" have been assigned "imclear rocket
weapons, perfected electronic equipment, and other material of
28the newest type" » Or? as adserted by Ore chic o in 1970s the 
technical equipment had 'undergone a radical change; the army 
had received far greater firepower pr* unit? aid had acquired 
much increased mobility in general as well as in conflict — —  
"under atomic war conditions" (peacetime simulation techniques 
not specified ) » And the core of the Air Force now
29consisted of all-weather and supersonic missile-armed planes* 
Superior "speed? cross-country ability? durability and 
weapon capacity" became the by-word of the land f o r c e s w h i l e  
the air force dictum came to demand that all pilots be capable 
of handling the most advanced planes from unsurfaced strips? 
regardless of adverse we at her-conditions»'^
27o Ogoniok? No * 25? June, 1965* The concentration on and 
scope of this conversion was indicated by Egyptian MIGà’ 
inability to counter Israeli 'strafing' capabilities 
during the 6-day war of 1967? the omission was recognized 
and rectified with the subsequent réintroduction of some 
artillery capability to supplement fighter missile 
capacities »
28» Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 May, 1969 (stress added)»
29* Pravda, 25 February? 1970*
And see Newsweek 'Periscope', 21 September? 1970? for 
evidence that the Soviet swing-wing jets vmre by then 
being mass-produced*
30o- Pravda, 23 February, 1965 (Malinovsky) *
31o Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 May? 1969, op*cit*
Parallelling the increase of internal service flexibility
came also increasing stress on the capacity to initiate and
co-ordinate "joint military operations" involving different
branches and services of the forces* /md as a result the need
for increased training and maneuver co-ordination and flexible-
52lity emerged as a prime concern»
This did of course further entail the placing of a
premium on commander and troop education and specialisation»
Discipline and general capabilities were no longer enough*
Expertise and special skills were becoming necessary rather
55than merely desirable*
But this did furthermore increase the difficulties 
associated with potentially necessary mobilisations* As troop 
sophistication demands increased, so did the training time 
needed before 'raw' peasants or townfolk could be inserted to 
augment or replenish ranks» And as the era came to entail 
decreased potentials for long mobilization periods, so there 
arose an increased need, for extensive pre-mobilization training 
of the populace»
The above, in conjunction with the general acceptance of 
the need for increased military-political (-economic) co­
ordination, and with possibly increased awareness of the need 
for some Home Guard type capabilities (See Chapter 8), may thus 
be presumed to have part-motivated one of the more pregnant 
novelties of these years*
This lay inherent in claims that previous distinctions 
between front and rear had become anomalies in the nuclear ages
52o Pravda, 25 February, 1965 (Malinovsky)*
For the trend, see e*go Pravda 26 January, 1968,(Air Chief 
Marshal Vers bin en) and Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 May, 1969,opocit
53o See e.g* Izvestia, 20 November, 3-969 (Col»Geno Grigoriev), 
and Pravda, 19 No vember, 1969 (Marshal Krylov)»
"war will become all-embracing? inter-continental — - the
former distinctions between front and rear will no longer be
preserved * All branches of the armed forces will be
required for total victory —  --- * Everything needed —
54nmst be prepared in advance
It thus soon became clear that the "everything' included, 
the intensified training of civilians for insertion into war­
time roleso This will be returned to below (as v\d.ll the
complementary inter-dependence between strategic considerata
5 5and investment and allocatory policies - (See Chapter 8)»
But it must be noted that extensive programs to this end were 
initiated by 1968*
haval Developments * Again? the relevant procurement/ 
matérielle developments may be found in Chapter 6? and we v/ill 
here concentrate only on some of the illuminating or explicatory 
pronouncements a. c comp any in g the process»
Thus it W8.8 soon made clear that the naval expansion 
Vfouid continue and that US naval capabilities were indeed seen 
as the qualitative yard-sticks
"More than one—third of the strategic nuclear offensive 
weapons in the possession of the US and NATO armed forces
belong to the American liavyo  -- That is why our navy —
is playing an ever-greater role in strengthening our country's 
   might*
And the evolution of the Soviet Navy towards a strategic 
equivalent to that of the US Navy? with its inherent second 
strike a. dv ant ages of dispersion and mobility? was soon farther 
confirmed*
54o Nedelia, No. 6, 1965, op* cit,
35o See also e*g* Krasnaya. Zvezda? 22 November? 1966 
editorialo
56o Pravda? 14 July? 1965 (Fleet Admiral Gorshlcov) *
Early 1965 saw the flaunting of the first srihmarine—fired 
57strategic missiles* By 1970 the newest surface cruisers
had been so totally oriented towards missile and nuclear
capacities that they no longer retained even a semblance of
50converti on al armament s I
And therein was to lie the main qualitative difference 
between it and the still quantitatively greatly superiarUS 
Navy* The combat orientation? and the much more recent 
commissioning of most of the Soviet vessels, certainly lessened 
remaining Soviet naval inferiority*^^
Marshal Sokolovsky had defined the 'new' Navvy's main 
tasks as long range, directed both agadnst enemy transports 
and Navies and against enemy b a s e s A n d  he had noted that 
naval activities should, no longer necessarily be contingent 
on land developments » He proceeded to define the means to 
the achieving of the tasks: strikes from missile—carrying
surface vessels, co-ordinated with missile submarine activity,
AO
and in conjunction with missile carrying planes;^ "great
possibilities" were seen to arise from the arming of the
Soviet Navy "vd-th nuclear weapons (in general), atomic missile
4-5submarines? and long range missile aviation"»^
37c Pravda, 25 February, 1965 (Malinovsky)»
38» Buhdeswehr's "Soldat und Technik", No» 10, 1970, p g o  
566—570 o Concise article on 'Neue und Mo demi si art e 
kriegsschifftypen der Sowjet-Flotte' surveys also new 
Kresta II cruiser, and presents pictures which are un— 
e gun VO val —  * Compare with other surveys in same?
NOo 11, 1969, p g o  626: The then surveyed vessels’ only
remaining cannons were so small (57 mm» ) as to rule out 
any conception of conventional war —
Note also tlie new 3*300 ton gas-turbine rocket- 
destroyer (NATO co denamed FBI VAN DBG) v/hich ’appeared’ 
in the spring of 1971, - embodying theory’s total practi­
cal implementation* No equivalent vessel is either 
serving or (as yet) projected for service with any western 
navy*
59- See extensive interview with SACEUR (NATO) General 
Goodpaster, Aftenposten, Oslo, 29 October, 1970*
4-0o Sokolovsky, op*cito, 3o ed*, pg* 242-245o
41» I hi d. -orr - k/ll
Similar definitions of tasks and means remained current 
during our period^ A mid 1969 article "by I'leet-'Admiral 
Kasatonov^"^ is illustratiueo H 0 began by confirming that it 
was Soviet policy to "build and further perfect an ocean-going 
fleet capable of solving strategic tasks of forward character*" 
After asserting that the core of such a fleet had by then been
formed, and after describing its prime components as "advanced
missile carrying vessels", submarines, and a vaunted "naval 
aviation" he proceeded thus:
"The fleet structure (now) incorporates also the determined
& unbeatable marine infantry* This is intended to be utilized 
over V'/ide ocean expanses in troop-landing craft, to break 
through enemy shore defences and to solve tasks on the shore*" 
Here were the means for accomplishing Sokolovsky's *task* 
vis-a-vis enemy bases*
And it becomes of interest to revert to a Sokolovsky 
elaboration of the relevant meanss thus Haval fronts _(^ where 
appropriate, in conjunction with land and air fronts m t h  
parallel perspectives) will "complete the destruction of enemy 
forces" by "taking advantage of the results of missile blows of 
strategic significance", and they will "occupy (the enemy) 
territory*
42o Ibid, pgo 246c
45* Ibid, pgo. 3)44o
44o Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 July, 1969 ( Kiadezhni Korposf
Rodini')a See also Kasatonov in 'Starchina Sersjant', 
hoo 7, 1969, for further treatment of the extensive na,val 
quantitative and qualitative build-up, and for dis crip tiens 
of the extending of haval operational patterns until these 
came to cover all major oceans^
45o Krasnaya Zvezda, Ibid: He further confirmed that "an
important role in the secu ring of bases and combat
operations is executed by aid vessels of various types" 
(ioC* electronically equipped merchant and fishing 
vessels ) *
46* Sokolovsky, opocit*, 5o ed*, pgu 340*
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Although defensive and offensive strategic potentials as
47such retained prime importance, it thus became clear that 
the development of h a,val inter vent ion any-type forces was seen 
as a complementary theme* This inference was supported both 
by increasing public Soviet awareness of the benefits that 
might accru e from local intcrveiitionary—type conflicts, and 
by the steady expansion of amphibious marine landing capacities 
following the first 1964-63 procurements (See Chapter 6)*
The theme, as well as the importance attached to it, was 
further confirmed by reports such as that carried by Tass in 
1970o An exposition on the exercises and events of the worlds
wide 'Okeai* maneuvers at the time (See Chapter 6) included
I -, . 4-8this passages '
"In the Northern Fleet the firing (described as 'missile 
and artillery'), as well as the 1 aiding of marines on the 
shores of the Hubachi peninsula, were attended by the Minister 
of Defence of the USSR, Marshal Grecldco, General Epishev, the 
Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Army aid 
ITavy, Admiral Gorshkov, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and 
Marshal Batitsky, the Commander in Chief of the Aif Defence 
Forces o'*
In conclusions It appeared that the development of 
marine amphibious/interventionary-type forces demanded 
considerable at tent ion* iiid tzieir training orientation towards 
the utilization of missile (nuclear) strikes furthermore much 
increased the impact potential of their as yet limited numbers*
4-7* As to defensive, Ibid*, pg* 363, focusses on the
crippling of hostile air-craft carriers and missile sub­
marines, ~ because of their strategic capabilitieso
48* Tass, 29 April, 1970*
(It must here he noted, with regard also to land and paratroop 
forces, that the 'clean' lack-of-lasting~fallout-effects 
nature of the m e  1 e ar war he ads by then available made it 
possible for forces to occupy targets very soon after a 
' talce-out ' strike I « With regard to different
scenarios, it must of course be said that the forces also 
entailed considerable psychological pressure advantages even 
in situations not allowing the full utilization of their combat 
capacitieso (Again, see Chapter 6), And, finally, the TASS 
communique night be seen to again reflect the attention 
accorded to 'combined-action' potentials —  *
The Military in Society* One might distinguish four 
inter-related but separate aspects: a) Efforts towards
establishing more advanced strategic research facilities;
b) Concerns relating to military-economic inter-dependencies;
c) The increasing need for pre-mobilization training for 
civilians, so as to permit their ■ fastest possible insertion 
into more sophisticated war-time roles; d) The general need 
for maximum general nuclear war surcvival prospects. The first 
three have been referred to previously, and all will be treated 
more extensively in later chapters * ]lut, at least with regard 
to the last two aspects, certain preliminary data and conmients 
fall within the present context*
' c' will be treated first* Some military training or 
education of and for civi.lians had long been accepted* But 
its extent had if anything contracted under Khrushchev (viz* 
the early 1962 decree cancelling preconscription training for 
students of secondary schools and institutions)* And it was
4-9o See Chapter 10 A for further exposition as to why one
could by the late 1960s envisage local nuclear conflicts 
not entailing escalatory probabilities*
only after his ousting that the scope of the practice was 
significantly extended*
Previous sections described the military's acquiring of 
greater autonomy from 'Party' meddling in matters relating to 
organisation and training; the stress on the need for "one-man 
command"' was relieved of the old accompanying and partly contra:!^  
dictory reminder of the ''‘role and influence" of the Party; the 
Party was to continue to give valuable' "assistance" but
in terms of support which might be called for rather than 
"Influence" which had to be accomodated or bowed too^^ And 
it soon became clear that Party acceptance of military training 
requirements incorporated acceptance of the need for increased 
pre-mobilisation tralningo
Party and public organisations were directed to be "more 
concerned vd-th the military«<-->pa,triotie upv.^ bringing of school» 
childi'en"'*^  ^ And similarly: "The TCL (Komsomol) committees
are obliged to carry out more actively the work of military 
and patriotic education of Soviet youth and preparing them 
for service iifithe ranks of the Armed Porces"K^^
There wan furthermore to be esta,blished "patronage over 
milita,ry units by workers, collective farmers and cultural 
figurrs"! officially to help "strengthen and expand the army's 
ties with the p e o p l e " T h e  intent is elucidated in testimony 
by Pavlov, then Komsomol First Secretary:
50o- Article by Grechko in ¥oenno-Xs to riche sky Zhumal, Fo<^  
June, 1966, supports the conclusion*
See also Col*General Yefimov, Ass*Chief of Chief Polit* 
Administration of Soviet Army and Navy* lzvestia,16 
November, 1965o And Pravda, 6 July, 1962 and 4 Jud-Yj? 
1965? opocito
51o Izvestia, 16 November, 1965 (Yefimov) *
52* Kornsomolskaya Pravda, 15 June, 1965*
55o Izvestia, 16 November, 1965, opocito
"Following the example of the Pacific Fleet, entire youth 
flotillas have heen set up in the Black Sea, the Baltic, and 
the North Sea. * In a.ll comers of the So'viet Union this
summer, tents were pegged out for the "Sons of the Regiment" 
camps where juveniles learned about military technology and 
studied the heroic history of the USSR Armed Forces"
That such training of "workers, collective farmers and 
cultural figures" as well as "youths"' and " juveniles" was to 
take on increasing importance was finally emphasized in 
19680- One then saw the introduction of decrees vdiich not 
only extended the scope of the training, but also made the 
previously volurtany participation obligatory* (Bee Chapter 8)* 
— r-- The Advantages for purposes of mobilisation are self» 
evidento
Mow with regard to ® d'g The basic concern did of course
complement also that of ' b' above, and could be defined as
follows g " » to create the conditions for the uninterrupted
operation of units of the National economy if nuclear war
96should brealc out"* Civil Defence, which constituted the 
means for the fulfilling of this task, was of course not a 
novel conceptiono But it was now to receive increased, if 
strictly limited, attention: shelter-=building facilities wero
focussed on the protection of national»economy essentialsg, 
whi].e educational drives were directed at the populace with a
54o Pravda, 27 Jun.e, 1965o
55* Although foreshadowed e*go by Maj * General Uemskov, 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 January, 1967, on the further 
extention of para«milita,ry training for civilians in 
schools and outside*
560 Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 November, 1966*
A A i .
view to, promoting realistic self-'help prospects* (See 
Chapter 5 B) *
Civil Defence was thus in 1965 defined as "a system of
state-wide defence measures being carried out throughout the
country for protecting the populace and national economy from
the weapons of mass destruction, and also for rescue work in
the zone of a possible strike"*^ "Every city and iiilmbited
9Spoint" was to be given protection© '
As for the population as a whole the limitations were 
stated franklyo "Planned and systematic" training would be 
given to "workers, employees and the general publiCo"^^
But "first of all attention is being focussed on the 
preparation of the entire populace, on the alility to help 
oneself and help one's neighbours
Both sources quoted made it clear that the program was 
encountering some opposition from enterprise managers and 
their illc who disliked the loss of time involved in the 
training of their personnel© And such opposition might bo 
seen to relate equally to the other civilian training en de a» 
vours treated above©
YTet in spite of this the programs were plainly of 
considerable scope and importance©
57o Pravda Ul^ rainii., 28 October? 1966 (article by Head of 
Civil Defence, Marshal Ghuikov) ©
58© Krasnaya Zveada, 22 November? 1966, opocit©
59o Pravda Ukrainii, 28 October, 1966, op©cit*
60* Ibid*-
It remains only to suggest that the encouraging of 
some military training of the civilian population may not 
appear inimical to Party interests as interpreted by its 
leaders, but may in fact appear conducive to their furthering^ 
™  * The programs encouraged may hence be seen as not
merely concessions to modem military necessities, but also 
as part-^motivated by beliefs in further-ranging advantages 
accruing from a more disciplined society * Factories?
not to mention Party cells, could on occasion also do with 
more discipline —  t ^
CHAPTER 5
Soviet Strategic Concepts and. Capabilities:
Their Implications for Foreign Policy (late 1960s»1970s)o
The following will be primarily concerned with Soviet 
developments, but Western CUS) parallels will be treated Where 
these are considered relevant for the sal^ e of claxity or placing 
in context© Thus, some of the conclusions emerging will be seen 
to pertain as much to a more general East-West strategic frame» 
work as to specific Soviet conditions©
There are two main prerequisites of military concern which 
determine the credibility and thus the effects of a na,tion's 
foreign policy commitments© One is the nation's ability in a 
last resort to provide sufficient nilitary support for the 
fulfillment of pledges© The second is the awaneness of others 
of its capacity to provide such supporto If this is doubted 
(vdiether rightly or wrongly)? other nations will feel neither the 
confidence nor the apprehension which they might otherwiso bo 
induced to feel (depending of the quality of their relations 
with the power in question) ©
The USSR until the mid-1960s totally lacked the capacity 
of the USA to intervene effectively in areas outside her imme» 
diately adjacent environment© Her capacity to defend the 
homeland and these adjacent areas carried some credibility, as 
did her capacity to inflict una.c cep table punishment on her 
strongest adversary vmthin a, first or pre-emptive strike 
scenario© Yet even this capacity was inhibited by the Imow- 
ledge of the far greater an.d more reliable US capacity to bring 
destruction to the USSR landmass©
The USA, therefore, retained a marked psychological 
advantage, a position of superior bluffability© That is? a 
US bluff could logically be carried further© (And this might?
IT
for example, be seen as having been of relevance to the 1962 
Cuban crisis sequence of events©)
The I960 Kennedy presidential campaign gave wide publicity 
to statistics which purported to demonstrate a developing 
missile gap in favour of the USSE.© The comparison did not 
include all US delivery vehicles capable of reaching the USSR 
(cogo bombers)© It did however include Soviet medium-range 
missiles covering Europe, - a force potential the deterrence 
value of which was strictly limited to Western Europe's ulti­
mate value in the eyes of the UoS©- The reliability of the 
statistics was therefore dubious, and îaisleading as an indica­
tor of relative strength© But the acceptance of the statistics 
testified to the popular credibility of Soviet "massive 
retaliation" at the time, a credibility buttressed by the 
psychological impact of the Sputnik successes*
The consequent priority on ICBM development by the 
Kennedy administration therefore did not close the gap? but, 
to the contrary, temporarily exacerbated it* The real gap? 
with the US in the position of superiority, had narrowed with 
the Soviet attainment of limited missile capabilities* But 
the emerging US quantitative superiority was such as to 
minimize and possibly eliminate the chances of the unprotected 
Soviet first generation missiles surviving a hostile strike*
The limited Soviet capabilities of the late 1950s had 
been psychologically up-graded in the hope of inducing a US 
belief in a new situation of genuine balance* This was 
presumably in order to gain such a bargaining position as 
could otherwise only be claimed following the climax of 
ongoing procurement endeavors; by APPEARING to possess 
offsetting super-power capabilities, the USSR hoped to erect 
a smokescreen which would permit her to effect these 
capabilities at a less financially demanding pace, while yet
T U
permitting the early enjoyment of the fruits whiohi wonLd
accrue from the efforts* But the design backfired, the result
being an exacerbation of Soviet vulnerability© The result of
this again was inevitably a more open Soviet drive ? first
qualitatively to improve her missile complexes by protecting
them and giving them, a 'second-strike character', second to
implement the quantitative increase necessary for the achieve»
ment of irrefutable counter-force capabilities© This drive
had succeeded by, respectively? the mid and late 1960s© The
second-strike character of both US and Soviet forces v/as
thereafter to minimize the de-stabilizing potential of forco
increments by either; the balance could no longer be upset
as-easily as in the days of primitive first strike type 
q
missiles©
It is intended in this chapter to tracæ and analyse the
Soviet development of strategic arms and capabilities * No
exhaustive summary of military and technical innovations is
attempted© Rather, as will be seen, the analysis will concon-
trate on such factors as are considered by themselves or in
conjunction with each other to have specific implications on
foreign policy choice and scope© Available data is believed
sufficient to malœ tentatively valid assertions© But before
pursuing this attempt it remains appropriate and necessary to
echo John Craven's caution regarding the difficulties of both
critical analysis and rebuttal when information as to (e©go) a
2
weapon system's effectiveness lies in the classified field©
lo For evidence regarding the scenario-definition at the
beginning of the paragraph, as well as for an analysis of 
the 'debates’ relating to the described process as a whole? 
see Chapters1, 5 and 4©
2© Adelphi Papers No© 46, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, March, 1968©
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A Æurther difficulty, relating to such data as is 
released, must also he noted* Tliis was indicated by reports 
of a 1969 Pentagon internal paper on "Improving the Acquisi­
tion Process for High Risk Military Electronic Systems"© The 
conclusion wrhich. followed an analysis of previous weapon 
(system) developments saw achieved operational efficiency to 
have been consistently much inferior to theoretical and 
planned-for efficiency* One should hence caution against 
inclinations to view "achievable" as meaning "that which is 
achieved"©
5 A Strategic Offensive Capabilities*
Some comparative statistics must here be introduced* 
lo- Growth of intex’-continental and submarine launched ballis< 
tic missiles:^
(Mid-year strengths) USSR-ICBM ; USA-IGBM ; USSR-SLEMs HSA-Sia
1959 Some None None None
I960 35 18 None 32
1961 50 63 Some 96
1962 75 294 Some 144
1963 100 424 100 244
1964 200 834 120 416
1965 270 854 120 496
1966 300 904 125 592
1967 460 1054 130 656
1968 800q 1054 130% 656
1969 1050-1350? 1054 160-200% 656
1970 1300=1440^y 
up to 1500
1054 280-350^ in
up to 400
656
1971 1054 656
3*
5o
7o
8o
See "Weapon Systems 
26 January, 1969©
A story of Failure", Washington Post,
The Military Balance 1969-70, same for 1970-71 (Both loS.S*? 
London) , and Statement of Secretary of Befense/otFmhe Fiscal 
Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, 
Before the H ouse Armed Services Committee, 9 March, 1971*
a Pentagon 
1969s asserted
The Military Balance 1970-71 asserted 1050; 
leak reported in the Guardian of 29 October,
1350*
The Military Balance 1970-71 asserted 1300; Laird's 9 March, 
1971 Sto, opoCito, asserted 1440*
In Laird's Statement, ibid (-estimate)*
The Military Balance 1970-71 asserted 160; Seer* of Defense 
Laird asserted 200 in an Associated Press Annual Meeting,
20 April, 1970*
V2o Estimate of Comparative Strategic Strengths - mid 1971s
USSR USA
ICBM up to 1500 1054
IRBM & MRBM (medium-range) 700 0
Cruise missiles 100 + 0
SLBM np to 400 656
Snhmarine-lannched cruise missiles 362 + 0
long-range bombers 173-193 569
Medium-iange bombërs 300 35
1 ?
2 Eo Anti-ballistic missiles - mid 1971:
Number of launchers: USSR » 64 ; US » 0©
3» Total Offensive Force Loadings - mid 1971:^^
USSR - 2000 s USA - 4600©
But US quantitative superiority must be related to yield 
inferiority: in terms of megatonnage the USSR was estimated
to have achieved parity already by late 1967^^1
3 Bo The backbone of Soviet ICBM forces by mid 1970 consisted 
of "over 300" SS9 with warheads of 20-25 megatons,an.d
900 SSll with warheads of one megaton plus^^ (similar to US 
Minuteman ICBM loads)© Multiple warhead - re-entry vehicle » 
capacity was being assigned to both models; some SS9s were 
developed for a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) 
or a retrofired depressed trajectory ICEM©^'^
9* The Military Balance 1970-71 asserted 280; Laird's 9 March, 
1971 Sto, opoCito asserted 350©
10© In Laird's Statement, ibid© (-estimate)©
11© Laird’s Statement, opoCito? figures not supplied by 
Laird taken from The Milit any Balance 1970-71©
12o Laird’s 9 March, 1971, Statement? opoCit©
13© Ibid©
14o Testimony of Deputy UoS© Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, 
in New York Times, 3 December, 1967©
15* President Nixon, Message to Congress, 18 February, 1970©
16© Laird's 9 March, 1971, Statement, opoCit©
17© Ibid©
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STATISTIC FIGURES:
a) Figure estimates show some discrepancies * Not only 
do different sources provide different estimates,but one 
can often find inconsistencies between figures provided by the 
same source*^^ The discrepancies may perhaps be seen to 
illustrate the degree of uncertainty of intelligence estimates* 
Pentagon’s preferral of the higher figures may then be taken
to reflect on an inclination always to present the maximum 
of any probability range estimate of enemy forces available 
at any one time* The inclination represents a logical 
precaution on the part of officials responsible for a nation’s 
defence* That it is also one with inherent dangers will be 
documented later©
b) As regards SLBM figures it ought to be noted that
remaining Soviet inferiority was due to her older nuclear and
diesel submarines having only 3 missile tubes each* But she
was rapidly converting to ’Y-class' nuclear missile submarines,
each with 16 tubes (corresponding to US practice): this force
rose from 4 operational units in early 1969 to "at least" 17
operational units by late 1970, vrlth another 13 "in various
stages of assembly and fitting out"? and with production
preceding at the rate of 7 - 8 (ioe* 112 - 128 missiles) a 
20year* She could therefore expect to equal US force levels 
21by 1974o A similar development related to the quality of the 
missiles available * Soviet SLBM reach had been consistently
inferior to American standards© But by 1970 she was converting
22to new types of comparable quality©
18© See footnotes 5 to 10; and/or figures provided by yet 
other sources, - e*g© Capitaine Raoust, in Revue de 
Defence Nationale, April 1969, Paris*
19o The Military Balance 1969-70 allows for 1034 Soviet ICBMs 
in 1969; The 1970-71 edition allows for 1050; Strategic 
Survey 1969 (also of ISS) allows for 1200©
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c)' The US quantitative stagnation after 1967 may be seen 
as partly reflecting a strategic decision of sufficiency, 
partly a dearth of funds - as about one third of the military 
budget became diverted to the conduct of the Vietnam war (See 
Chapter 3)o
d) The slow Soviet quantitative growth until 1967 
reflected priority concentration on the development of second- 
strike characteristics (hardened silos, mobile launching pads, 
initial ABM endeavors etc©)© The consequent effecting of 
missile hostile strike survival expectations mitigated Soviet 
vulnerability, and gave her a security she had not possessed 
since the war© But her quantitative inferiority nevertheless 
still detracted from the public credibility of her deterrence© 
Sovs.et expositions on the subject had never allowed room to 
doubt her determination to counter US capacities© It was 
therefore to be expected that the qualitative securing of the 
USSR’s existing forces would be followed by the quantitative 
increments necessary for them to effectively counter US 
capabilities (and the US "bluffability" aUvantage)© By 1970 
she ha.d manifestly succeeded© Her momentum was furthermore 
leading to a position of apparent superiority" ("apparent", 
since the UoSoA©s earlier effecting of second-strike force 
characteristics ensured against critical vulnerability; a 
constellation of mutual check-mate had emerged)©
20© Laird’s 9 MEirch 1971 Statement, op©cit© More rapid Soviet 
conversion rates have been asserted by others: See e*go
(Senate Armed Services Oomm* member) Senator Jackson’s 
closing remark in the US Senate debate on ABM authoriza­
tions, 6 August, 1969o
21© Laird, ibid©
22© Bundeswehr’s Soldat und Technik, No© 7, 1969, pg© 381, 
and Laird, ibid©
23o Azovtsev, N ©, in "V©I© Lenin i Sovetskaya Nauka", Voenizdat, 
Moscow, 1971? asserts present and insists on future 
"superiority"©
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QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS *
a) There was the development of silos capable of with»
standing and offering protection from comparatively close-
24-proximity nuclear explosions - See 5 B for further 
treatment©
b) Control, facilities were greatly improved© Early 
procedures and techniques had been most primitive* So much so 
that sa.fety considerations alone had entailed considerably 
longer missile preparation times than those theory envisaged©
3In was only by the mid 1960 s that the USSR perfected suffi ci ent^ 
sophisticated capacities to out reaction and missile preparatic 
time demands to a respectable minimum©
c) Missile technology advanced considerably© Liquid
fuel missiles needing fuel changes every few days were
replaced by missiles needing fuel changes only every few
months;, these were finally replaced by solid fuel missiles
exempt from fuel»changing restrictions© Power and accuracy
improvements meanwhile permitted missile trajectories previ»
26ously ruled out by prohibitive cost implications©
24© Log© Ogoniok, No© 2, 1965, op©cit©
25© Marshal Krylov, in Pravda, 19 November, 1966©
26» Minimum energy flight 
trajectory? with a 
flight time of say 
20 min © ------------
Alternative trajectories
FOBS trajectory
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Early missiles followed, high "minimum, energy" trajectories?
27’with pealt altitudes of perhaps 800 miles© A more flexible 
trajectory choice was to pose problems for a defence; a 
lower trajectory cut down the time available for detection, 
identification and réaction©
d) The USSR pioneered mobile solid fuel I C B M s * T h e  
speed and accuracy of modern satellite detection to cliniques 
might have been thought to maice their ground immunity 
uncertain© But authoritative Soviet expositions later 
testified to a conviction both regarding these missiles'
29survival prospects and regarding their offensive potential©
e) Another Soviet innovation was the development of
30an orbital or sub»orbital bomb© The advantage of these 
bombs lies in the fact that their low orbital altitude of 
about 100 miles poses defensive problems not fully alleviated 
by the contemporary development stage of ' Over—the»Horizon 
Radar’ (Again, see 5 The further development of OBR
may however be presumed to eliminate the relative immunity 
of the sub-orbital bomb© And as regards its fully orbital 
brother? satellite course predictability male es its interception 
easy© Even first-strike conceptions would not allov/ of a 
high military values syncronization difficulties ensure that 
a large percentage would at any one time have orbital locations 
defying immediate firing - these could therefore not be 
effectively utilized© The main potential of these bombs is
27o UoS©. Secretary of Defense McNamara to Washington D*C©
Press Conference, 3 November, 1967©
28© Pravda? 19 November, 1966, op©cit©
29© See e©g© Marshal Bagramian et all, "Istoria Voin i
Voennovo Islcusstva"? Section Pour, Yoenizdat, Moscow,1970©
30© Izvestia, 4 July, 1965? and lavestia 8 November, 1965; 
also Pravda, 19 November, 1966*
31© MaNamara’s November 1967 press conference? opoCit©
Xtherefore psychological, relating to popular unease or fear of 
"homhs overhead"©
f) The 1960s tlirther saw the development of sophisticated 
decoys (PENAIDS, or penetration aids) aimed at confusing and 
increasing enemy identification problems so as to ensure the 
unintercepted arrival on target of a missile© But the value 
of PENAIIS became dubious by 1968-69o This was because of the 
development of high speed short range ABMs (such as the 
American Sprint)? and more sophisticated 'floating' long 
range ABMs (such as introduced by the Soviet Union in 1968),^^ 
with associate radar facilities© The former envisaged inter» 
ception only after the athmosphere had separated the warhead 
from the dummies (differences in weight and density entail 
differing re-entry times); the latter allowed for interception 
prior to the release of the dummies © The cost of effective 
sophisticated dummies was approaching the point when "one 
might just as well use several warheads on each missile"©
Or, as U8IS put its "As opposed to other methods of pénétra» 
tion? WLKSf is regarded as more certain since defense against 
it must necessarily utilize — ABMs for each individual 
MIRY warhead©
g) The research and development of MTRYs (Multiple Individu» 
ally-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) was at first considered a US 
preserve© But by 1968, it bocame clear that the USSR was
32© See treatment in "Non-Proliferation Treaty", Hearings of
the UoS© Senate Foreign Relations Committee? 1st 
Session, 1969©
33o Rathjens, George W©, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race", in
Scientific American, April, 1969, pg© 13-25©
34o USIS release, U©8© Embassy, Oslo, 17 September, 1969o
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equally determined to produce such, weaponry© And hy 1969
came American confirmation of "very successful" extensive
Soviet 1ÎIRY tests, and affirmation that the Soviet testing
did concern MIRVs and not merely the less sophisticated non-
individually targeted ÎÆRVs (Multiple Re-entry Veliicles "dropped"
36during descent)© It was at the same time stated as a, fact
that "Both the USA and the USSR already have a limited number
of rockets capable of delivering multiple warheads ready for
37'use? and both are continuing their development^© The 
imminence of major genuine MIRV deployment could not bo 
doubt0do
35o A rocket of a multiple waxhead type was shovm. at the
7 November, 1968, Moscow military parade© No specifica» 
tions were announced© - As noted by Strategic Survey, 
1968, (188? London)? Soviet testing of a. multiple re» 
entry vehicle was reported to have occurred in. August?
1968©
36o Bro John S© Foster, Jr©, US Defense Dept©? Director of 
Research and Engineering, in testimony to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, US Congress? 5 August? 1969 
(text released by Pentagon same day)©
Another official US Government account is less categorical? 
but does confirm that the 889 certainly at least 
"possesses MIRV homing and control equipment, vdiieh in a 
few years vhLll possess sufficient accuracy for the des truc» 
tion of US Minuteman 111 rocket silos"© The same source 
further affirms the much greater size of USSR MIRV war» 
heads. (USIS release? op©cit©)
NOTE Perhaps it ought to "be noted here that probably 
the most useful definition distinguishing MIRV from MRV 
(and one inherent in the above description and the 
following dmagrem),at least for defensive identification 
and monitoring purposes, is that which defines MIRV as a 
missile the re-entry vehicles of which have a lateral 
variation from the flight pi air exceeding a certain number 
of degrees© - A definition of little additional 
conceptual value, but possibly essential within a context 
of arms limitation and control posts (c© as concerning 
SALT)©
37o UBIS Release, ibid©
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Ilie Principle of MIRV may be diagrammed ihnss
Boost phase Mid-course Terminal phase
phase
Individnal rockets 
(vehicles) released 
with boost 
variations of 
10-20 ^/seco
Boost velocity 
a.b ont 5 lorn/ s e c o 
(Compares A 
boost velo of 
II km/sec would 
shoot a vehicle 
ont of the 
atmosphere 
completelyo)
Notes The effect on spread by a difference of 1 m/soCo 
in boost velocity equals
dR
■joaXpiruiit
so CO km
\5cx>
dR = 2V IV sin ;
g(-about lo); dV 3
^ ^gQo meters:
A very considerable spread^ or "footprint'" ^ may hence be 
effected with only very minor velocity variations between 
individual vehicles at the time of their releasco
There were apparently some variations between ITS and 
USSR conceptso That of the USA saw a single guidance and 
propulsion system controlling the velocity of a "bus" from 
which re-entry vehicles are released sequentiailyo The bus 
realligns its trajectory and velocity each time in accordance 
with the desired targeting of the next-to-be released vehicle;
o
Released and 
targeted 
re-entry 
vehicles
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As opposed to this y there were indications that the USSR 
was pursuing the concept of having each individual warhead 
equipped with a separate guidance systemo American comment 
labelled this concept "more cumihersome" and less sophistica- 
tedp^^ but this might perhaps in part be seen as a partisan 
comment y since the Soviet concept's effectiveness- as such 
remained unchallenged:
Released. _____
re-entry 
vehicles with 
self-targeting 
facilitieSo
\
A prime advantage of the MIRV concepts is that the early 
flight trajectory ejection of independently guided re-entry 
vehicles make it possible to discount the danger of an antics 
ballistic missile destroying the booster prior to dispersal# 
This ha,d been a real danger of the "old" MRV concepts#
ÈHRV target accuracy achievable with present technology 
is thought to lie inside a 0o25 nautical mile (350^400 meters) 
radius from the target ("achievable" ultimate accuracy is 
considered to lie within a radius of 30 meters from a, 
targett)^^ This should be related to the impacts, or Idllc^
probability, calculation of U m U h  which, correlates
 ^ accuracy
the effects of warhead accuracy and yield# As evinced by the 
formulas improved accuracy permits smaller warheads for 
constant impact probabilityy and therefore significantly 
lessens the cost of warheads in relation to the booster and 
silo costs#
38>o Newsweek y (Periscope") % 16 June y 1969, quoting US 
"intelligence" sources and official "analysts"#
39 o Ur# Brennan y presentation of evidence released by 
Pentagons, opo cit#
VThe US seemed to have decided on allocating ohly three 
re-entry vehicles to each land based ICBMj, but 10 to each 
Poseidon ( submarine-bas e d missile)# This was on the calcula^» 
tion that a greater concentration in Ian.d—based missiles would 
too significantly increase the temptation for an opponent to 
initiate a pre-emptive strike# The relative invu]n.erability 
of SLBM's 5 however y permitted the installation of a, near 
maximum number of warheads in these without creating similar 
temptations# The correspo.nd.ing calcuiation on the part of tho 
USSR might be presumed to effect similar deployment decisions 
in the Soviet Uni on, although the greater size of the SS9 
might increase the maximum number of warheads which could be 
carried#
One could thus anticipate an early 19 TO s' multiplying
of either side's offensive missile capability by a factor of
between 3 and 10#
OVERKILL: It is illuminating to relate the existing
numbers to such as are considered to guarantee the destruction
of either superpower# Already deployed Sovi.et "overkill"
capacities seem to emerge from Secretary of Defense Laird's
spring 1969 testimony to the US Senate5, that 200 nuclear
warheads of one megaton each vmuld assure the killing of 55^
of the US population# On the other handy he claimed that it
would take 1200 US one-megaton warheads to destroy 45^ of tho
USSR populationy due to the more scattered pattern of Soviet
40industrial and population centres,
40# But see discussion in "The Military Balance 1970-71"% 
which concludes: "To an unmeanurable extent % however 5,
that a,dvantage may be offset by the greater administra­
tive and ideological centralization of the Soviet system^ 
and its consequently greater vulnerability to the 
destruction of a few centres of control#
rv
The comparison might he suspected as being based on 
"maximum efficiency" criteria with regard to Soviets and 
"minimum efficiency" criteria with regard to US capabilities# 
Yet even so it sufficed to demonstrate also US overkill 
capacities^ when account was taken of existing bomber and 
Polaris forces# (Senate Armed Services Committee member G-ore 
shortly thereafter reportedly estimated that there were 4-8 
American strategic weapons for each of the USSR's largest 
citieso^’^)
DEGIUiUATlON FACTORS: But although prima facie calcula­
tions strongly confirmed either power's "overkill" or excess 
force capacity by the late 1960sp there yet remained a. number 
of uncertainties# These ''Degradation factors" could be listed 
as follows:
1# Missile availsbilitys a certain number of missiles would 
probably always be unusable9 through undiscovered technical 
and other faults;.
2# Readiness availability: a. certain number of missiles
might for various reasons, although technically up to 
standard? not be prepared or available for immediate 
firing;
3o launch reliability: launch facilities might dm certain
cases not be ready for action? Cog# due to unpreparedness 
of personnel or equipment;
41o Quoted by The New York Times? 10 April? 1969#
See also eogo Secretary of Defense MeNamara in his 
"Posture Sto" of 1967? pgo 68? regarding the number 
of tactical warheads in Europe# And e # g o  Secretary 
of Defense Laird in "Hearings on Military Posture"?
Commo on Armed Services? House of Representatives? 1969? 
Part I? pgo 2467? regarding the number of Polaris and 
ICBMs#
4o In-flight reliability: -undiscovered faults could negate
the in-flight reliability of a percentage of the missiles; 
h# Remainder after first strikes the calculation as to how
large a percentage of one's forces remain intact and 
available after an initiating strike by an enemy;
60 Remainder after meeting ABM defenses the calculation
as to how large a percentage will penetrate a potential
BMDo
Factors 1-4 could each detract from effective missile numbers 
by? say? 3-20/o Factor 5 could inevitably detract a signifi­
cant percentage? the exact size depending on one's own 
missiles® vulnerability? on enemy intentions? and on enemy 
missiles® yield and accuracy# (It was of course with ‘this in 
mind that US Secretary of Defense Laird warned that the Soviet 
SS9 might be capable of destroying even strong silo-protected 
US ICBMs? and that the USSR might infer the possibility of
crippling US capacities for decisive second strike retaliatory 
42action# Suffice it here to note that the warning was
intended also as a spur to ABM deployment? and to remind our» 
readers that only land-based US missiles were affected#) With 
regard to the sixth factor? ABM developments are treated below# 
But for illustrative purposes one might see this degradation 
as detracting another 3-20/ from effective strength#
42.0 Secretary of Defense Laird? ibid# The Hearings concerned 
BMD authorization# - See also testimony by DroPanofsky? 
Professor and Director of Stanford Linear Acceleration 
Centre? Stanford University (in "Authorization for 
Military Procurement? Research and Development Fiscal 
Tear 1970? and Reserve Strength"? Part 2? Hearing before 
the US Senate Committee on Armed Services? GPO? 
YTashington? 1969% ppo 1129 and 1175) s "It is consistent 
with loiown technical intelligence information on their 
high yields and accuracy on target? that each SS9 missile 
could destroy a Minuteman launch control centre and/or 
silo"#
And see footnote 36? second paragraph#
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One “understands how military calculations of guaranteed 
deliverable weapons? in each case using the maximum degradation 
factor? ma,y leave a "reliable" number of possibly only one 
tenth of the theoretically available missiles# The full 
conversion to MIRV? m t h  its multiplying of utilizable war— 
heads? would consequently appear to be necessary to secure 
second strike capability confidence#
A further consequence of high degradation factors' 
estimates is? of course? that by decreasing missile cost— 
effectiveness expectations? they also lead to an upgrading 
of bomber cost-effectiveness expectations# Competitive such 
have been suggested to emerge if the 'deliverable® missile 
force percentage was judged to be as Iovj as or lower than 
30/c^^ This would lead to pressures for the continuing R & D 
of advanced bombers which would be considered out-performed 
and out-dated vAen faced with more optimistic missile degra­
dation factors® estimates
Finally? to sum up 1970 Soviet postures and capabilities: 
1) The Soviet Union considered that she had achieved strategic 
parity; she furthermore felt confident that she could secure 
its continuation - and she could effectively demand that
43o Hearings on Militairy Posture? Gomm# on Armed Services? 
House of Representatives? 1969? Part II? pg# 4241o
44o "Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year
1 9 6 7 " ?  p g o  35? Hearings? Senate Armed Services Committee? 
G P O ?  Washington? 1 9 6 6 o  See also Bingham? J o B o ?  "Can 
Military Spending be Controlled?"? Foreign Affairs? 
October? 1 9 6 9 %  p g o  3 1 - 6 6 #
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this parity he recognized as the operative hase for any
potential SALT discussions and agreements# 4-5 2) She felt
confident that she had secured forces commensurate with any
need and that she could maintain this stance#^^ Her strategic
targeting options were no longer restricted to counter-city
prospects; she could afford the luxury of integrated counter^ -»
force? counter-city and counter-administration foci forces -
she had secured capabilities permitting an impressive scale of
47hypothetical strike option choices#
5 B Strategic Defensive Capabilities_o_
Before analyzing the BMD problem complex? a few words 
must be said about the radars on which it depends# A hostile 
ICBM can only be detected by land-based rad^r during one of 
a few specific periods of its flight? as indicated by the 
follov/ing diagram:
Y/arhead and 
exploded thrust 
stage
Re-entry
effects
Sound waves
Impact: light? heat? 
gamma, rays? & Impact blast 
effects (relate to attack- 
co-ordination efficiency)#
Warhead and finaB. 
thrust stage
Heat? light? 
ionization
Prefire effects
'^Beismic phe= 
omen a
4-5o Pravda? 7 March? 1970 (Art# "Yashnaya Problema")#
46# Pravda? 5 February? 1971#
47o Sokolovsky? ed#? Yoennaya Strategia? 3rd Edition?op#cit#
Sushlco? NoYuo? and KondratkoVo ToR#pgo 235,
"Metodologicheskiye Problemy leorii 1 Pralctild." ? Yoenlm%^ 
dat? Moscow? 1967% pg# 147#
This' limited range of detection possibilities mnst he 
related to the wide range of nahnral cosmic disturbances  ^ such 
as meteorsp which can induce false radar readingso It hence 
becomes clear why a number of scientists of the late sixties 
believed that (for example) decoys would add a hopelessly
confusing factor to BM'D radar tasks g and malce TMI) designs
, . . , , 18utopran in practices
A further difficulty could be seen in the possibility 
of "a,dvance" high ahtitude atomic explosions^ which might 
have the consequence of completely bla,cking out grouid radar 
capabilities„
But there followed official belittling of both of thoso 
problems? and of the defensive problems posed by decoys and 
separate warheadSo ibid the embarking on the path of HÆB 
deployment indicated that the belittling was backed up by 
considerable confidenceo One reason for this might relate 
to progress being achieved towards the development of satellite 
radars with the capacity to go beyond the detection of the 
firing and bum^^-out phases? and to actually trank a missile'^  s 
flight path a A look-down radar of this type would not only 
be generally advantageous? but would greatly facilitate defense 
aspectally against low trajectory and submarine-fired missiles? 
and against MIRVs (by monitoring their early separation spread 
and the paths of their re-entry vehicles)^ But the prospect 
was one belonging to the 1970so
4©o Richard G-aiw/in and Hans Be the? "Anti-ballistic Ivlissilo
Systems"? Scientific American? March? 19680 Their questic^ 
enable quoting of McHamara (po31) leaves considerable 
room for misinterpretation (see "Authorization for 
Military Procurement — - fiscal Year 1970'% opocito g part 
2 g  p g o  1340)0 But otherwise? the article is both good 
and instractiveo
"Authorization for Military Procurement Fiscal Tear 
1970'% opocitoQ part 1? furthermore contains more optiLoifj-* 
tic evaluations of radar possibilities? as well as useful 
graphs of the various relevant radar types pgpl73-181o 
In this context it should be noted that the use of relay 
stations necessitated by "Forward Scatter" may be made
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The basic radars being utilized in the late ’60s could be 
suumarized as followso There were the "ordinary^ '' BB/IVfER radars 
which penetrated the atmosphere but were limited by the horizon 
linco Then there were the previously referred=to developments 
of Over-the^Horizon radaro This operates on the same principle 
as radiop with radar beams ’’bouncing off” the ionosphere^ then 
to be bounced back off earth relay stationsp with the
pattern Ccipable of repetition until the waves talce on global 
characteristicso But aside from being affected by atmospheric 
false echosp meteors and other ’norma].’ problemsp OTH efficiency 
versus IGBM trajectories is limited by the rockets^ short stay 
beneath the low ionosphere levelo The BH(I¥ES hence remained 
necessary? if only as ”back-up” radarso OîîR and BTOJES 
facilities were? finally? supplemented by infra-red censors 
designed to detect missiles’ boost and burn-out phases (the 
censors were traditionally carried aboard planes flying in 
complementary formations? but increasingly foimi part of 
emerging satellite capabilities)o
4-8 o contndo
superfluous through the development of "Back Scatter" 
(what might be termed a "self-relaying" beam)o
Once detection had been accomplished by a radar facility^
there remained yet other problems* One was? as indicated? that 
with the
associated/definite screening and identification of the
detected object* Another related to the subsequent trans^
mitting of data and interpretation to the officer or body
entrusted with the responsibility to decide on the response»
Then there was the process of sending the decision back through
the same channels? of coordinating its implications into the
mechanisms of the defence? and of initiating consequential
actions* These procedures had of necessity to be talc en in
sequencco And they had to be completed within the remaining
flight-time of the IGHll (under 20 minutes) for AHÀÎ utilization
to-be possible* One does not need to be an expert to perceive
the complexity of the problems involved*
Res-ultant scepticism concerning the potential efficiency
of a BMh clearly motivated early US concentration on other
means of protecting her retaliatory capacities? and her early
spurring of defense in depth concepts* She hence concentrated
for example on increasing the PSl (blast overpressure in pounds
per square inch)? or blast resistance? of silos*^^ By 1969
there were reports that silos capable of withstanding 2--3000
PSI could be constructed; this meant that they could survive
60even close proximity nuclear explosions * But Secretary of 
Defense Laird’s 1969 testimony? that the Soviet SS9 had the 
correlated power/accuracy potential to destroy missiles in 
silosp nevertheless indicated emerging doubt as to the ultimate
49o That the USSR followed the US example and secuyed (at
least some) "hardening" of all their IGBM silo's/testified 
to by Secretary of Defense Laird in "Hearings on Military 
Posture"? Conmio on Armed Services? House of Reps*? 1969s 
part 1? pgo 2467o
50o Dro Brennan? Hudson Research Institute? op* cito
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efficacy of silo-strengthening (possibly also on grounds of
cost)o (And the doubt is supported by the presented impact
calculation? o this formula means that an' accuracy 2 ’
improvement in accuracy by g say? a factor of 2g has the same 
effect as a ten fold increase in warhead yield? or as a ten 
fold improvement in silo blast resistance capacitieSo^^)
BMD scepticism was? however? deeply rooted* The depth 
was indicated by US Secretary of Defense McMamara’s last 
official prediction? th8ii/.n an all-out nuclear exchange in 
the nm,d-70s either power would be capable of inflicting about
120 million fatalities on the other? regardless of which country
62staTUck firsto
BMD sceptics retained confidence in the viability of a 
second-strike capability (the aclmowledged viability of which 
was recognized as the best deterrent)? without a HiD* Their 
logical premise must have related to the impact blast effects 
notation on our diagram on stages of detection possibilities; 
even if individual radar detection fails? then the urnni stall able 
first arrival of a hostile missile would be guaranteed to 
activate reaction procedures* And there would be sufficient 
time for reaction in force* Because quite irrelevant of the 
talce-out capacities of more powerful and accurate rockets? 
attack synchronization problems were alone of a scale to make 
any concept of ideally co-ordinated first-strikes untenablG*
The greatly differing geographical locations of launching 
sites as well as of ultimate targets? and the widely spread
51o See also Strategic Survey 1969? ISS? op*cit* ? pgoiO-53o
52* US Depto of Defense Posture statement for 1968 (including 
fiscal 1969)0 — He must have Icnown the formula
presented above»
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multiple- and independent nature of count-down and targeting 
procedures? ensure that missile arriving times vary consider­
ably* They therefore entail a gn.arantee of sufficient reaction 
time for a considerable percentage of land-based forces to bo 
activated* One could hence rely on a sizeable land-based force 
to survive ? and to supplement(the already sufficiently power­
ful) Polaris and other forces? - to provide continued double-» 
en surged second-strike capabilities* BMD deployment therefore 
appeared to be unnecessary and superfluous*
Ballistic Uissile Defences
Yet in spite of the outlined reasons for scepticism 
regarding BB/iD radar potentials? and in spite of the given 
reasons for confidence in second-strike capabilities even 
without a BIÎD? the USSR nevertheless early demonstrated a 
contrary conviction? by pursuing BMD development* She 
evidently considered pro-BMD considerations and rationales 
as of greater validity* We shall return to these below*
What, was considered to be a primitive ATM (the "Griffon") 
was shown at the 7 Uovember? 1965, Moscow military parade* 
Shortly thereafter an article in Krasnaya Zvezda conveyed the 
definite impression that a partial and probably experimental 
B M D  deployment had already been implemented*^^ The 
following year’s parade unveiled the improved solid fuel 
Galosh? the missile presumed to form the core of early BMD
55o Dr* J*S* Poster? Jnr* (US Defence Dept *)? 5 August? 1969? 
testimony to the House of Representatives’ Foreign 
Affairs Sub-committee? revealed that the US had acquired 
evidence of a tentative BMD deployment avound Leningrad 
as early as 1962? and that this had been followed by 
evidence of some 1964 deployment of an improved ABM in 
the same area* It seemed that this development was not 
followed up? and one might therefore conclude that it 
represented initial experiments rather than a fully-­
fledged "system"*
54o Marshal Baryshev? Krasnaya Zvezda? 13 Hovember? 1963? 
and ibid*
deployment patterns*
5SThere was visible evidence of some deployment by 1966*
What appeared to be the protective domes of a BMD battery’s
radar complex could then be glimpsed from the Leningrad road
north-east of Klin? about 65 miles from Moscow* And what
appeared to be elements of a long-range BMD radar wa,ming
system? such as the huge aerial arrangements? could be seen
from the Minsk road, about 50 miles from Moscow*
Initial American reports specified only Moscow and
66Leningrad as centres of BMD activity* But it appeared
logical to assume that initial deployment patterns extended
also to the protection of at least some IGBM sites» Confirma»
tion that deplojnment patterns did extend beyond Moscow and
Leningrad was finally given by implication in a Mchamara
67statement of 1967» It was further supported by a London
Institute of Strategic Studies assertion thaU existing Soviet
AHÆs were intended for area defense, in particular of the
North-Western BSSR*^^
69The same source characterized the Galosh missiles as 
having ranges of "several hundred miles" and being equipped 
with "nuclear warheads in the 1»2 megaton range"» The AEMs 
were in other words programmed for early and high—altltude 
interception of incoming missiles» The power of their war» 
heads appeared sufficient to disrupt the homing equipment of
55o When this author visited Moscow»
56o As regards the Moscow BMD complex, President Nixon was in 
1969 reported as testifying that it encompassed at least 
67 Galosh ABMs - The New York Times, 15 March, 1969o
5To Secretary of Defense McNamara, at a, San Francisco press 
conference 18 September, 1967? revealed that there had 
been initiated offsetting increases in US ICBMs targeted 
on AB M defended "cities and areas"»
58» The Military Balance? 1968-69» op*cit»
59» Ibido
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hostile missiles at some distance beyond that affected by the 
immediate blast consequences
There was no evidence that initial deployment encompassed 
also greater thrust short-range missiles such as the "Sprint"» 
(This was the missile envisaged as the back-up to the longer- 
range "Spartan" in the limited US BMD authorization of 1969o) 
And there was? furthermore? no evidence of any significant 
expansion of the early deployment patterns during the 
remaining 1960s
Yet this was not logically explained by perceived Soviet 
misgivings regarding BMD potentials» Dormant BMD deployment 
expansion designs were more logically explained by economic 
allocatory decisions subject to? and expected to? change vith 
the late I960 advent of more favourable cost-exchange ratios 
(see below)» A related secondary rationale for the JWD 
development hiatus was to be found in the evident priority 
initially accorded to IGBM procurements and improvements *
Throughout the period Soviet BMD research (as opposed to 
deployment) ? continued unabated* It received funds far in 
excess of equivalent US progrEuiimes* One tangible consequence 
was the unveiling of a more advanced and sophisticated version
60» US News and World Report? 6 February? 1967? pg* 56?
produced a report according to which the USSR had succeeded 
in producing "the so-called X-ray effect in intense pro» 
portions”; with the described result being a neutralizing 
of IGBM guidance equipment and even fissionable material 
at considerable distances from the ABM detonation* See 
also Teclmology Week? 2 January? 1967? pg* 10-12? 
according to which this effect would not be hindered by 
present US vmrhead shielding materials *
61» US Defense Dept* Posture Statement for 1968»
62» See "Non-Proliferation Treaty"? Hearings of the Foreign
Rela/bions Committee? US Senate? 1st Session? 1969? pgo419? 
for Secretary of Defense Laird's testimony regarding 
Soviet BMD R & D and ABM testing» In a, nationally 
televised Washington interview? 9 February? 1969? Laird 
asserted Soviet BMD research allocations to be four times 
those of the USA? and expanded by claiming that this 
represented a seven times greater relative effort when 
related to differences in, GNP»
65
of the Galosh A M  in 1968» This missile had the capacity
to "float” for a while after its talce-off until it had
definitely identified its target ("controlled float");
its propulsion vrould then he re-ignited? and it would he
guided towards the target»There was also the parallel
deployment of new large and improved Anti-Bqllistic Missile
radar complexes? presumed to give sophisticated guidance to
6 6the afore-mentioned Aj3Ms *
A more basic consequence v^ as revealed when the US in 1969
"aclmowledged” that the experience acciuing from early Soviet
research and development efforts provided the basis for a
□ubstan.tive Soviet BMD technological lead» President Nixon
crystallized the situations ”The Soviets have already deployed
an ABM system wliich protects to some degree a wide area
centered around Moscow» We vd.ll not have a comparable capable?
lity for over four years» We believe tha.t the Soviet Union
is continuing its ABM development directed either towards
improving this initial system or more likely, mailing substan^
66tially better second-generation ABM components"»
One should here expand by refuting also the belief that 
the referred“to development hiatus was based on apprehension 
that further deployments vrould precipitate increases in US 
arms procurements» Although this might have been a secondary 
factor? the USSR implicitly stressed that she considered any
63» I b i d o  ("Non-Proliferation Treaty")*
Baird’s Statement of 9 March? 1 9 7 1 ?  op»cit»? postulated 
operational deployment during 1971o
64o "Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System”, Hearings before 
Sub-committees of the Committee on Appropriations, House 
of Representatives? 91st Congress? 1st Session? 1969, 
p g o  10(&llo Aid see Laird’s 1971 St»? ibid»
65o "Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead
Missiles"? Hearings before the Sub-coimnittee on National 
Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committes 
on Foreign Affairs? House of Representatives? 91st 
Congress? 1st Session? 1969? pg» 2 4 4 o
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sucli action-reaction sequence to be unnecessary as she savf no 
necessary causal connection* The view warrants credence in 
view of the fact that she never once objected to early US 
BMD procurement efforts» Prior to the entertaining of 
President Nixon’s "Safeguard" concept for initial US BMD 
deployment^^ she furthermore never indicated that she might 
consider any potential US BMD programme as a danger which 
demanded increases in Soviet strategic offensive forces» Kosygin 
expressly propounded the belief that a BMD was a stabilizing 
development? that is was therefore desirable and that it was 
not something one v^ as interested in banning»^^
A further indication that the USSR did not consider BMD 
developments as necessarily affecting the relative strategic 
balance could be seen in a 1964 statement by Major General 
Talensky» He argued in favour of BMD deployment since this 
v/ould "make (the state’s) defenses dependent chiefly on its 
own possibilities? rather than merely on mutual deterrence"
66-0 President Nixon’s News Conference? I4 March, 1969,
announcing the Administration’s intention to proceed with 
the deployment of a modified Sentinel BMD system, the 
"Safeguard" system* See Keesings contemporary Archives, 
1969=70, pgq 25289*
Also see Secretary of Defense Baird, 9 February, 1969, 
interview? op*cit*
By this time there was also concern that a very large-scale 
expansion of BMD capabilities might be imminent through 
the conversion of anti-aircraft defenses (such as the 
Tallin line) (by the introduction of advanced BMD radars)  ^
See So g o  Baird’s 1971 statement, opocit»
67o Approved by the US Senate after the defeat (6 August,1969) 
of (1) the Senator Margaret Chase Smith amendments (2) 
the Cooper-Hart amendment, op*cit»
680 Statement by Kosygin at Press Conferences in London 
10 February, 1967, and New Y ork, 26 June, 1967*
See also Adelphi Papers, No* 65? February,1970, ISS London « 
footnote 15 of article "Parity, Superiority or Sufficiency".
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( - "that is? the goodwill of other states”) I n
conjunction with the above interpreted Soviet attitude, this
statement may be seen to support the view that should limited
70BMD effectiveness be achieved, and should costs prove 
surmountablej, then a decrease in expected casualty rates 
could, and ought to, be effected through the relevant réallo­
cations of fund-So As long as the resulting casualty 
expectation reductions are not of sufficient order to malce 
consequent expectations any more "acceptable" (say, a reduction 
from 120 to 80 millions), then BMD programmes might be 
initiated through the reallocations of otherwise offensive 
oriented funds; there was no 1 o.gi c alfr e as on why BMD endeavors 
need entail a. d din g to these funds and fuelling the "arms race" » 
See below for a more comprehensive discussion*
It here becomes necessary to present more exact cost and 
efficiency measurement data» One can only judge such as 
presented by the USA, but one may probably presume that Soviet 
data with regard to scientific developments do to a large 
extent parallel those arrived at by the USA for siniilar 
projects»
As to costs, the US Department of Defense presented the 
following calculations in 1967* Pos'ture A related to limited 
BMD deployment and Posture B to a more extensive programme»
69o Major General lalensky, in "International Affairs”,
Moscow, October, 1964a
70o One might here interject a supporting quote from
Dr» Brennan, ”Hea,rings on Military Posture”, before the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Repr*, 1969^ part 1, 
pgo 2189s "One major Russian scientist who closely 
associated with the Soviet missile programme has said (to 
Americans) that effective missile defense is on the v/hole 
probably lealizable”* The stress is Dr* Brennan’s*
See also Sokolovsky, ed*, Yoennaya Strategia, 3rd ed»g 
p g o  361»
Either programme calculation was based on intended early 1970s
71deployment schedules»
Posture A Posture B'
US $ Bill US Bill
Radars (MAE? TACFiAR? PAR? MSP)
Investment costss 6»5 12*6
Missiles (Spartan & Sprint? no 
number given)
Investment costss 2*4- 4*6
Total BOB (Depto of Defense)
Investment costs: 8*9 17»4-
AEC (Atomic Energy Gonmiission? 
fabricating warheads at 
est» cost of US$ 5 mill» 
each» The Postures repre­
sent 2000 and 4000 warheads 
respectively)
Investment costss 1»Q 2»Q
Total investment costs
(exclo E & D) 9*9 19o4
Annual opera/king costss 0»38 Oo74
Uoo of cities with local defense
(ioSo protected) 25 50
These estimated costs may be compared to about $ 50 billion
spent on "normal" air defenses since the Second World War? with
$ 1»9 billion projected for 1968»^^ The first figure included
accumulated operating and turnover costs and might for fairness
of comparison purposes possibly be halved» But even so, the
figures indicated that a BMD? if effective? would reduce
75fatalities to a greater degree and at less costs»
71* UD Depto of Defense "Posture Paper" for 1967? pg* 49
see also subsequent Senate Hearings»
72o See Auiual "Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal
Year ---- "? Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces? 
U8 Senate, US Govt» Printing Office, Washin.<^ ton, D*C»
73o A view forcefully propounded by Dr* Brennan at the 1968
Oslo Conference, op cito
The US Defense Department release quoted above went on to
T4*present the following "cost-exchange" ratios (This is the 
relationship between the cost of the offensive system increment 
needed to offset on increased defensive capability? and the 
cost of the defensive increase needed to offset specific 
offensive systems* It had until then greatly favoured the 
offense* Novf, however? this appeared to be changing) :
For a BMD restricting US fatalities from the otherwise 
expected 100 million plus down to 20-30 million? the cost- 
exchange ratio incurred by a Soviet attempt to offset the 
fatalities’ reduction through offensive increments would look 
like this g
Cost-exchange ratio^
40 million 1 : 4
60 million 1 s 2
90 million 1 : 1
related to a Soviet second-strike (ioSo US first-strike)*
Bluntly - The Soviet offensive increment needed to up US
casualty expectations to 40 million would cost only I/4 of
the US effort» But the Soviet offensive increases necessary
to force a return to the previous status quo of 100 million
expected US fatalities? would incur greater costs than had the
US BMD programme which had decreased the casualty expectations,
The following year the equivalent annual Posture Paper
altered the figure of 100 million» It now anticipated 120
million US deaths to result from any early 1970 exchange? even
if the USA struck first* It was clear that HMD research had
proceeded to the state when a small decrease in casualty
expectations could? at least in theory? be effected at less
cost than that of the offensive increment necessary to effect
74* US Defense Department "Posture Statement" for 1967ppgo 53,
an equivalent increase in enemy casualty expectations; it was 
clear that an invariance of the "value for money" effect of 
defensive versus offensive weaponry now existed in relation to 
a sizeable decrease/increase in casualty expectations; it was 
clear that it was only beyond that level that offensive 
increments became cheaper (the more so the higher the level}» 
There remained sceptics vbo not only doubted BMD opera­
tional efficiency, but who believed that the cost of any 
potentially efficient system vrould increase far beyond prognos^^ 
tications» This did in fact seem likely? as previous 
(offensive) weapon systems had invariably proven more costly 
than anticipated»^^ But no convincing evidence was presented
as'to why a EL\îD system’s eventual costs should exceed estimates
77to a. greater degree than any other new weapon system’s costs»
The BMD estimates might be presumed? if anything? to have
passed more than usually sceptical scrutiny? since they were
presented by a Secretary of Stale who opposed the system’s
deployment (on political grounds)» It appeared reasonable to
presume (as did? for example? Dr» Brennan)? that the cost-
exchange ratio would in fact become more favourable to the
defense» Further technological advances are probably more
likely to be achieved in relation to new weapon-systerns than
79in relation to older ones» ^
75 o Garwin and Be the? in Scientific American.? March? 1968» 
Rathjens? ibido? April? 1969?
And see Senator Jackson’s Senate speech of 6 August? 1969j? 
opocito for a useful list of scientists opposing HMD 
deployment»
Also? see Roi» Rothstein "The ABM? Proliferation? and 
International Stability"? pg» 487-505? Foreign Affairs? 
April? 1968? and G»Mo Herzfeld "BMD and National Security"? 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences? New York?1965* 
Herzfeld’s critique that "any defensive system can re ably 
do no more than raise the entrance price which an 
attacker must pay in order to destroy a target" may of 
course? in the view of later developments and our analysis? 
be seen as misconceived and in fact providing a basic 
rationale for BMD deployment (%)»
Two further statistics? appearing in the Defense Depart­
ment’s 1968 Posture statement? deserve reproduction»
They are to some extent based on unverifiable assumptions 
(cogo with regard to cither’s chosen emphasis of attack)» But 
they provide as relatively accurate a graphic representation 
of BMD potentials as is available»
16o Wnio Co Poster testified? Cogo, to development and
production costs of an IGBM missile increasing from 
TJSS 3o3 million in I960 to US$ 8»75 million in 1965? in 
"Prospects for Arms Control”? pg» 415-455p Foreign 
Affairs? April? 1969*
7 7 *  DoGo Brennan? "The Case for Missile Defense”? p g o  4 5 5 ^ - 4 9 p 
Foreign. Affairs? April? 1 9 6 9 ?  and testimony of same to 
ÎJS Senate ? see "Authorisarion for Military Procurement —  
Fiscal Year 1 9 7 0  —  ” ? op» cito ? part 2 ?  p g o  1558--->1350o 
(Testimony by? Cogo? Rathjens? is to be found just before 
that of Dro j3rennan; testimony by other leading 
scientists are to be found in the same volume) *
78» US Defense Department, "Posture Statement"? January? 1967? 
opocito; and see "Military Procurement? Authorization? 
for Fiscal Year 1970"? part 2? pg» 1410-1414? and 
elsewherco
79* Dro Brennan "Authorization for Military Procurement —  
Fiscal Year 1970"? op»cit»
80o US Defense Department’s "Posture Statement"? January?
1968? pgo 64*
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SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE
US Retaliation at USSR Cities
Expected Expected
US Programme Soviet Response US Fatalities USSR Fata:
(in, millions) (in millii
(S ome) ABMs N one 120 120
Sentinel None 100 120
(Limited BMD 
System)
PEN AIDS 120 120
Posture A None 40 120
(More Extensive MIRV & PENAIDS 110 120
BMD) 4- 100 ICBMs 110 120
Posture B None 20 120
(Even more MIRV & PEN AIDS 70 120
Extensive B MD) +550 ICBMs 100 120
US FIRST-STRIKE
USSR Retaliation at US Cities
US Progromme
Expected 
Soviet Response US Fatalities
(in millions)
Expected 
USSR Fatalities 
(in millions)
(Some) ABMs None 120 80
Sentinel N one 90 80
(Limited BMD 
System)
PENALDS 110 80
Posture A None 10 80
(More Extensive MIRV & PEN AIDS 60 80
BMD) + 100 ICBMs 90 80
Posture B None 10 80
(Even more MIRV & PEN AIDS 40 80
Extensive BMD) + 550 ICBMs 90 80
The US first-strike v^ as postulated as aimed at strategic 
targets? while the USSR first-strike was presumed aimed at both 
strategic and city targets* It must, of course? be noted that 
the actual strategic balance at the time would more properly 
have been represented by an inverting of the first two columns 
(so as to evaluate US attempts to offset Soviet BMD programmes 
through increased offensive forces)*
The graph reflected Secretary of Defense McNamara’s concern 
to show that a USSR BMD programme could be offset through 
offensive dispositions? and that it would therefore not necessa­
rily warrant the building of a US BMD system* But the graph’s
most -unequivocal evidence led elsewhere * It confirmed that a
BÈÆD could significantly reduce casualties*
The second graph related to US fatality rates expected
from potential Chinese attacks during 1975=1980»^^ The
limited nuQiher of missiles conceived of as available to the
Chinese by the mid-1970s was presented as a factor of x» X
82was not specified but could be presumed to represent 10»
Foo of Chinese Missiles 
Expected US Fatalities X 2*5x 7o5x
XTiH E rriiTE i') ^  —  —
Without Sentinel
(Limited BMD) 7 11 15 (25)
With Sentinel 1 * 1 ^  1^2 (1)
X less than one, and possibly none*
Against any possible 1970s Chinese attack prognostications
presented by (as yet) anti BMD officials hence affirmed that
fatalities could be kept to a ’negligible’ total with the
introduction of e'ven a, limited BMD»
Before turniipg to our Strategic Debate analysis, a few
words must be said regarding super-power civil defense (shelter)
programmes, - the more so since they could be seen, and most
often were seen, as necessary adj-uncts to any effective BMD*
At the same Senate hearings vihich examined the Johnson admini-^
stration’s conception of initial BMD deployment (the Sentinel
system). General Wheeler of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared
the followings (Relating to potentials) "A full fall-out
shelter programme should be able to preserve the lives of some
22 per cent of the population^ We are talking in terms of
40 million fatalities in the time frame of 1970»
(With relation to a BMD: ) " — — (if we did not have civil
defense programmes) the So-viets could defeat our anti-ballistic
missile defenses by -bhe tactic of shooting away from the
(defended) target rather than shooting at it*" - That is.
they could rely on the fall-out drifting on to the target*" 
There was? however? no corresponding budgetary allotment of 
consequenceo
In the USSR the sane belief v^ as expressed? that active
civil defense and shelter programmes could limit the effects
of a nuclear (and/or chemical/bacteriological) exchange, and
85thus contribute to national survival» By 1970 she had 
implemented comparatively extensive programs». But they were 
not of the scale envisaged by Wheeler? and did therefore not 
entail the strategic consequence he had referred to* Because 
of this they will be dealt with rather in our analysis of 
military civilian integration (Chapter 8)*
81o Ibid»
The figures in brackets are alterations introduced by 
Secretary of Defense Clifford in presenting the same 
graph in 1969? see "Authorization for Military Procure^* 
ment —  1970 —  "? op* cit», part 1? pg» 52»
82» As it was presumed by Dr* Brennan at the 1968 Oslo 
Conference? op» cit»
83* Military Procurement Authorization for Fiscal 1970",
opo cito? pgo 253=254*
8 4 *  I b i d o  <v p g o  2 5 7  (this author’s explanatory insertion) o
85* Marshal Chuykov? Izvestia? 15 June? 1967? and same in 
Rodina? 3 January? 1968
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50 The Strategic Debate
It appears proper to begin by reiterating our earlier 
conclusion, that the USSR had by the late 1960s achieved a 
dynamic equilibrium with the USA as regards strategic capa­
bilities* There remained American individuals (especially 
military) who insisted on achieved present and necessary 
future US superiority* The novelty emerged rather with 
the appearance of Soviet authorities or individuals who 
insisted on the obverse, i*e*, Soviet superiority (see 
Chapters 0 and 9)* While superficially contradictory, 
such verbal and in part psychologically inspired claims 
might perhaps be judged a natural outgrowth of a situation 
wherein both powers were assured of confidence in their 
ability to destroy the other*
The major debate here referred to accepted the basics 
of the above, and concerned itself instead with the possible 
dangers inherent in the dynamism of the equilibrium*
On the one hand, there were the firm proponents of BMD 
deployment, such as Dr* Brennan* They drew from the re­
vealed data the conclusion that the new cost-exchange ratios 
invalidated all previously elaborated rationales for the 
continued pre-eminence of offensive forces* They claimed 
tha/b the powers’ relative positions could now be maintained 
through vigourous defence programs* And they went on to see 
the traditional offensive-oriented "assured destructability" 
concept as having become "assured vulnerability"* Stressing 
the emerging "invariance" in offensive/defensive procurement
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costs, they concluded that "one dead Russian equals one 
live American"* They demanded that US policy give precedence 
to the latter, and re-orient her strategic thinlcing according­
ly* As concerned arms limitation talks, they based them­
selves on the new cost-exchange ratios, and demanded that 
the desired effects be brought about through reductions in 
offensive, rather than limitations in defensive, armaments* 
They saw a clinching argument in the "fact" that a major war 
was less likely to be initiated if both sides possessed a 
"hea,vy defence" ; this argument related to the view that 
escalatory war was more likely than immediate all-out war*
The presence of a BMD was seen to limit the potentials 
for accidental war, as it promised to provide protection 
from limited attacks* Yet another desirable consequence 
was seen in the fact that it would eliminate "counter-city" 
blackmail possibilities of limited missile exchanges, by 
providing that any successful strike would have to be part 
of a major effort* By increasing the "threshhold", one 
guaranteed that the initiation of hostilities entailed
greater necessary consequences; this was considered in
86practice to mean a more secure deterrent*
Then there were the equally convinced BMD opponents 
(see footnote 75)o They tended, as indicated, to raise 
doubts regarding both BMD cost and efficiency* Yet this 
seemed to be a secondary consideration* They did not so
86» Dr* Brennan, op*cit*
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much refute the above reasoning, as question one of its 
'implicit premises* That is, they doubted whether a potential 
BMD deployment would or could be effected as but a different 
way of ensuring the same relative security* This was because 
they related impressions from the US efforts to counteract 
initial Soviet BMD endeavors through offensive increments, 
with the belief that decision-making authorities had followed, 
and would continue to follow, the advice of "hawkish" military 
advisors* They saw no reason to hope that BMD deployment 
could be initiated on the bases of a diversion of offensive 
funds* To 'the contrary, they were convinced that such 
deployment would necessarily be accompanied not only by 
"normal" offensive increments, but by offensive increases 
based on the desire to counteract enemy BMDs* In other 
words, they thought that the basis, of securing a status quo 
as concerned relative security, would dro'wn in a psychologi­
cally misguided but inevitable arms race of ever-increasing ■
87proportions*
Rather than view BFU) as qualitatively different, they 
viewed it as what might be called a negative offensive incre- 
nent* It was, therefore, seen to represent yet another cycle 
in the action-reaction syndrome of offensive increases, a 
syndrome encouraged by lead-time (research and development) 
considerations* In other words, there was concern that 
either side not only augmented its forces in reaction to
87* See especially Rathjen's article in'Scientific American’, 
April, 1969, opoCito
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actual increases by the other, but had augmented, and possibly 
must augment them, in reaction to anticipated increases by 
the other (on the principle of preparing for the worst***) 
Original Soviet BMD development was seen as possibly 
in part a reaction to the early 60s (and later shelved or 
postponed) American designs for new supersonic bombers* The 
prime reason was no doubt rather part of the Soviet resolve 
to gain strategic parity v/ith the USA* But one caiuiot dis­
miss the possibility that conceived American designs might 
have influenced the decision and/or the urgency* — Further 
action-reactiens were seen as US MIRV development in response 
to Soviet BMD efforts, massive Soviet IGBM build-up and 
Soviet MIRV endeavors in response to the US MIRF program,
88and, finally, US BMD in response to Soviet offensive advances* 
The main fear was that the advent of overkill and 
possibly multiple over-kill capacities might not be accepted 
as guaranteeing the survival of second-sbrike capacities*
They feared that it might rather be seen to make possible a 
"first strike" - a strike so massive as to rule out any 
major retaliation, or at least sufficient to limit survived 
second strike capacities to a tolerable or manageable threat 
for a nation possessing a BMD* While a BMD might by one side 
be considered an essential effort to limit fatality expecta­
tions, the other side was expected to react by introducing 
MIRVs to maintain the credibility of its destructive capacity,
88* See ’Ibid*’ for a good exposition of this belief
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its deterrence; finally, a nation having acquired a population- 
defending BMD might, with the acquisition of MIRV, 'feel 
that it could survive the retaliatory forces retained by 
the other Eifter a MIRV attack* The inlierent temptation to 
attack would be reinforced by apprehension if the other side 
also possessed both weapons systems, - to the extent that a 
pre-emptive strike might be considered necessary in a situa­
tion of mistrust in the other’s intentions
One might further highlight the fears by postulating, 
as did William C* Foster, a full mutual conversion to MIRV,
90with each booster containing a mean of 5 re-entry vehicles* 
Hypothetically this would mean that one booster rocket would 
suffice to destroy 5 enemy silos, each containing 5 warheads,
“ ioCo, a total of 25 warheads* The '*temptation" aspect 
emerges as self-evident (at least as long as the invulnerable 
Polaris/Poseidon type forces are conveniently forgotten)*
The psychological insecurity objection here outlined 
formed the basis for most BMD opponents* views* A number 
of other points were also raised, but most of these could, 
as indicated, be refuted with greater ease* (As concerned, 
for example, the objection that current BMD designs would 
become outdated: certainly, but so would current offensive
system designs, and no cogent reasoning was presented as to 
why this should be signifieiantly more so with regard to the 
BMD * As concerned the objection that while cost-exchange and 
efficiency prognostications might point to one conclusion,
89* See, e*g*, Dr* J*S* Foster's Congressional testimony, 
5th August, 1969, op*cit*
90* Wm* C* Foster, 'Foreign Affairs', April, 1969, op*cit.
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one could not rely on this proving correct without inconceiv­
able operational testing: this appeared equally applicable,
to offensive systems’ penetration capabilities versus a 
BMD ooo) Any analysis of the pros and cons had to allow the 
potential validity of BMD opponents’ fear of a psychologically-
Q 'I
induced vicious circle of arms (and cost) escalation* But
by 1969/70 certain facts, and counter-"uncertainly factors",
had to be considered* We shall treat the latter first*
Following France’s successful building of missile firing
nuclear submarines, there emerged evidence that the stage
had been reached when the relevant technology had become
widely available* In other words: a number of technically
nations could by the late 1960s effect the production of a
Polaris-type submarine, provided only that they were willing
92to invest the necessary funds *'
As Dr* Herman Kalm strongly suggested, this meant that
the super-powers would relinquish their privileged position,
if they did not implement a BMD, - the technology of which
95would remain their preserve for the foreseeable future*
Their positions would be relinquished, since any nation 
possessing even one primitive "Polaris" with ten nuclear 
warheads, would be assured the capability to destroy the 
ten most populous cities of a superpower*
91o As regards the costs, see, e*g*, ’World Military Expen­
ditures, 1966-67', The Economics Bureau of the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, 1969 or 
synopsis, thereof, by A* Alexander: ’The Cost of World 
Armaments', Scientific American, October, 1969, pp* 21-27* 
And see Chapter 8*
See ’Overkill’*
92* Dr* Herman Halm, Director of the Hudson Research Institute, 
at a 9th May, 1969 seminar arranged by the Norwegian 
N*UoP*I*, and attended by this author, presented this a 
the definite conclusion of his Institute’s specialists*
93. Ibid*
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Any second-rate power thus capable of inflicting un­
acceptable destruction could bluff, act, and blackmail as if 
it was a super-power* Any fear as to the potential irratio­
nality of the USA or the USSR would of necessity be multi­
plied by any such situation*
This uncertainty, and the fears induced thereby, can be 
seen as reflected in the apparent fact that the USSR had at 
some time prior to 1969 deployed ABMs in such patterns as to 
also protect against potential Chinese attacks* (See above for 
US Defence Dept*’s efficiency predictions regarding a US "anti- 
Chinese" BMD*) This was revealed in the reported testimony 
by President Nixons"^ "Today their (Soviet BMD) radars are 
also directed towards Communist China"* (Although it must 
be noted that his evidence may well have related merely to 
additional east-directed BMD radar facilities around Moscow, 
or it may have teetered on logical inference only, - logic 
overcoming evidence ***?)
There was another dimension to the uncertainty? that of 
a genuine accident* The position by the late 1960s was such
that some leading scientists considered it very much an acci­
dent that an accident had not occurredl^^ ("Dr* Strangelove")* 
That many of these scientists enjoyed access to classified 
material lent credibility to their assertion* The fact that 
they considered the danger of accidents to be less acute by 
1969s with the introduction of more sophisticated multiple-
94o Pres* Nixon, as reported by ‘The New York Times’, 15th 
March 1969 (per the President's news conference of 14th 
Ml arch, 1969)* And in Secretary of Defence Laird’s 
testimony, ’Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System’, 
Hearings before Sub-committees of the Committee of 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, 91st Congress. 
1st Session 1969, pp. 10-11*
95c Herman Kabn, Op*cit* and ’‘VHiy ABM’ , by Herman Kahn and 
other Hudson Institute analysts, Pergamon Press, 1969*
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control measures and equipment, did not mean that the possi-
96hility either was or could be eliminated*
One might therefore with some confidence declare that the 
uncertainty complex associated with a no-BMD situation, was 
more acute and dangerous, than the uncertainty problems 
focussed on by BMD opponents* Our analysis of attack s^ na- 
chronization problems indicated that even the conceivable 
massive attacks of a post-MIlW era would be most unlikely 
to destroy an opponent's second-strike capability before it 
could be activated* First strike t alee-out success could not 
logically be expected by either super-power's strategic 
experts, - even without considering degradation factors and 
other conceivable difficulties surrounding any initiation of 
attack* The temptation factor therefore decreases, and 
would probably in reality be negligible*
This did not mean that "arms race - temptation" uncer­
tainty should or could be completely discounted* Only that, 
on the theoretical side, a different, and quite possibly 
more ominous, uncertainty, made some BMD deployment appear 
essential* And, on the practical side, there was the fact 
by the late 1960s of the existing Soviet BMD deployment, and 
of the authorization of some US deployment by the US Congress* 
The USSR seemed already to have made the decision that she 
must protect herself against second-ranlc power capabilities 
and against accidents* The USA seemed at the very least to 
have indicated that she leaned towards the same conclusion*
96 * Ibid*
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Buty if the decision to effect a limited BMD deployment 
was thus talc en, and probably irreversibly, on grounds of over­
all security considerations, a nunber of worrying factors yet 
remainedo One related to the refferred-to spiralling military 
costs, a spiralling frighteningly encouraged by military 
authorities' tendency to over-react in their desire to counter 
enemy programmes conceived of as threats to their deterrence 
capabilities* And to anyone sceptical of a nation's strategic 
analysts being proficient enough to perceive the impossibi­
lity of a successful pre-emptive attack, even if this impossi­
bility was dictated by both logic and technology, to him there 
remained indeed a dangerous "temptation" factor inlierent in 
any "arms race"o
There were therefore reasons for hoping that BMD deploy­
ments would be effected to the extent necessary to eliminate 
no-defence uncertainties, - but that they would not be effected 
to the extent where they might mistakenly be conceived of as 
endangering the other super-power's ultimate deterrents There 
was a consequent need for an agreement to this effect, an 
agreement of sufficient mutual credibility to allow for
limitations on offensive arms increases and, potentially,
97to limitations on existing stocks. In other words° there 
was need for an agreement to accept the existing relative
97o An early appreciation of this on the part of some US
G-ovt* quarters is found in the US Draft Treaty of 29th 
April, 1965, to the Geneva "disarmament negotiations"*
It suggested a reduction in offensive strategic forces 
by cutting a substantial percentage from the forces of 
either side in each of two stages* The reductions would 
be effected so as to preserve the relative balance* The 
proposal came to nought (as was probably expected) and 
v/as not followed up* Yet thh indicated thought process, 
hopefully, gestated * * * - see 'Authorization for Military 
Procurement „o* fiscal Year 1970', Op.cit*, p* 1545o
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strategic balance, if possible with a lowered level of 
"guaranteed" casualty-inflicting capacities*
The necessity to accept some approximate of the existing 
relative balance situation was stressed by Kosygin in a
 ^ 98meeting with US Senators Gore and Pell on Uovember 19th, 1968* 
He presented three prerequisites to any proposed arms limita­
tion talks : (1) peaceful co-existence; (2) detente;
(3) avoidance by either power of attempts to acquire positions 
of greater ("superior") relative strength*
The third point referred to President Nixon’s ambiguous 
election campaign pledges that he would only negotiate with 
the USSR from a position of strength* Soviet advocacies of 
the necessity for USSR superiority (see also Chapter 8A), 
represented a clear warning not only that the Soviet Union 
could also play the escalating arms race game, but that 
Soviet military pressures for such would not be resisted 
without a curtailing of the parallel US tendencies* The era- 
of US strategic superiority had to be recognized as at an end, 
and as "non-resurrectable"*
Hence the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) initiated 
in Helsinlci in November, 1969, engendered considerable expec­
tations* At least their very opening indicated wide-spread 
appreciation of the NEED for agreement(s) *** *
98* US Embassy, Moscow, News Conference, 19th November, 1968,
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Overkill. Two factors mest be delineated° one, the 
overkill capacity necessary to ensure kill capability in 
tie minds of defence planners maximizing all factors potenti­
ally detracting from such a capability; and two, the popula­
rized ludicrousness of ’killing the enemy x times over'*
The latter is preposterous* The former is not, although 
it can often be seen to be in danger of becoming the latter* 
Degradation factors (re* missile effectiveness progno­
stications) indicate that the I97O missile numbers might, 
even when correlated with contemporary conversions to MIRV 
capabilities, yet conform merely to the requirements of the 
first type of overkill* One can envisage credible degrada­
tion percentages of such a scale as to make the consequent 
warhead number necessary within the logic of cautious defence 
plannerso But when or if this number is further multiplied, 
as implied in US prognostications of 2500 Soviet ICBMs by 
1974-75,^^ then the logic becomes more questionable*
Even the resultant equation MIGHT be seen to effect 
only the first type of overkill if degradation factors are 
maximized even more, for example through the powers’ develop­
ment of more extensive and sophisticated HMDs than currently 
envisaged* But in this author’s judgement the powers will 
at that juncture have engaged in procurements relating to the 
second overkill category* Present semi-balanced large-scale
99o US Secretary of Defence Laird, Hearings on Military
Posture, Comm* on Armed Services, House of Reps*, 1969 
Part 1, p* 2467*
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offensive forces complemented by a limited BMD are considered 
to be reasonable and/or necessary. But multiplications of 
offensive capacities justified by "hostile" BMD system 
expansions can only lead to a higher level of mutually 
offsetting offensive-defensive increments, leading to the 
same basic balance being retained.
There can be little doubt regarding either power's 
capacity to effect the increases in its own forces necessary 
to offset increments in those of the other. The logic herein 
drives towards a recognition of the present balance, a 
recognition which might permit the balance to be retained at 
a "lower" level (through BMD expansions accompanied by 
offensive contractions)*
It has to be in thus "lowering", without altering, the 
inter-super power balance, while simultaneously assuring 
the Super powers' security and relative positions vis-a-vis 
lesser powers, that one might envisage ultimate SALT success* 
The argument and process is contingent upon a recognition 
of our premise — that attack degradation and synchronization 
problems, juxtaposed with defence dispersal and "second-strike" 
qualities, guarantee against the possibility of either 
achieving a "credible first-strike" force through any con­
ceivable force augmentations of the foreseeable future* But 
the premise is supported by the technological facts*
Over-reacting dilemma* A few additional comments ought 
to be made concerning this related quandary, some aspects of 
which have been dealt with previously* On the one hand there
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are the mentioned inducements to an arms race psychosis 
which are inlierent in long lead times* Research and develop­
ment time demands are such that present achievements may he 
said to have been determined by debates of 5 years or so ago& 
the present debates determine the postures and capabilities 
some 5 years hence. It is in this context that the above 
conclusions take on crucial significance*
The same is true with regard to the other aspect (although 
it is made all the more difficult by it): this is the psycho­
logical inheritance of the past Soviet obsession with the 
need to achieve balance and offsetting capabilities* The 
obsession with the need to eliminate the weaknesses of 
vulnerability might cloud the realization that the task has 
basically been achieved* There is a danger of being so intent 
on reaching parity, as to pass it, and threaten an obverse 
imbalance — with all its arms race connotations* Or to put 
it differently: there is a danger of over-consciousness of •
the strategic quagmire of the vulnerable, to the exclusion 
of strategic considerations affecting the non-vulnerable, 
with the result that when the latter position is attained, 
it may not be accompanied by the appropriate thought and 
plan level* There were, however, indications of appropriate 
political leadership appreciation, - as seen in the SAIT 
negotiations* And this was of greater import than cruder 
military endorsements of the need to pursue no longer realiz­
able, but destabilizing, superiority designs* (See also 
Chapter 8*)
IGHA.PTER 6
Tlie Development of the Navy and the Emergence of 
Soydet Interventionary-Type Forces; The Soviet Navy’s 
Acquiring of Global Capabilities and Perspectives
By 1970 the Soviet Navy had assumed a strategic role
of considerable significance; she had acquired vessels with 
such qualitative combat orientations as did to a considerable 
extent mitigate residual quantitative inferiority; and she 
had developied interventionary-type forces of notable 
importanceo She had achieved world-wide mobility and a 
flexibility of operation and response which covered the 
gamut from strategic warfare to interventionary activity 
in areas not adjacent to the USSR*
Russian desires for such capabilities had been long­
standing* One may for example point to the fact that she 
kept a naval squadron in the Mediterranean throughout most 
of the period from 1769 to 1830* But at no time had she 
previously had the capacity to sustain more than a very 
limited presence in foreign waters*
Even the sizeable second world war fleet had to restrict 
its operations to territorial waters, where it could rely
on land-based air-cover, and concentrate on defence against
2
potential hostile landings*
1* This appears a fair assertion in spite e.g. of her
important assistance to the Royal Navy (then penalized by 
mutiny) before the battle of Camperdown in 1797, in spite 
of her nuisance value during the 19th century (especially 
in the Mediterranean), and in spite of her (Baltic Fleet) 
round the world odyssey to disaster at Tsushima,
27 March, I905,
2o Sokolovsky, VdD*, Marshal, "Voennaya Strategia", 3rd 
edition, Moscow, 1968, pg* 362-363, and see Gmdr*
Me* Guire in Brassey's Aimual, 1969, for a good exposition 
on the limited character of- the Soviet Navy’s tactical 
mobility at the time, and on its reliance on short-range
Q  n  Q  a  O  S 4 -r» -v.-I- ®
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Tlie Cold War saw a considerable bnild-up of the submarine 
fleet, but little else* The maximum expectations that might 
be ascribed were analogous to those relating to the German 
Navy during the war: to foil but not to replace hostile
control of the seas* In fact even such circumscribed 
expectations appeared not to be seriously entertained, since 
the submarine production centered on smaller types with 
restricted action radii* Operational emphasis apparently 
remained limited to defensive anti-invasion conceptions and 
tasks, with enemy control disruption endeavors providing 
merely a secondary consideration*
Yet Soviet recognition of the theoretical NEED for mere 
extensive capabilities was evident as early as the time of 
the Spanish Civil War*^
And the viability of this recognition is evinced in 
Stalin’8 reported remark concerning the post-war Civil War 
in Greece* Despairing of breaking Allied communication lines, 
due to their being protected by the world’s "most powerful" 
nation, he concluded that we have no nayy* The uprising
in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible*"^
3o Kouznetsov, NoG*, Vice-Admiral, ’Naloaiume’ (Memoirs) 
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966: See discussions re* Spanish
Civil War and supply difficulties*
4o Djilas, Milovan, ’Conversations with Stalin’, Pelican, 
1969, pgo 141 (Copyright by Hareourt, Brace & World,
Inc*, 1962)0
One might interject that Stalin did even before the War 
apparently consider it theoretically necessary ultimately 
to build aircraft carriers, heavy surface ships, 
destroyers, U-boats, supply ships, etc*, so as to 
challenge the traditional seapowers* But as with 
Admiral Raeder’s famous Z plan of 1936, the means for 
immediate or early realisation were not available -— *
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One may postulate two reasons why the recognition of the 
advantages of greater naval capacities did not result in 
relevant procurement programs; - why the naval expansion that 
did occur was neither in qua).itity nor quality such as entailed 
the potentials indicated as desirable or necessary by Stalin/ 
Kouznetsovs
a) Insufficient priority in the face of such acute
q
budgetary stress as was publically intimated by Malenlcov*
b) During the late 1950s - early 1960s there was the
further impediment of over-optimistic initial missile procure-
6ment and capabilities prognoses*
But the situation was to change drastically in the 1960s*
7
The early 1962 upgrading of the Navy coincided with emerging 
awareness of missile unreliability (high ’degradation factors’ 
minimizing effectivity expectations) and vulnerability ('1st 
strike characteristics’), an awareness which was encouraged 
or forced by the Kennedy-administration’s procurement 
policies* — See Chapters 3 and 5o The consequent efforts 
to provide the missile forces with second-strike qualities, 
through silo-hardening, increased launch mobility and/or 
dispersal, and more sophisticated missile control and dis­
patch proceduresf may be seen to incorporate and thus cause
5o Pravda, 9th August, 1953o
6o Pravda, 15th January, I960*
To Pravda, 2nd February, 1962, and same, 29th April, 1962*
8* For progress reviews of these efforts, see International
Affairs, No* 11, November 1963, pgo 32,
Pravda, 4th July, 1965, Ogoniok No* 2, 1965, Pravda 19th 
November, 1966*
See also Chapter 3: The Khrushchev Legacy; Deterrence vs. 
General Purpose Forces*
the naval build-up * Far irom having become superfluous in
the modern age^, the Navy was now recognized as an, important
10ingredient of a balanced and secure strategic posture*
Once the basic decision '"-.^d been talceii, however, it
was evidently extended to encourage the development also of
non-strategic naval capabilities* (See below)* And the
changes and procurement developments were soon reflected in
strategic promulgations of note*
The New Navy was no longer to be a mere vc; met to
other service branches * A high stress was pr,: v51. on inter-
service co-ordination and support, but the Navy was clearly
i 1to. be capable also of independant operations * She was 
assigned definite strategic defensive and offensive tasks, 
but was further to be capable of interventionary-tyne action
12
against enemy bases and presumably, by extension, other targets*
And it is significant that such action, whether of a strategic
or a non-strategic nature, was to be accomplished by personnel
trained to operate under and to utilize nuclear conditions
and technology. It was clearly accepted that modern de facto
equipment requirements made a mockery of traditional nuclear/
conventional distinctions; troops and officers were trained
to utilize the implications of such sophisticated nuclear
technology as was making possible 'clean' take-out strikes
11rapidly followed by physical occupation* ^
Giese, Fritz, LtoGmdin, in 'Wehrkunde' (FRG) , October 
1959, reprinted as ’Beh;I.nd the Scenes of the Red Admiralty 
Military Pev' jw, Fort leawenworth. May 1960, quotes 
Sokolovsky'^ comment (to Gorshkov) that the Navy was 
"totally obsolete" for modern warfare* But these were the 
halcyon days of undaunted projections of the implications 
of missile orocureuents*
i-i
12*
1b
Isvestija, 19th May, 1963*
Sokolovsky, rp eit*, pg* 340-341o 
Ibid. pg. 242-243, 246, 344 and 366.
YFinally, there emerged a complementary awareness of 
the potential peace-time psychological advantages accruing 
from the mere oxistence of evident naval capacity* ^ ^
These development trends will he traced in more detail 
below* But it appears propituous first to turn to the
'1 5other aspects of the trilogy of Soviet maritime assertions:
a) A nayy with a striking power surpassed only by that 
of the USA*
b) A merchant marine among the world’s largest and most 
modern, and the largest and most modern fishing fleet in the 
world*
c) A unique program of oceanographic research.
The Merchant Marine: The emergence of a sizeable, modern
and specialized merchant navy is treated also in Chapter 8, 
under ’Strategic Utilization of Economic Factors’* Yet one 
must here note its dynamic development from representing 2^ 
of world tonnage in 1960 to 6,5% in 1967 (about 12 million 
tons d*w*), with an achieved and projected tonnage increase
14o Timofeev, K*, ’The Role of Navies in Imperialist Policy’, 
New Times, 28th November, 1969* — G-un-boat diplomacy- 
possibilities are herein treated in a serious vein and 
as of contemporary significance*
15o This delineation approximates to that presented by Capt* 
Raoust in 'L’Expansion Maritime de l’URSS’, Revue de 
Defence Nationale, Paris, April, 1969; the article 
reported on a 8th December, 1968 Conference at the 
Institut des hautes Etudes de Defence Nationale which 
reviewed our title topic in some detail*
See ’The Changing Strategic Naval Balance USSR’ prepared 
for the Conmi* on Armed Services, U*S* House of Rep.s, 
pgo 13 and 26, for graphs depicting 
aT The rate of Soviet naval expansion, and
b) The relative weight of old vs* new vessels in the 
respective navies*
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rate of about 1 million tons d*w* per year.*^ ^
The fact that a significant proportion of the Soviet
grain purchases from Canada (and, to a lesser extent,
Australia) of 1963 and thereafter had to be transported in
17foreign vessels ‘ , highlighted early Soviet toimage limitations*
facie
There was thus clearly a prima/case for such merchant marine 
expansion as would facilitate minimal self-sufficiency in 
Soviet export-import transport capability*
But having identified this basic strategic consideration 
one must proceed to reflect further on some of the related 
desiderata*
There are the purely political implications of an 
awareness in foreign ports of modern Soviet ships frequenting 
the harbours* The implications are abstract and any defining 
of their scope must be contentious* But one should not under­
estimate the impact of the emerging ’normalcy’ of previously 
unlaiown routines* This will be returned to below*
Then there are the more concrete advantages which accrue 
from not having to submit cargo to foreign scrutiny, whether 
such might be deemed undesirable for strategic, moral or 
other reasons* The military relevance was demonstrated 
during the 1962 Cuban crisis when merchant vessels, evidently 
constructed to accomodate military needs, were utilized for
16* See ’Strategic Bulletin’, April 1969, Btenrikspolitiska 
Institut, Stockholm,
‘Shipping and Society’, 1969, Norwegian Shipping 
Federation, Oslo, and
Carlson, V*, ’The Soviet Maritime Threat’, US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, May 1967, pg* 44*
17* This author was himself temporarily employed on board 
such a vessel in 1965 (a Norwegian vessel working out 
of Vancouver) *
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tlie transport of missiles* And one may perhaps presume 
a continuing utilization of this military capacity, with 
relation e.go to arms exports*
This ability to carry military hardware did of course 
also entail ability to accomodate military personnel* The 
Naval transport capacities later developed provided more 
potent means, but did not obviate the advantages of supple­
mentary merchant marine facilities. These remain an impor­
tant adjunct to Soviet strategic capabilities*
The Fishing Fleets Captain Raoust succinctly delineated
the relevant factors of contemporary and abiding significance.
After describing the Soviet merchant fleet as "the most
modern in the world" and as operating on "all seas", he
continues: "In a normal period 400-500 fishing vessels are
concentrated in the North Atlantic. They may repair to
Havana where a base has been specially constructed with the
aid of Soviet capital and technicians as with the merchant
fleet (it) is utilized equally for military-political
ends such as control of occidental manitime activities
 o But above all —  sonars utilized for the detection
of fish may also no doubt be utilized to detect larger
objects. It is not implausible to infer that Moscow laiows
the deployment of American Polaris submarines nearly as
19accurately as Washington."
18. See e.g. Wolfe, t., ’Soviet Quest for More Globally 
Mobile Military Power’ , RAND Memorandum RM 5554, pg* 1 
Santa Monica, Gal., December, 1967*
19. Raoust, op.cito
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A NATO source goes further: "The Soviet ’fish-factory’
ships and trawlers now range over the world’s oceans, and 
it is significant that a large proportion of them are out­
fitted for intelligence gathering. They carry comprehensive 
monitoring equipment and highly sophisticated electronic 
gear* Their speed is often in excess of that usually 
associated with such craft. It is not unusual for such a
trawler to attach itself to NATO formations during exercises
20as an «— - extremely persistent observer."
A determining of the extent and utility of data thus
derived by the USSR necessarily rests on educated guesswork.
But that it is substantial may be inferred from Fleet
Admiral Kasatonov’s assertion that: "an important role in
•he securing of bases and combat operations is executed by
aid vessels of various types" (i.e. electronically-equipped
21merchant and fishing vessels — .
The Oceanographic Research Programme: The same Revue de
22Defence Nationale source stated categorically that by 
1968: "the number of (Soviet) research vessels (of various 
types) ——  is greater than the combined number of ships 
performing analogous missions for all the other nations of 
the world". Accepting this correlation as accurate, the 
import is clearly relevant to an investigation of Naval 
capabilities.
20. "NATO, Facts and Figures’, pg. 80, NATO, Brussels, 1969; 
and see also ’Defence Policy’, pg. 24, NATO Information 
Service, 1969*
21. Krasnaya Zvezda, 27th July, 1969*
22. Raoust, op.cit.
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Most scientific data, such as relating to ocean floor 
contours and ridges, ocean currents, ocean salination and 
temperature levels, and ocean marine life, may be utilized 
by Naval authorities engaged in sub-surface-activities* 
Furthermore, as with the fishing fleet, one might expect the 
presence on board of electronic and other equipment intended 
for the discovery, tracking and supervision of hostile vessels* 
Such vessels might be photographed, their electronic equipment 
(radio, sonar, radar et all) tapped, and their activities 
audited*
It was presumably Imowledge of this activity which 
prompted Admiral Rickover to suggest that the USSR would by 
the mid 1970s possess the knowledge and techniques necessary 
to destroy the U*S* Polaris fleet*^^
This appears to be an exaggerated evaluation of an 
emerging situation of US loss of non-vulnerability* A glance 
for example at the National Geographic Magazine's charts over 
the Indian Ocean (1967), the Pacific Ocean (1968), and the 
Atlantic Ocean (1969) floors would indicate that a proportion 
of a nuclear submarine fleet ought to succeed in finding a 
safe haven among the myriad ridges (North-South in the first, 
East-West in the latter oceans)*
But the programme’s aid to Soviet anti-U-boat tracking 
and killing capabilities and its general contribution to 
such knowledge as required by the expanding surface fleets, 
must nevertheless be of a considerable scale*
23* ’Defence Policy', NATO Info* Service, 1969, op.oit*
24* In giving witness to the Armed Services Committee,
transcript appearing in the New York Times, 15th June 
1969*
XTlie Navy: The qualitative and quantitative innovations
which signified the end of the deliberate or forced defensive
in
strategy previously/operation were plainly evident by 1965 - 
660 The Navy Day propaganda of July 1966 stressed the 
Soviet Union’s new stature as "A Great Naval Power", and 
announced the end of the "complete domination of the seas 
by the traditional naval powers"* The assertion was hasty 
with regard to contemporary force balances, but significant 
as a statement of intent* And it further reflected the 
results of the substantial infusion of funds into Naval 
developments and the priority rating of such, both of which 
may in view of development-time demands be dated back to 
early 1962*
This dating of the initiating efforts is furthermore 
suggested by a consideration of the basic requisita that 
had to be provided even before any particular procurement 
design could be envisaged* General ship-building, dock, and 
dry-dock facilities had to be expanded and modernized, and 
the communication networks within, to and from ports had to 
be improved*
Yet even the amphibious forces development had by 1963
reached the stage when suitable landing vessels (of the
Alligator and Polosny classes^^) were being produced, and
27marine infantry formations had been established*
25* Petrov, Vo, 'Soviet Canals’, U.S* Naval Institute
Proceedings, July 1967, pgo 32-44o
26* The Alligator - about 5OOO tons d*w*
The Polosny - about 900 tons d*w*
27o NATO Letter September 1970, pg* 20-22*
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By 1965 the developments were referred to extensively
in the Soviet press* One now possessed "high speed landing-
craft (carrying) ground units and marines with all their
28light and hea^ ry equipment, including missiles"*
By 1967 there were the first public demonstrations of 
mock amphibious manouvers and operations (with Polosny craft 
each carrying two amphibious tanks and four amphibious 
armoured personnel carriers)*^^ And there were the first 
public parades of specialist naval infantry (’marine’) 
forces*^
The trend was thereafter evinced by more and more
frequent and detailed articles dealing with amphibious
d 1operations, training and techniques*
As concerns the regular surface, and the strategic 
fleet, qualitative innovations will be returned to below*
But their implication.(if not their scope) was forced on 
world awareness by the 1967 sinlcing of the Israeli ship
28* Ogoniok, 25th June, 1965, pgo 47
29o On 1967 Navy Day near Leningrad, - witnessed by a 
colleague of this author*
50* At the 1967 7th November Moscow Parade : - numbers
estimated as 8000 by 1968, 12000 by 1969 and 15000 by 
1970 (’The Military Balance’ 1968-69, and 1970-71, ISS, 
London*)
See also Norwegian Minister of Defence Grieg-Tidemand, 
Parliamentary Debates, Oslo, 29th October, 1968*
31o Log*: Krasnaya Zvezda, 24th June 1969, pictured landing 
craft nudging ashore, emitting amphibious tanlcs; 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 3rd August, 1969, carried pictures/ 
stories of amphibious operations;
Krasnaya Zvezda, 2nd November, 1969, did same (Amphib* 
tanlcs and personnel carriers were on or reaching a 
beach with marines storming on; the mother ships lay 
100 yds to a mile off shore);
As did also Tass, 29th April, 1970 (Extensive report on 
Rubachi landing exercises, - as one aspect of the world­
wide Okean exercise)*
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Eilat by a missile from an Egypt fan-in armed Komar class
Patrol boat, — - so nmcli so that it immediately sparked
off NATO efforts to develop similar weaponry for member
naviesn "The seriousness of the Styx missile problem
is evident in that no surface-to-surface missile system
with an adequate range is in general service with the US
Navy or the navies of Allied countries — - Naval forces
must drastically alter operating procedures". ""^ /^ Put
quantitative developments must here be referred to.
Mediterranean trends were among the most easily ascertainable,
and were illustrative. Thus according to one authoritative 
34-sOurce: "Between 1963 and 1966 Soviet Mediterranean
forces increased tenfold"* Soviet submarine operating days 
in the Mediterranean were asserted to have increased 2000% 
during the same period. One 1969 survey ascertained that 
"the number of Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean varies 
between 25 and 50 and has included vessels which can land 
tanks and a helicopter cruiser"another evidenced the
32* The Penguin, developed in Norway (with which this author 
became acquainted while working for Norway’s Defence 
Research Establishment), and the Exocet, developed in 
Prance (see e.g. Le Monde, 31st May, 1969, and 31st 
July, 1969, for comment), are sea-to-sea missiles thus 
being developed.
“• And see US Fiscal. Year 1969 Navqr Budget Posture St., 
pgo 1 and 7, for description of the Sea Sparrow 
tentative anti-ship-to-ship missile.
- See also Revue de la Defence Nationale, Paris, Jan* 
1968, for further comments *
53o "The Changing Strategic Naval Balance", pg* 20 -
prepared for the Comm* on Armed Services, U*S* House of 
RepSo, December, 1968*
34o UoSo Ambassador Harland Cleveland in NATO Letter,
Nov., 1967, Brussels*
35o "The Military Balance 1969-70’, I*S*S*, London, 1969,
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fact that the over-all Soviet naval expansion had already
made her navy "larger than all the Navies of Western Europe 
36put together".
The Soviet Navy’s combat potential clearly remained 
severely restricted when compared to UoS. Naval capacities. 
But it had equally clearly already acquired a status which 
enabled it to entertain a far wider policy option spectrum 
than ever before. This may be illustrated by the following 
survey.
Four credible potential action-initiating scenarios 
relevant to a Navy such as the late 1960s Soviet Navy may 
be schematically delineated:
1o - Is the type represented by the limited 1961 British 
landing in Kuwait; - a landing in support of a friendly 
regime feared threatened by foreign intervention (in this 
case from Iraq).
2o - May be exemplified by the 1958 UoS. venture in Lebanon; 
- a landing to stabilize a perceived friendly regime at 
times of internal political disintegration, the consequences 
of which are feared* Analogous operations might of course 
be initiated to encourage or stabilize the fortunes of a 
friendly power faction engaged in utilizing the political 
disintegration (Thus for example Soviet Ships in Latakia at 
the time of a hypothetical Syrian G.Po coup attempt could be 
decisive* Quite apart from limited interventionary support 
potentials, the mere providing of an escape route could be
36* Western European Union Report prepared by Mr* Griffiths, 
Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, surveyed 
in NATO Letter, June 1969? pg* 2 - 7*
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sufficient, in that it would encourage coup leaders to
’hang on' through the crucial hours/days following a 
N 37seizure --o)
3o “■ May he seen as 'gun-hoat diplomacy’, a modern example 
of which was provided by the DRK’s seizure of the Pueblo in 
1968»^®
4o - The last scenario complex is that encompassing symbolic 
actions designed to lend conviction to national policy; - 
manouvers, deployments and redeployments are tools at hand.
These may be contrasted with three action-deferring 
scenario complexes for which the resources of such a Navy 
suffice:
1o - Is represented by the 10th July, 19674 arrival of 
8 Soviet warships to Alexandria and Port Said (in conjunction 
with the Arab-lsraeli War), and their possible role in 
deterring any design for crossing the Suez canal that Israel 
may have envisaged. (The Soviet Admiral in charge announced 
that his command might join the Egyptian Armed forces in the 
face of aggression across the cnnah.) Or one may point to 
the analogous Soviet Naval presence in Alexandria at the 
time of the sinlcing of the Eilat, - as having been instru­
mental in deterring Israeli reprisal schemes  --?
2o “ Might be illustrated by referring to the spring 
1969 unrest in Lebanon, - a situation resembling that of 
1958: in 1958 the USSR had protested vociferously but to
37o This potential scenario was elaborated on by James Cable, 
of loS.S.y in discussion with the author on 4th February, 
1970.
58. See also Timofeev, K., op.cit.
39o This classification matured and profited by the mentioned 
discussion with J. Cable, op.cit.
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no avail against the U*S* intervention; in 1969 she merely 
warned mildly that any similar sequence of events would be 
opposed* The consequent UoS* denial of intent appeared 
genuine, but any such intent would otherwise certainly 
have been strongly affected*
5* - May be seen in the (in this case possibly coinci­
dental) deployment of one Soviet Naval Squadron west of and 
one east of Libya at the time of the 1969 revolution* This 
would necessarily have caused concern to any Western inter­
vention scheme had such been envisaged *
As this survey indicates: a belittling of Soviet capa­
bilities was not only becoming militarily dubious, but it 
might be seen per se to represent a misconception* It thus 
appears clear that the political value arises from the mere 
capacity to assest a presence, and is not contingent on 
relative military s brengths (except at a time of general 
conflagration)* Thus an elaboration of the second action- 
deferring scenario example would see political considerations 
exaggerate the effectiveness of a militarily inferior Soviet 
flotilla stationed between potential interventionary force 
vessels and the cost — -* It is the political value which 
is strategically relevant in times of peace*
The capacity to show face was therefore a crucial
extension of earlier capabilities: by the late 1960s the
emerging forces already sufficed to initiate significant 
supporting and diversionary action*
One final illustrative example may be treated with 
profit, namely the impressive scale of the Soviet link-up 
manouvers - followed by simulated 'landings' on the Kola
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peninsula - around the Norwegian coast, after the intervention 
in Czechoslovakia. The size and character of the forces 
involved, including amphibious forces, escorts and air-cover, 
was impressive enough to cause serious concern in the 
Norwegian government. This was evinced by the subsequent 
address to Parliament by the Minister of Defence. He dwelt 
at length on the fact that "the Soviet Navy, which is today 
the second largest in the world, is constantly being expanded 
with, (inter alia), new rocket cruisers, nuclear submarines, 
helicopter carriers and amphibious landing vessels. The 
increase in anphibious capacity, that is in landing vessels, 
coincides with the establishing and expanding of marine 
infantry". This was followed by a documenting of similar 
recent Soviet maneuvers in the North Barents and Baltic Seas.^^ 
The psychological novelty of finding oneself potentially 
interred BEHIND established enemy front-lines necessarily 
enforced a profound re-evaluation of policy concepts
The last part of the decade witnessed a dynamic fur­
thering of these trends. Three strands might be differen­
tiated: strategic/missile developments; amphibious capability
patterns; and world-wide mobility/flexibility achievements.
The dynamic aspect is perhaps that on which attention 
ought to focus with regard to all three. It may tentatively 
be documented with the following quote by Lord Balniel,
British Minister of State (opening the Parliamentary Debate
40. Minister of Defence Grieg-Tidemand in Parliamentary 
Debates 29th October, 1968, Oslo.
XVII
on Government Policy of 19th November, 1970)^^: "Five
years ago the average number of Soviet vessels (in the 
Mediterranean) was 3 surface warships, 3 submarines and 
10 auxiliaries. This year it was 24 surface ships, at least 
13 submarines and 24 auxiliaries -— * Five years ago there 
were no Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. This year 
there were 7 surface warships, at least 4 submarines, and 
9 auxiliaries. — The Soviet Union builds a nuclear sub­
marine every 5 weeks."
As concerns strategic/missile developments, the 1967
missile sinking of the Eilat was soon demonstrated to have
been not merely indicative of experimental endeavors, but
to have been illustrative of a conscious, all-embracing and
novel combat orientation progranmie. By 1969 it was clear
that the Soviet Navy had engineered a near-total conversion
of its vessels' armaments from artillery to rockets.
Developed vessels only retained such small-caliber cannons
(37. cim) as could not effectively be utilized under conditions
of general combat; they could no longer even theoretically
4-2engage in so-called conventional conflicts. It became 
abundantly clear that (nuclear) missile technology would be 
utilized even in local combat constellations, where these 
vessels were involved.
41o From the Guardian's Parliamentary Report of 20th 
November, 1970*
42. Bundeswehr’s 'Soldat und Technik', No* 11, 1969,
pg* 626,
and same, No* 4, 1970, pg* 198 - 199»
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By 1970 new warships were apparently no longer equipped
even with symbolic concessions to old conventional theories;
the Kresta II class destroyer had no ascertainable conven­
irtional armament at all, - only missiles.
Even the limited helicopter complement (one or more) of
these vessel types appeared uniquely oriented towards missile
technology considerata, as they were most probably conceived
of as helping to provide "self-contained target location
beyond the radar horizon"
And it was within this context, of ever-increasing
evidence of unprecedented qualitative innovations towards
the effecting of a totally missile-oriented fleet, that the
world-wide Okean manouver of that year took on increased
4-3significance. Thus the manouver deployment patterns , when
4 6co-ordinated with missile radii data , strongly indicated 
that a prime exercise aim related to deployment and disposi- 
tioning for global atomic warfare. And if this correlation
45o Ibid, No. 10, 1970, pg. 566-570; Concise article on
•Neue und Modernisierte Kriegschifftypen der Sowjet- 
Flotte'5 with accompanying, detailed and confirming 
photographs.
See also The Military Balance 1969-70, op.cit, for 
lists of various vessel and missile types.
NOTE also the 3500 ton gas-turbine rocket destroyer 
%NATO codenamed KIIIVAK DDCl) which 'appeared* in the 
spring of 1971? - embodying the new theories' total 
practical implementation. No equivalent vessel is 
either serving or (as yet) projected for service with 
any Western navy.
44o As suggested by Erickson, John, in 'Soviet Naval Presence
in the Mediterranean', Bulletin of Soviet and East Eur. 
Jewish Affairs, No. 3, January, 1969, pg. 9 - 15a
45a Soldat und Technik, op.cit., No. 8, 1970, pg. 428-451,
and same No. 9, pgo 500.
46. Ibid, No. 7? 1969, pg. 381 - see graph relating to
capabilities of Soviet Sark, Serb and 3rd generation
missiles (respective radii: 1500, 2000 and 3000 plus km).
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of the evidence is accurate, as appears indubitable, then 
Okean may well be seen to augur a new naval era. It will 
be returned to below.
As concerns amphibious capability patterns one ought
perhaps to turn first to the helicopter carriers which were
4-7being produced by the late 1960s , as they impinged on a
wide gamut of strategic thinking.
Their initial assignment related to the defensive 
strategic purpose of submarine tracking and killing.
Their contingent of 36 helicopters might hence be presumed 
oriented towards this role, as well as towards performing 
tasks analogous to those of the helicopter(s) of the regular 
cruisers. But they could clearly also be utilized by the 
marine infantry for purposes of sea-borne landings ~ then 
presumably divided into 3 echelons of 12, in accordance 
with traditional Soviet tactical preferences (see below).
The limited character of the force potential lessened the 
likelihood of its use against organized land forces of 
significance. But it entailed considerable consequences 
within scenarios such as were traced above.
The helicopter-carriers had furthermore been developed 
after a lengthy and sceptical consideration of the modern 
role and utility of traditional aircraft carriers. Admiral 
Chabanenlco had declared these to be "extremely expensive
47o Two were commissioned during 1968/69*
- See the Military Balance 1968-69 and 1969-70, op.cit,
48. Krasnaya Zvezda, 28th May, 1969, carried a picture of 
the first helicopter carrier to be commissioned, the 
Moslrva, with a caption defining it as an anti-U-boat 
cruiser.
See Sokolovsky, op.cit, pg. 363; hostile subs, and 
aircraft carriers are defined as prime targets.
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giants of very doubtful efficiency" M s  Gmdr. in Chief
Gorshkov had stated flatly that they were "eight times the
cost of an atomic submarine", and strongly implied that
50they were in reality much over-rated sitting ducks. The
51cost scepticism was born out by relevant UoS. estimates ;
the effectivity scepticism must, in view of the referred-to
combat re-orientation programme, have been born out by
achieved missile performance standards.
Yet there was no doubting Soviet awareness of the need
for air-cover for distant operations. It had to the contrary
been emphasized ever since the inception of the naval expan- 
52Sion efforts. But overall cost-effectiveness considerations
had evidently dictated reliance on "long-range missile avia-
55tion" based on land.
In consideration of this strong awareness (footnotes 52 
and 53)? it would be logical to assign considerable causal 
influence, as relating to the helicopter carriers, to new
49o Literaturnaya Rossia, No. 30, 25th July, 1969*
50o Isvestia, 19th May, 1963*
51 * U.S. News and World Report, 9th September, 1969, asserted
that the U.S. Navy spent about 40% of its funds in 
supporting its strike carrier program and activities.
52. Sokolovslcy, op.cit., pg. 246, lists the co-ordination of
the activities of missile-carrying vessels, missile subs 
and missile-carrying planes as the essential requisita 
for action against distant hostile bases and territories.
53o Ibid, pg. 344o
And see Krasnaya Zvezda, 27th July, 1969, op.cit.
- This was obviously why "some people, previously and 
at present continue to fight for the construction of 
aircraft-carriers". - See Admiral Gorshkov in Morskoi 
Sbornik, February, 1967? pg* 19*
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aviation developmentso It was in 1967 that an all-jet
Soviet VTOIj (vertical talce-off and landing) fighter was
54-first unveiled in publico
And it therefore appeared most probable that some 
advanced version of this VTOL was intended for assignment 
to the helicopter carriers by the early 19708* Aircraft 
carrier needs would thus be obviated, - with the sought- 
after advantages of air-cover flexibility being provided 
by cheaper vessels of probably superior mobility and 
flexibility*
Meanwhile the general emphasis on amphibious capacity 
was, as already mentioned, becoming ever more pronounced, 
with self-evident implications also for the auxiliary tasks 
of expected future ’helicopter-carriers* * One may again 
with profit turn to ’Okean’, in conjunction with which there
55were extensive amphibious exercises on the Rubachi Peninsula*
The landings of marines were specifically stated to have
been co-ordinated with missile firings, and to have been
witnessed by an impressive array of prominent Armed Forces 
55personalities o
54o “ At Romodjevo, 8-9th Au^st, 1967, the VTOL showed
similarities with the British Hawker Siddley Harrier,
- the only Western equivalent*
- A first prototype model, a plane-helicopter with 
motors on the wingtips and rotors placed above these, 
had been demonstrated as early as 1961, at the (Soviet)
Tushino Air Show, 9th July, 1961*
55o Tass, 29th April, 1970*
56o Ibid,
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One must again emphasize the implied ’nuclearisation’ 
of the forces involved: "All branches of the Soviet Armed
Forces are now equipped with nuclear rocket weapons, per­
fected electronic equipment and other material of the 
57newest type*" '
The amphibious forces themselves were to bo operationally 
flexible* They plainly entailed potentials for local inter- 
ventionary-type activities* But they were also assigned a 
definite strategic-orieiited role* They were to utilize 
(clean) nuclear take-out strikes against hostile points, and 
be able to proceed quickly to occupation of the site(s) and 
remaining facilities: "In maritime regions — - naval fronts
— - will taXe advantage of the results of missile blows of 
strategic significance complete the destruction of the
enemy’s forces, (and) occupy his territory"
Attention must now be reverted to the world-wide 
mobility/flexibility factor*
A NATO source indicated the tendency: "(The Russians)
have intensified their surveillance of all maritime activities 
west of Bornholm* From a tentative start some years ago, 
there is now a constant and wide coverage of the Danish 
Straits and aXl waters leading to it by Naval and specialized 
surveillance vessels"* And it appended a chart of ’Soviet 
Naval Exercises 1960-70’ which displayed the increasing out­
ward thrust and extending of regular Soviet maneuver patterns: 
from Baltic and Arctic Seas, to North Sea, to Icelandic
57o Marshal Eutalcbov, in Krasnaya Zvezda, 17th May, 1969 
(this author’s stress)*
And see Adm. Kasatonov, in Krasnaya Zvezda, 27th July 
1969, op.cit.
58. Sokolovsky, op.cit., pg. 340.
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59waters, and. then to mid-Atlantic maneuver settings*
But Soviet sources were themselves equally car.did in
describing the extending of their naval activities into
distant oceans and p o r t s F l e e t  Admiral Kasatonov was
quite explisit in a 1969 exposition on the extensive naval
qualitative and quantitative build-up, an exposition which
went on to describe the extending of naval operational
patterns until these cEime to cover all major o c e a n s A n d
6 2other sources were unequivocal in asserting Soviet rights,
and in emphasizing that the developments would be continued
65and were not to be regarded as transient phenomena*
A 1970 chart^^ over recent Soviet maneuver patterns in 
the Mediterranean does as a consequence talce on increased
59o NATO Letter September 1970 (pg* 6-11, for described 
charts)*
60* See e*g* Izvestia, 3rd September and 1st October, 1969;
Krasnaya Zvezda, 15th May, 1969, which deals with the
return of a fleet just completing a 7 months cruise of 
African and Asian, ports; - or Admiral Gorshkov, in 
Pravda, 27th July, 1969: "Units of the Pacific Fleet 
have just returned from a 6 months cruise in the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans, covering more than 50*000 miles and 
visiting 50 different nations"* And note their prOotemp* 
achievements in constructing floating docks and complex 
logistic and supply depots off sheltered coasts; See 
Murphy, F*M«, ’The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean’,
UoSo Naval Inst* Proceedings, March, 1967o
61o In 'Starshina Serzhant’ No* 7? 1969*
62* See Kolosov, L*, in Izvestia, 11th November, 1968*
65* See Admiral Gorshkov in Ogoniok, 3rd February, 1968*
64o ’Soviet Mediterranean Squadron’, - Declassified chart of
wirich Soviet vessels visited the Mediterranean, and for
what length of time, during 1968-69, The Ministry of 
Defence, London, January, 1970*
- And see evidence regarding rapid turnover in operational 
commands and short tours of duty, presented in the 
Bulletin of February, 1969, of the Munich Inst*, for 
the Study of the USSR*
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significance* It clearly indicated that short tours of 
duty and frequent rotations as between Northern, Baltic and 
Black Sea Fleets were standard* The Mediterranean Fleet was 
thus shown as probably not being a separate unit of defined 
ships and crews* One rationale might be that Mediterranean 
duty was seen as a compensation or reward for more trying 
duties elsewhere, due to the advantages of climate and ports 
of call, as well as to the professionally stimulating(?) 
shadowing of the U*So 6th Fleet* But it appeared a fair 
inference that a primary or auxiliary rationale was a pro­
gram in process, to train rapidly expanding Navy personnel 
cadres in as diversified tasks as possible* This inferred 
demand for experienced cadres does of course support, and 
is supported by, the above evidence that new ships and com­
mands would be developed — - in accordance with the described 
dynamic trends of previous developments*
’Okean’ may again be seen as a turning point: - this 
time as the first manifestation of the world-wide nature and 
range of the new Soviet Navy* Over 250 ships participated,
deployed over every major ocean, as well as up some of the
65major rivers, of the world* In the north: "Ships and
65o See e*g* Pravda, 14th, 16th and 20th April, 1970, 
or Izvestia, 14th and 17th April, 1970*
- For Western reports, see e*g* The London Times, 
25th March and 24th April, 1970*
The Guardian, 25rd April, 1970, or the Sunday Times, 
26th April, 1970 (for interesting radar photograph)' 
“ For good synopsis, see Soldat und Technik No* 8, 
1970, pg* 428 - 431.
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submarines moved back and forth between the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean in a display of rapid redeployment and rein­
forcement available to meet the requirements — meant to 
tell NATO that the Soviet Navy can operate wherever circum­
stances dictate, be that by their choice or NATO’s*"^^
And it finally served also to highlight Soviet awareness 
of political considerate and potentials, - of the psycho­
logical import of political appearances* Thus the manouver 
was not wound up by the prompt return of participating vessels 
to their home bases or routine patrols* Instead they dis­
persed to a variety of 'neutral' harbours around the world; 
a flotilla of smaller warships even went up the Danube to 
Vienna —
CONCLUSION:
Combat potentials: The qualitative novelty of its
combat orientation not only mitigated residual quantitative 
inferiority, but did, in conjunction with the high priority 
quantitative expansion efforts, entail Soviet Naval potentials 
of an order far above that generally appreciated*^^
Peace-time implications: Two quotes may serve to
synopsizc our tenet: - "Navies are not created solely to 
fight other navies* Sometimes we loose sight of this fact*
660 NATO Letter, September, 1970, op*cit* (Testimony by the 
Supreme Allied Cmdr*, Atlantic)*
67o Soldat und Technik, No * 9, 1970, pg* 500*
680 Cmdr* MCoG-uire's Guardian feature of 26th August, 1970? 
perpetuates this now outmoded underestimation (although 
this may be explained by contemporary political con­
siderations; the article discussed Soviet interests only 
as related to the UdCo South African Arms Debate)*
- Compare with SACEUR General Goodpaster's October 1970 
interview; see e*g* Aftenposten, 29th October, 1970, Oslo*
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Navies are also instruments for the projection of national 
power, when circumstances require us to he strong in distant
It g q
places* - And: " — - it is no longer possible to keep
military and political considerations in separate water-tight
compartments --- whatever may be the military assessment of
the significance of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean — -
the presence of this fleet is having a profound effect on
men* s minds — it is contributing significantly to the rise
of Soviet influence
There was thus a considerable kernel of truth in, for
example, the propagandistic Soviet assertion that her
Mediterranean Fleet was "preventing the U*S* 6th Fleet from
carrying out with impunity the aggressive designs of the
Pentagon and from lording it in the area in the same uneere-
71monious fashion as previously*"
And therein lay the essence of a very changed inter­
national situation indeed*
Note: - Naval bases considerata are dealt with in the 
fokowing Chapter, on "Geo-Politica Considerations; The Kola 
and Vladivostok Gore Area Problem Complexes"*
- The emerging Naval leadership is treated briefly in 
Chapter 9, in the section on "The Changing Pattern of 
Military Leadership"*
69* Admiral McDonald, Chief of US Naval Operations, in
’Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 
1967 ,^ Hearings before the (US Senate) Committee on 
Armed Forces, pg* 65, G-PO, Washington D*C*, 1966*
7O0 Admiral Sir John Hamilton, Former Cmdr* in Chief of
Allied Forces Mediterranean, in 'The Changing Strategic 
Naval Balance' (USSR vs* USA), op*cit*, pg* 51-52*
71o Krasnaya Zvezda, 12th November, 1968*
- See also Izvestia, 11th November, 1968, op*cit*, and 
P n a v d a  27tb N’nvpm'hPT* MQAA ( a r h U'sr T^
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Related Air and Land Developments
The great Soviet stress on inter-command unity and
72
flexibility of operations and training , and the related
equally embracing stress on Armed Forces units effecting
the specialization and mobility required for nuclear combat
conditions'^^, does necessitate some attention to other fields*
Two Air Force developments are of particular relevance:
1o The introduction of transports such as the giant
AN-22, and the increasingly extensive utilization of helicopter 
74-strength' , greatly increased the mobility of the airborne 
divisions* But they furthermore entailed considerable con­
sequences relating to a co-ordinating of land and sea follow- 
ups to strategic (or non-strategic) missile strikes*^^
2o The 1967 presentation of a VTOL (at the same Air 
Show which saw the Soviet variable geometry swing-wing jet 
first demonstrated^^), was referred to above - where also the 
implications were elaborated upon*
72* See e*g* ColoG-en* Schtemenko, in Nedelia No* 6,
6th February, 1965o 
- Sokolovsky, op*cit*, pg* 540, and
Minister of Defence Grechko in Pravda 25rd February, 1970*
75o - Ibid; And e*g* Krasnaya Zvezda 17th May, 1969, op*cit*
and Krasnaya Zvezda, 27th July, 1969*
See also Chapters 5 and 4*
74* See Aviation Week and Space Technology (US), 50th Sep­
tember, 1968, and Lt*G-en* Taranenko, in Krasnaya Zvezda, 
28th January, 1968, for comments re* air-lift capabilities, 
as tested in the Dnjepr manouvers of late 1967*
75o Sokolovsky, op*cit*
76* In mass production (about 12 a month) by 1970,
according to Newsweek’s 'Periscope', 21st Sept*, 1970*
XXVIII
As concerns land developments, relevance may be
assigned to operational tactics again on the basis of
the official stress on specialization and flexibility, tlie
striving for independant survival capability plus easy
insertability into joint operational endeavors* like tie
naval marines, the land units were trained to operate under,
77and to utilize, nuclear conditions *
The use of nuclear weaponry, either for take-out strikes
or for high-altitude defence disruptive type explosions, is
presumed to be standard; (- as indicated also by:) ambitious
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land advances of about 60 miles a day are planned for;
’deep’ helicopter/paratroop landings are envisaged, with co­
ordinated thrusts by armoured units drilled in automatic and 
smooth transitions from marching to attack formations; no
front and rear forces are delineated; rather, there are three
pushing
consecutive ’echelons’ with the ones behind/on or through 
immediately the front falters or slows down'^ ;^ infra-red
77o The Military Balance 1969-70*
78* See Cog* comment by Sir John Hackett, recently retired 
BOAR Commander, to New York Times, 29th November, 1969;
A Soviet offensive might (then) be expected to reach 
the Rhine within 48 hours*
79o Soviet attack formation: 0 = taihc; f:3. = armoured person­
nel carrier
a
0 ^ 0 cq □ limits of
0 a □ © © © □ □ □ p a a  -----------
y  © □ p  500 mtr,sD
D across
First two 
echelons 
attack at 
10 km/hour
1st e chekn 
300 meters
10 km/h
V
I the Compajiy' s 
last echelon, on the operational res- 
march, approaches at jponsibility 
15 lon/hour | ( ’ outside ’ areas
2nd echo! 3rd echelon (or troop)|.^ ®^ f^,
700 mtrsi 5000 meters other
ICompanies)*
(The Company as a whole stretches 5 kilometers)
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equipment is standard, as is extensive amphibious water-
... . .80 iording equipment*
And it may be proper to end by reverting to the aspect
of specialization* It came to cause increasing awareness
81of the worth of the individual , and a novel, if limited,
emphasis on the need for subordinate commanders to display
82individual initiative* The complexity of the weaponry 
and conceived combat conditions demanded high levels of 
troop education; inherent in the recognition thereof was 
a profound principal shift from earlier attitudes relating 
to combat personnel*
80* 'The Military Balance 1970-71', ISS, London, 1970, pg* 8,
- And see for example Krasnaya Zvezda, 8th October 1969, 
for pictures*
81 * Seen e*g* in articles like Army Gen* Belik's in Krasnaya
Zvezda, 4th January, 1970, which dug out relevant Lenin 
quotes*
82* See e*g* Marshal Vershinen, Pravda, 26th January, 1968 -
and above references*
CHAPTER 7
^eog ro. p'KJcaI
Factors/Determinants of Soviet Strategic Policy*
No analysis of the extraordinary mid* and late 1960s 
qualitative and quantitative improvement of the Soviet-Union® 5 
strategic capabilities can be complete without a consideration 
of geographical determinants« One here thinks of such as have 
long affected Moscow and Leningrad (resulting in the age-old 
insistence on control of the area north-west of Leningrad, and 
in the according of PML development priority to the industrial 
and population basin of north-western USSRo ) The operative 
concept is that of an area, the strategic importance (and 
"equipment") of which is vi-tal to a nation’s survival* and 
therefore an area in regard to which it is vital for that 
nation to control the adjacent land^ sea and air masses, - or 
at least to ensure that these are not utilized by hostile 
powerso
By the late 1960s dynamic developments on the Kola 
peninsula snd in the southern Far East singled these areas 
out as cores of equally deci sive actual or potential strategic 
significance^ They gained singular importance as the main 
base-complexes of both naval interventionary and naval strategic 
forces (the most potent and reliable component of the USSR’s 
assured second strike capacities), an importance further 
augmented by forward BMP and ICBM deploymento Our concern
relates to the geographical factors which made these develop­
ments and dispositions inevitable^
lo "The Military Balance 1968-69’% I*SoSo, London, 1968,
2o "Okean'% Yoenizdat, Moscow, 1970o
"The Military Balance 1969-70", laSoSo, London, 1969o 
"Nato Facts and Figures", pgq GO, NATO, Bruxelles, 1969
À brief survey of alternate naval bases is first 
necessary:
a) A glance ab a map suffices to ascertain that the 
strategic role that can be assigned to the Black Sea and Baltic 
Fleets is seriously limited by the vulnerability of the 
respective straits leading out of the two seas* The Dardanelles 
and Oresund straits are both narrow enough to be closed vd_th 
ease, either through action from hostile shores, or through 
aerial (bomber) bombardment and minings Improvements of the 
overland canal and water artery system between the two seas have 
facilitated inter-Fleet mobility and thus affected dispositionso 
Bus this relates only to peace-time operations and to defensive 
considerata, as attested to also by the fact that the overland 
water system dr en chin g s ha.ve not been such as to permit the 
passage of larger atomic submarines (about 10*000 tons)^* 
Geographical factors thus eliminated these fleets from effective 
strategic concern*^
b) Freedom of access limitations.have led to a search
for alternate bases, and it is clear that some facilities have
been provided by Cuba, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, Yemen,
India, and others*^ But they appeared of "depot and repair"
7rather than "base" character* And political considerations 
alone would in any case militate against the USSR’s accepting a 
decisive reliance on foreign facilities*
5o Petrov, "Soviet Canals", UiSoNaval Institute Proceedings, 
July 1967o
4o "Est & Oust"p Association d’Etudes et d’informations 
Politique Internationales, Par^s, 20ohov* , 1967*
5o Mo Edmonds and J* Skitt, in their otherwise competent
"Current Soviet Maritime Strategy and Nato", International 
Affairs, ÏToo 1, Jan* 1969, make the mistalce of confusing 
the traditional defensive requirements with those associated 
with strategic concepts and facilities*
e) Other efforts have encompassed the designing and 
constructing of floating docks, as well as complex floating 
logistics and supply hases off sheltered coasts*^ But these 
must be seen as a complement to b) above, and as inhibited by 
similar considerations* They could never serve as prime base 
areas*
The only realistic alternatives as major bases for the
strategic fleet, were therefore such as could be found along
q
the northern and Pacific shores* As the first two maps 
following clearly shows Ice conditions effectively restrict 
the sections of these shores that may be utilized to part of 
the Murmansk coast, the tip of the Kamchatka peninsula, and 
the Vladivostok area*
A technical variation may be noted: The maximum
extension of the ice in the Par East regions occurs in Pebruau?y. 
while in the Kola (Murmansk) region it occurs during March— 
April* This is caused by the rivers floving north halving their 
upper reaches melted before their lower» The pressures which 
build up as a consequence "push" the ice out while simultane­
ously "screwing" it* It is the emergence of this type of ice 
which extends the hazardous period, and area* The Par East, 
of course, has no rivers of similar characteristics^
60 Guy de Garmoy, "Prance Algeria and the Soviet Penetration
in the Mediterranean", Military Review, Port Leavenworth,
March 1970*
See also e*go The New York Times, 16 July 1968, and 
Neue Z'hrcher Zeitung 15 Dec* 1968*
7 o  See eogo Komsomolskaya Pravda 28 May 1 9 7 1  for text of new
Soviet-Egyptian Treaty: This might result in somev/hat
more ext ensive arrangements --- -*
80 Murphy, PoM*, "The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean", UoSo 
Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1967*
9o Prom "Atlas der Eisverhaltnisse des.   Ozeans",publisher
unlmown, Hamburg, 1960* Notes The two maps immedi ately 
following come from navigational charts in my possession*
The Kola Gore Area*
The area in question is presented in a close-up schematic
form in the diagram which follows the maps * On and below this
sketch are furthermore to be found some of the relevant
characteristics of the area*
At its maximum extension (see maps) the ice curves around
at a mean distance of only 180 miles from the Kola, coastline,
until it turns southwest to meet the coast near Mys Svjatoi
N o s T h e  distance from the Norwegian border to the ice-limit
is 240 nautical miles, not counting the fjord leading into
Murmansk and the smaller bays* Vf hi le a harsh winter may partly
freeze even the fjord, the bays, and some of the surrounding
w a t e r s , t h i s  strip of the coast can be kept open at all
times with the use of ice-breakers when necessary* The coast
is comparatively steep, with granite cliffs and slopes which
1 2often reach heights of between 300 and 600 feet* With access 
as sure d and land composition and formation thus conduc/ive to 
the protection of installations, the area’s development as a 
centre for naval bases was inevitable* Aside from the natural 
opportunities afforded by the area towards the establishing of 
bases which can be blasted into the rock - , and the tolerable 
ice condition, there is also the fact that navigational depths 
are satisfactory* This emerges clearly from a study of the 
third and fourth maps (and see footnote 10*)*
10o Sailing Directions for Northern USSR, Hydrographic Office 
publication No* 47, Vol. l,Govt* Printing Office, 
Washington PtG*, 193Ao
Ice Atlas of the Northern Hemisphere HoO* PuboNo* 550 G-PO, 
Washington DoG* 1955o
11o HoOo Pub* Noo 47 opo cito
12* Ibid*
T. The limitations to the length of shore line available
for bases, the fact that the area must accommodate also the
Soviet merchant and .fishing fleets of the Arctic and their
facilities, and the fact that the Norwegian Cape sector lies
nearly 500 nautical miles closer to the Atlantic, all
contribute to cause fear of Soviet designs on Northern
15Norwegian shores* But such fears, in the form generally
espressed^^r, seem based on false premises, and appear therefore
to lead to misconceived aid somewha/t misleading c one lus i ons*
Two comments, both relevant to our puspose, must be
made regarding Western fear of Soviet desires for bases in
Northern Norway* Although the number of existing bases in the
area is classified, maps 5 and 4 strongly suggest that the
geographical capacity for base expansions can not have been
exhausted* The rapid conversion of the strategic fleet to
the
nuclear fuel during/l960s entail a significant lessening of
the fleet’s need for extensive base complexes* And finally,
as regards the distance to the Atlantic, it might be added that
enemy action against the Kola complexes would be hampered by
a loss in range and time comparable to, and thus partially
offsetting, the disadvantages for Soviet ope rati bnsc, There
might yet remain a Soviet rationale and desire for "mobile
bases" utilizing depot ships, as support facilities in the
15event of a major war * The N orwegian coast would be admirably 
suited for such* But they would constitute a convenience and 
not a necessity*.
13* The Swedish Deputy Minister of Defence has identified
these as constituting one of the major Soviet objectives 
in Europe: "Sveriges Shkerhetspolitilf% Stockholm 1955o 
See also Gapt* Araldsen, "The Soviet Union and the Arctic", 
US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1967, pg* 49-37*
14* Ibid*
No Orvik, "Scandinavia NATO and Norwegian Security", in 
International Organization, Summer 1966*
/>
■' 't 'if!
< 1 I M • { . ' II I ‘ I ■ ' '
c:0
: C' c." O o a O 
- J  c  ^  o
0 /J V O '• y  ^  Û o Io .<,00 0^-0^0^ /
”% (H "%-l
mw#
'v V
utri
“  ‘ \ 0  O q  Q  
] o O
>'a c. >
J— ^
t/î
r - n
%
©
4
N  c.,
n
Irs
en
:u
© (/)
c:
o
C."iXJ
c© ni
n ©  i n  ;■•■
■ r  X - v  n i
o  -
i
.p%I "!a-,
..a('
' © - a  . © i
§
<o >. r-
/tî
©
) ; \% . " - - ' d M  r-;- ■'.,. ■o . ■ “'.3 • ,;. : -J > .,W
Ij CJ
■ ' • ■ •'■ ' ' / .v’' •>
" Sfi . % ,
î? »«
s53 ii 3 s
" (ù 
/ ' : /
:/
"V|
\!^ y
©)
m m msa- .
)!'©r©‘ ©
. .  ■ ■-.. © 
a saa-.m’
: S3 g ..
:>. !; "
' © a w . ^
'5
!&■' / « A  S/-
a - :
1} f 
[T1 ■'
a  .V
0/7 /aa\ tS -
:i
■ s- a'/.:aa
'Sai //
p > '
a a -,U c 1 1'-
, ;©©:. 
r '^ 'a..
à Co %
©K
•/ C3 A - , s :u A ;■a.j .' 0”l'a -.;
;r, O  -\  A «as =. SSK';., 9; I 2 ■«■ y „ a a ai /  j a -,
/ : a © f f © © î ' s a © / ’^ ' ; a r ? i a a
- ■ 
r\ ' '%
'; g .a ù ; ;
■ ■ a- . /
(.A
5  a ©  ©  
•a"' ' '
M \ :
)/ v>1
%
Ua
\ âa© \
”\ '■ 
■©
\ a
A
{C:
i ©
/*> 9_. ■' a
./ /a
©a/
J .. .
. ' 1 . © ,
a  J
3 a
' fcif
k ;
■y.X
asf ;
A- .a y
Sfi ,
alfs
H
©b
Ü w
...©
©
3; il
©1
ib I};,.or?©n\ H - - © ■
r
% © ©/©© 
/■ • = /  ; / / : /
b / a a . : «/;;/
a ? H
-F— r^T/.:v: a
’^ 4 ,/ n
( . ■! • ■
■ ■ a-
. ©
©a
B e
© a
c >  ti
Z
:--- #---- ÎL
3 Rq
s S' S
sA vaav'V .s ■ : '.
■ ■ n « ï © :
; . ' _% x
■■'Vâ' -à'v‘ a ©  \ '
r -: .a
r - 4 / © a a \ : . a a
- a a a-
a "sa
%
:n © © y  ' '(y /a''©::'' a  ^ — \
J©;©'©//; \ ©' ,©
 ^ / .i:
© © © © © ; © : © / a ^ tV'i-j 
/' f?
I gg ,s a* Î
5t
n r: 5 f:s
e-t
©
a
3- § i;
( ' a n :  ■©■■
,
a s l l / a
s k
■ -/. lE '
- i -  -  c  n r  —
■’©fB’i
. a r, ■
(y
©Ane: ©arm.
vx©"''" "'"'-©a.
X..
% >
©
\ \ ''ïb')
/ ■ /
SVJA’iOi
A a : % 4 ©
B  - n'--'
-"'n'.'© ©i' ' ^
?ay;
' ©  a
H
AACMrBau.:' 
.o . B .y '
J! /
V'
5
© %
©© ? ..1
■fT-"
Y<.-
à
% ■
•,B
J
©
r 9
- s
i.LiaB- '
>.A.,
l"-.
r-r, 7 " " ^ ; ^  j j  . '1|
pclc© ©co-oa© ozni.nnuioa ( te. :iXû
X© a; ©nri!l_.L:.X©\ W)or0:131 arr
______________________________à9irb oâjnan___(___nr'c:©;
nr‘, oarl© x.-ouBon
:^ ir r c
ARC (AnG:':i,s%
Tc©TIr%7R:A.©
VT^ORG
Avôra.Ra tco- .'bar •\C\. no:o:lod (l‘9/î-9-,,-i?)
©% on bo uwooii 1 . Jxov and ] OrRc'C
i.uo 00 üvfo0 ‘.\. 1J '• ay and dix dun
Jfron hotvjooo. IRloc* and 3.rd'cd 
|t.o between 20^ .JSxrJ: and 3©J©:
fxron betv;oen. 1 ••«Hov and -I.C r ■> 
fto between 1 oMaÿ and 20©la:' •
= •• noTwax ©T'XXry: be two on ndid.aJi bb'j • noâ( on^ n^ v Ya/B;':—  ^:©
'neooivod fo:; ncrwcr;da.\ oBDlnit'itinTi (nznlRôS cnnya:'.â_nj on
t h ê  c b n b i r \ G Ù t ? © .  r i b . n d f  B © ) a n  t o r  a n o d o .  n l c a l  d o  v  o l o n n o n i J  
/. V  G o n n a r o  S o v i e t  n e e d  C  " d c r a i t i n a t o ' ^  ') f o r  e l e c t r o n i c  n n n v o d d l c  
-  ■' a n d  e a r l - i T  v / a r n i n a  a n d  b a l l i s t i c  n u l s  o l i o  o v o l n t i o n n .
Towards the end of the war, in a discussion with the then
Norwegian Foreign Minister (and UN Secretary General to he)
Trygve Lie and Ambassador Andvordy Molotov presented the basic
Soviet concerno The c%uote serves both to synopsize this^ and
to indicate the enduring character of the Soviet considerations
involve do lie had demanded that Norwegian suzerainty over
Svalbard be exchanged for a joint Soviet-iio37wegian administra^
tion to act "as a condominium", and that Bear Island should be
transferred outright o V’Jlaen the demands were turned do mi he
continued v/ith unusual and revealing franimessg
" c *o the Dardanelles ooo here vfe are locked in ooo 
Oresund « ^ ^ here v\re are locked iiio Only in the 
North is there an opening; but this v\rar has shown 
that the supply-line to Northern Russia can be out 
or interfered witho This shall not be repeated in 
the futureo We have invested mucli in this part of 
the Soviet Nnion^ and it is so important for the 
entire Union''’s existence that v/e shall in future 
ensure that Northern Russia is permitted to live in
— ------------  Te~--- — -------------- —
socurity and peaces
His concluding statement of confi den ce in the Norwegians 0.3
"friendly neighbours" was rounded off with the question "shall
we settle this in a friendly maimer, or shall there be a
dispute?"^^
Admiral Golovko surmied up: "Wi bhout the Kola inlet the 
Northern Fleet cannot existo-"*- the Kola inlet is necessary to 
the steiteo"^^
15o This view is presented by Torgil Wulff in 'hvungiiga Krigs^- 
vetenskapsakademiens Landlingar ock tidsskrigt”; Hoo 9oThe 
Royal Military Science AcademyjStockliolmy Novo I960 ««o in 
a comment on Jan Klerberg's "The Cap and The Straits"? 
Occasional Paper in InteiTiational Affairs? Noo 17?Harvard 
UniVoo Febol968o (With eviddnce such as presented above 
Klenberg denied any Soviet "need" for Norwegian bases)«
16o Molotov? as quoted by Trygve Lie in "Hjemover" (Homeward)? 
Ti den Norsk Forlag? Oslo? 1958o
17o Trygve Lie? ibid*
18o Golovko? Arseni? "With the Red Fleeto The War Memories of 
Admiral Golovko"? Pitman? London,1969? pgo 4-0 (first
Over 25 years of dynamic expansion of Kola base 
facilities and the introduction and build-up of strategic 
naval forces in particular? must have greatly increased 
the importance thua attached to the area by MolotoVo Since 
potential physical bases in Norway can not be judged to 
constitute an important Soviet objective? for reasons outlined 
above? it becomes necessary to look elsewhere for the main 
contemporary causes for concern and sensitivityo
The prime causes and imperatives derived therefrom? 
must be seen in the light of the Strategic Balance of Power 
and categorized as followss
1) PEPENCEo The nuuber of steps to be taken in 
sequence (radar contact and Identification? information 
processing? command decisions? etoalo) prior to the 
activation of ballistic missile defence and other defence 
systems require that^^
a) Hostile offensive weaponry? especially missiles, 
can not be tolerated within a certain minimum distance 
without making a mockery of the security of the base complexes<
b) Certain forward military facilities? especially 
radar? must be acquired to ensure tolerable? adequate reaction 
times
19o These concerns are referred to eogo in "Inteuiational 
Affairs", Noo 12? 1959 (Moscow)„ On pgo 62 it quotes 
"NATO Letter"? Sept* 1969? pgu 16? to the effect that 
"from the point of view of NATO strategists the coast line 
of Northern Norway affords the best surveillance sites 
for controlling the exits of the Russian Arctic Fleet into 
the Atlantic Ocean"o It goes on to refer from the same 
source? pgp 19? as showing that "they (NATO strategists) 
persistently recommend increasing the co-operation between 
the United States? Britain and Norway, in reconnaissance 
operations in this area"o
As concerns a) ? one might see a tacit Norwegian
recognition of this in the refusal to pemit any stationing
of offensive missiles on her soil? and the refusal to permit
?0NATO exercises within about 300 kra<> of the Soviet hordero '
The same may he said regarding Norwegian, insistence that she 
has not permitted and will not permit the peace-time utili-
21zation by Polaris submarines of Norwegian radar facilitieso 
Some tactical electronic and other surveillance by the
Norwegians must obviously be tolerated* Especially since
for example the Western coast of the Ribachi Peninsula is
within visual (naked eye) surveillance distance from the
border - as shown by maps 3 and 4o But anything beyond
this would clearly tread on some very sensitive So’viet
corns* (See footnote 19)o
Thus, one Spring 1969 Krasnaya Zvezda article most
forcefully condemned alleged radio and radar communicatione
between Northern Norwegian installations and US nuclear suU-*
22marines on patrol in Northeim waters — - * ' There appeared
little reason to dou bt the Norwegian assurances* One might 
furthermore presume that this state of affairs has been and can
20o Confirmed by Col* Hope (Senior Research Officer) of the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Hay 1968* And 
verified by a perusal of public accounts of past maneuvers* 
their general rationale and course (as always made 
available through the nat’l press and TV broadcasting 
networks) * And. see Jo Klenberg Vs "The Gap end the Straits" 
op cito
21 o See e„go Norwegian Minister of Defence? Ct„ Harlem? in 
Parliamentary ]3ebates (Stortingsforhandlinger) 1964-63,
Volo 79 pgo 2475« incl* "   it is correct that the new
very low frequency radio station which has been authorized 
for construction in Norway will not serve Polaris 
submarines"o
22o Krasnaya Zvezda? 30 March? 1969 - author’s empcasiso
be verified by the Soviet TJnioiio Soviet allegatio^rs such as
the above noy then be seen as representing not a belief? but
a fear regarding; potential activities? and a definite warning
of the unacceptable nature of sucho In fact? if the prime
concern lias been correctly identified? then it appears that
such activities as indicated would not only be theoretically
unacceptable but would demand countering actionso In other
words: a Norwegian departure from the tacit concession to the
legitimate (necessary) demands inherent in the core area
character of Kola cannot be initiated with a vievi/ to improving
Norwegian bargaining positions* To the contrary? it could but
mean an invitation to "a Cuba in reverse'© Kola security
demands would probably be considered so essential as to entail
23acceptance of the risks associated with intervcntiouo
As concerns b) it, of course? incorporates also the 
requirement for verification and control posed by a)? as well 
as the need to provide the necessary general early v/aming 
capabilitieso The failure to acquire Svalbard and Bear 
Island facilities has been compensated for by the establishing 
of military bases (and radar installations) on ice floes in
2.Ùthe Barents and White Seas? as well as on Franz Josef Island* 
Th. ese facilities? complemented by electronically equipped 
surface vessels? have evidently been accepted as complying 
with at least minimum requirementso
23o NATO-aligned conmiuni ca Lions and early warning systems,
NATO manouvers as previously conducted and preparation 
of bases to permit wartime reinforcement of men and 
equipment - described by inure Sington in "NATO defensive 
installations in Norway", NATO letter? Jan 3.966 - 
certainly represent cause for Soviet anxietyo But such 
NATO activity can be (and has been) tolerated and 
accepted* It does not infringe on essential Kola security 
requirements in the way that the described potential 
radar utilization wouldo
24o ToJo Laforest? “The Strategic Significance of the North 
Sea Route"? United States Naval Institute Proceedings? 
December 196To
2o OFFENCEo Here the obverse considerations are 
(potentially) involved* Any potential Polaris or Poseidon AHA 
capacity which was automatically synchronized with Norwegian 
radar capabilities would seriously detract from the effective­
ness of ICBMs from the Northwestern IJSSRo It would make 
interception of an I GEM during the ascent phase of its 
trajectory, the period of its greatest vulnerability,a distinct 
possibility* It would, therefore, inherently detract from 
calculated "assured" offence capabilities, and thus seriously 
affect strategic missile considerations and deploymentso
3o THE OCEAIT FLOORo There is one further consideration 
which must cause concern? although its implications have never 
been publically (or officially) recognized in either the 
Soviet Union or Norwayo Yet at least one Norwegian strategist 
(Colo Egge^^) has indicated awareness of the situation? and 
Soviet awareness thereof may be presumedo
a) As shown by the accompanying sketch? the ice-limit 
not only restricts the area where bases can be located? but 
furthermore ? forms what can be termed one shore of a narrow 
"fjord" leading into the bases and with its mouth spanning the 
area Svalbard/Norway’s Cape* This has resulted in a, geogra­
phically-determined very narrow "shipping lane”? a fact which 
inherently increases the necessity for close supervision and 
control*
25c Golo Bjom Egge? ex-military attache to Moscow and Senior 
Research Officer of the Ministry of Defence? Oslo? 
touched on this problem-complex in numerous informative 
and informal discussions during 1968-09, while tins 
author was fortunate enough to work as his colleguoc.
b) Another related cause for concern may be seen in the 
shallowness of the ocean floor of the mouth of the “fjord" (see 
maps 3 and 4) ; this was such as to place the floor witliin 
“exploitable" limits by 1970 or shortly thereafter* The con­
temporary international law defines a nation’s privileges off 
its coast to extend to a depth of 200 meters or such depth as 
to which exploitation of resources is feasablo*^^ Ai astouii- 
dingly accelerated process in underwater exploratory to cliniques 
allowed one already by the time the treaty was ratified to
envisage the elimination of any restrictions to "exploitable 
27depths"* It followed, therefore? that the treaty could be
interpreted to grfint a coastal power exploitation rights over
all waters inside the half-way mark betvi/een it and. the coastal
28nation on the other side of the waterway, sea ? or ocean*
In our case, it would mean a form of Norwegian control over 
the entire ocean floor between Northern Norway and Svalbard* 
And it couAd thus provide the legal rationale? however tenuous, 
for NATO "base" type installations*
26o 1958 (Geneva) Convention on the Continental Shelf - 
ratified in 1964*
27o Mr* Mellingen of Norway’s Technical Natural Scientific
Research Institute has pointed to the following development 
(in a discussion with the author on 28oJaiiol969, at the 
Institute): Already by 1968 oil drilling and exploitation
was conducted regularly at depths of 200 metres and. experi­
mentally at depths of 500 metres, (especially by the 
French)? while exploitable depths of three times that were 
acknowledged by most experts as reachable within 5 - 10 
years* Unwelld],y bathyscopes had reached the deepest 
ocean floor 8 years nrevion sly (Au;pist Piccard)* Now new 
manouverable (and even nuclear) deep-subinurgence vessels 
were being constructed*
See also Arvid Pardo, "Who wi.ll control the Seabed?",
Foreign Affairs, October 1968*
28o Arvid Pardo, ibid*
XYII
Quite apart from the general unacceptability of any treaty
9Q
interpretation such as outlined, it could obviously not ho
tolerated by the Soviet. Union due to the possible military 
SOimplications5 ' accentuated by horv/ayis hATO mombershipo in
fact y it appeared by 1969 tha/b military under sea developments
already threatened to jeopardize the treaty's provisions
through the establishing of fait accompli installations
(developments in our area being dictated by Soviet determination
S1to safe-guard her security prerequisites)o '
Leaving the legal &ind technical possibilities aside? the 
above will suffice both to highlight the geo-political 
considerata affecting Kola? and to indicate the limited and 
therefore vital security policy options activated thereby*
A final observation must be made concerning the Soviet 
haval mcnouvers of the latter >ialf of the 1960so Repeated naval 
(and naval air-aim) manouvers and operational patterns in the
go
North Sea and the Eastern Atlantic could be interpreted as 
an attempt to establish a definite outer defence perimeter 
along lines west, of both Iceland and Great Britairio Aside from 
guaranteeing access to Kola? this would have the additional 
benefit of limiting the danger of enemy penetration to thavb 
other bottleneck, the banish ,1 traits(And it would of course 
also affect the potential strategic utility/role of the 
Baltic Fleeto)o
29 o Arvid far do, ibido
50o Jens Evenscn, bi rector of l,egal Affairs, horwegic/i
Ministry of Eorei^i Affairs, "1resent hilitary Uses of tlie 
Beabed: foreseeable Developments"? Document presented to
the symposium on tlie International Regime of the Sea-bed? 
Rome, June 50 - July 5y 1969o
51* Jens Evens en, ibid*
32o One may, for example, poinb to the Soviet naval manouvers 
in the Atlantic of Apr!]. 1969 and 1970* Non classified 
data on the manouvers can be obtained from the Ministry 
of Defence, London, or NATO Secretariat, Brussels*
Such operations as the Sever "pinch" and other
33amphibious forces manouvers around and outside Norway? might 
thus be regarded as evidence of, and symptomatic of? an intent 
to establish a regular presence in the areuo Such a pattern 
of regular presence would, of course, ease any hypothetical 
intervention deemed necessaryo b«So (NATO) assistance might 
not be equally forthcoming if it risked encountering major 
resistance en. routeo - Ikit this operational pattern might 
equally be seen as malcing Norwegian territory even more 
superfluous, since the evolution here indicated would place 
it at a considerable distance behind the Ooviet front-lines^^--
THE fAI7. EAST.
It becomes appropriate to turn to the Par East* Here are 
located the three other important Soviet base complexes with 
"direct" access, to the sea, namely Petropavlovsk on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula (especially for submarines), the more 
extensive Vladivostok installations, and Povietskaya Gavan', - 
opposite Salchalin and about 500 miles North East of
32o contoS See also NATO letter Sept* 1970, pgo 6-lls Art* on 
Soviet Naval exercises 1960-70, documents and charts 
Soviet Naval exercises of the period, and demonstrates the 
increasing extension and on tward thrust of tlie regular 
inanouver patterns: Baltic and Arctic Seas - North Sea
I cel and - hi d-Ablrinti c o
33o Norwegian Minister of Defence C-rieg™Tidemand, Parliamentary 
Debates, for 29 Octo, 1963„
34o See also C o l o  Bo Egge "De Danske Straders betydning i 
Sikkerhetspolitisk perspektiv" (The Role of the Danish 
Straits in a Strategic Perspective), Copenhagen, 1970o He 
draws the conclusion following a similar exposition that 
the SU sees the Baltic, the Norwegian and the Norti Sea 
as belonging to the same functional strategic buffer 
terrain protecting the USSR's Western Plank as does the 
Barents Sea* They are to be similarly considered^
Vladivostok* As with the Kola hases, the areas available for
extensions are seen to be limited, mainly due to the ice
conditions, although the presently utilized sections can
3deasily be kept open through ice breaker activity* '
A delineation of the relevant characteristics may be
, . 36presented tnnss
VliAhlYükTüKo The port has about 85 days of fog and 
freezes for three months, as of December* However, it may 
easily be kept operational through ice-breaker activity* An 
additional problem lies in the fact that all channels of 
access into the bay, except the shallow and frequently iced 
Tatar Strait, can be said to face Japan (from which hostile 
surveillance and barrier operations could restrain Soviet 
mobility)*
80 VI ET SKAT A GAVAIT'^  incorporates a major submarine base 
and has dock facilities sufficient to accomodate any naval 
vessels* However, the base is ice-bound from December to 
March, and excessively prone to fog (up to 22 foggy days have 
been note d in J uly only O  *
PSTROPAVTjOSK is more ice free* Although it freezes in 
December and remains thus for three to four months, it is 
easily kept open hv ice-breakers* It is furtherraore protected 
from winds and fog by Kamchatka's volcanic mountain ranges*
The settlementb sole raison-d'etre is naval activities* It is 
primarily a submarine base, and presumably that responsible 
for severing the East-West shipping route from the USA (500 
miles south) in the event of war*
35o ToJ* Laforest, ppo_Gij|b See also the first map*
36o SoAo Swartstrauber, "Alaska and Siberia, A Strategic 
Analysis"? Naval Review 1965? pgo 159 ? US Naval 
Institute*
Gore area type definitions and consioerations may be
applied to all tb eoe complexes, singly or together* But
proximity to operational theatres of consequence gives VLADI-
VOSTOIv pride of place* Its geographical location and natural
harbour ensures its position as the Pacific Fleet headquarters
and as the home base for naval operations in the Japan? Yellow,
and China Seas, in the Southwestern Pacific and in the Indian
Oceauo A consideration of the major missile base at its
S7neighbour Khabarovsk" suggest a defining of the core area as 
based on the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok axis#
Its crucial significance, dictated by geo-political
considerations5 may be seen as emphasized by a 1957 Council of 
Ministers'^ D e c r e e T h i s  designated Peter the Great Bay, 
within which Vladivostok and the naval bases arc located, as 
part of the internal waterways of the USSR* The closing line 
or limit established for the bay was 108 miles in length? with 
the justifying principle evoked being that these waters 
constituted an "historic bay"*
Soviet definitions of this designation are based on it 
being part of the internal waters of the coastal state and 
subject to this state's unlimited sovereignty*^^ Thus, the 
White Sea within the Sviatoi Nos-Kanin Nos line, tlio Azov 8ea, 
and Riga Bay have been similarly classified, as have others
37p This should be noted as of primarily Asian importe
Because as concerns tlie direct IJSS1A1T8A configuration 
even Western USA is within closer reach of missiles from 
Western USSR than from Khabarovsko
58o Izvestia, 21 July, 1957o See Nicolaev, "0 Salive Petra 
Yelikovo", Mezhdunarodnaio. Ahizn, TToo 2? 1958*
39o Arto 4? I960, Statute of the (USSR) State Boundary*
such as the Kara? Laptev, East Siberian and Chukotsk Seas *
Tvm general considerations emerge ikom the above core 
area concepts* As in the case of Kola the areas' proximity to 
potentially hostile borders entails certain security imperatives. 
Thus, for example, a Soviet concession concerning the Japanese 
demond for a return of the Southern Kuriles (given up in 1951^^) 
would most probably be seriously affected by reasons of securi^ -^  
tyi>
In the case of the more sensitive Khabarovsk-Vladivostok 
basin, basic core area considerations (Viz* our delineation of 
tliese with regard to KoloJ entai 1 and demand a, certain super­
vision of or over the adjacent Chinese territories^ The
frequent Chinese allegations that such have occured (allegations
4 2which proliferated after the Czechoslovak intervention) ' may, 
therefore, be regarded as confirming Soviet a,ppreciation of the 
security prerogatives involved* Overflights of Chinese 
territory near Vladivostok-Khabarovsk must be seen as complying 
V'/ith a permpjient military demand vAiich is not of a nature such 
as might be affected by the state of political relations * Or? 
rather, while adverse political circumstances might lead to 
demfu'ids for more intensive supervision, favourable ones would 
not lessen the military need for continuous (adequate) 
supervi.si on*
4-0 o Z,, Meshera, "Morslcoe Pravo: Pravovoi Re shim Morskikh
Putei" (r.laritimo Lav/s Legal Regime of Maritime Routes) 
pgo 10, 1959, Moscow*
4-1 o At the San Francisco Peace Treaty, - claims were only
r en oun ced p art! ally *
42o LCNA (the New China News Agency) 16 Sept* 1968, listed
about 4-0 Soviet Air sorties into Heilungkiang province 
between 9 and 29 Au gu st, 1968* Their purpose was 
designated as "re conn ai s s an ce ? harassment and provocation"
^ X*'Q:T - .. - - • ■ -   # - i    ^ ^
The military sensitivity of the area must have 
entailed strong military support for an uncompromising Soviet 
position vis a vis such Chinese aspirations as were high­
lighted by the 1969 Ussuri border battles* It may furthermore 
entail a military pre-disposition in favour of a. more active 
forward stance in general? whether of initiating or responding 
character? so as to ensure the satisfaction of Soviet 
requirements in the area^
A few coiiujients specifically regarding the NORTHSW SEA 
ROUTE appear fi nally to bo desirable* This sea route? which 
is kepb open for up to 150 days a year by ice-brakers (in-- 
eluding the nuclear powered "Lenin"), was on 28 March? 19T0? 
declared by tJie Soviet Union soon to be opened to commercial
shipping of all states* It wfvs furthermore announced that
4-3unspecified fees would be charged* The commercial sigïiiRU-^
cance needs no elaboration* It is self-evident both for the
Soviet Union itself, in viev\f especially of the recently
discovered major oil and gas deposits of Northern Siberia? 
and for? amoy&ig others? participants in the Japan/Far East™
Europe trade, - the distances of which would be most
significantly shortene d«
But more important to our analysis are the military
implications of the implicit Soviet confidence in her ability
43o See treatment by Rochard j-.oyle, "Arctic lassages of North
America"? US Naval Insti tute Proceedings? J oj.io 1969 ? pgo 52o 
The sea route is deemed Soviet territorial waters since 
passage must be made through the straits between Severnaya 
Zemlia and the mainland (Villcitskovo) and between Novaya. 
Zemlia and the mainland - both of which are less then 
24 liomiles across (Soviet-specified territorial waters 
extend 12 n*miles from any coast line)* Of interest is the 
1967 refusal of passage through Vilkitskovo to the US Coast 
Guard vessels Edisto and Eastwind, which had attempted to 
pass north of Severnaya Zemlia, but been forced south by 
the ice*
See also T*J* Laforest, "Strategic Significance of the 
N o rt he D:n Sea Rout e " ? U o S * N avaH Ins t i tut e pro c e e dings ? De c * 
1969, pgo 56-65*
And S*Ac Swartstrauber? op*cit*, for description of 
secondary Soviet Naval bases in the area, aird of fuel and 
denot bases for the Nor tlie un Sen Unnr ^ _
to keep the route open and navigable* Submarines had long been
45
able to use the route? winter as well as summer? for travel 
from, for example Vladivostok to Murmansk * Th.e described 
development meant that surface ships could make the transit with 
equal ease through a major part of the year* Two prime 
advantages accrued: 1) The major cutting down of transit
time? 2) The security bonus of maldLng hostile surveillance 
eittempts far more problematic^ The transit time involved? as 
well as the adverse geographical conditions? remained of a, 
sufficient scale to discourage major redeployments along the 
route in peace-time^ But the development greatly facilitated 
war-time contingency planningo
CONCLUSION
Geographical factors clearly dictated - and delineated 
the evolution of the Kola and Fan* East regions into vital and 
sensitive core areas* The importance of both regions was long 
recognized by Soviet planners * Some of the traditional 
considerations and consequences no longer apply (e*g* the need 
for more base space? - made superfluous by the conversion to 
nuclear power*) But these have been replaced by others of even 
greater sensitivity and further-reaching ramifications: they
are such as are associated with the development of strategic 
concepts and capabilities? with the implications of strategic 
technology*
44o Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No*22? May 1969, and R* Boyle?
o p o c i t o p  p g o  5 2 *
45o LtoCmdr* L* Luehring? ""The Never-never Sea"? US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, August 1969*
ri W T m ' EIGHT - GfeMD STRATEGY 
6Aq. Soviet Strategic Terminology^
Indications Regarding the Military Hierarchy's position 
vis-a-vis tlie_ Rarity*
"Strategy - Generalship? the art of war, 
management of an army or armies in a 
campaign, art of so moving or disposing 
troops or ships as to impose upon the enemy
the place and time and conditions for
fighting preferred by oneself"* (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 5th Edition,
London, 1965)o
The above definition of purely military strategy can be
seen as describing only one aspect of a political entity's en*
d.uring concern with survival and security* Grand Strategy
(or Indirect Strategy^) however, transcends these bounds
and encompasses any means or antion which contribute
to the said security* It is therefore concerned not only
with the utilization of military capabilities, but equally
with economic, social and political endeavours designed
to secure or strengthen such capabilities - with any
endeavour/policy whereby the most facile route to the
achievement of one's aims vis-a-vis other political
entities may be found and traversed*
lo Beaufre, A* "Ai Introduction to Strategy", Eaber, London 
1965% "Deterrence and Strategy", Eaber, London, 1965% 
"Strategy of Action", Eaber, London, 1967*
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Nothing approaching a comprehensive presentation of 
Soviet strategic thought or doctrine was published prior 
to Marshal Sokolovsky's book of 1962 which is discussed 
belowo What little had been published was at most excerpts 
of thought patterns together with some "basic" Statements 
of a generalised nature* Thus, there are the statements 
derived from the authors' ideological convictions? and 
reinforced by the state of their contemporary society? - 
statements derived from conviction regarding the inherently 
necessary cuid non-compror.iising enmity of capitalist or 
imperialist societies towards conmruiist ideals and . 
aspirations: "(Socialism) *0.0 will be victorious first in 
one or several countries? while the others will remain 
bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time* This must cause 
not only friction? but also a direct striving by the 
bourgeoisie of other countries to defeat the victorious 
proletariat of the socialist state,-may be seen as a 
prototype*
It was early accepted that original Marxian views of 
the army? as unnecessary except as a tool of oppressing 
class stru-ctures and therefore an anachronism in socialist
A
societies of equals, were both impractical and impossible* 
A class-based military organisation was soon seen as/
2* Since the 1920*8, when a multitude of fractured thoughts 
on the subject were expressed^  representative of the two 
main divergent trends are Trotsky? with his insistence 
on the existence of a military science "applicable equally 
to capitalists an.d proletarians"? and Erunze's insistence 
on a "completely new unified proletarian doctrine"*
(RoLo Garthoff? "Soviet Military Doctrine",Rand Corporation
1953.)
3o Lenin, V*L*? Complete Works?5th Russion Edition?Volo50,p*13
4-0 Iloehn? Reinhard, "oozialismus und Heer", Told? Gehlem 
Verlag? Berlin? 1961? po45o
Ill
as a necessary prerequisite to the overthrowing of à
bourgeoisie manipulating state power chaiuiels* And. it was
subsequently recognised as necessary to galvanize the
populace behind the Party for the defence of past
achievements? and for conducting the war against the
bourgeoisie which would be necessary in order to secure
and further those achievements*
As regards the latter? Lenin concludes the paragraph
quoted above with these words: "In these cases a war from
our side would be lawful and just* This would be a war for
the liberation of other peoples from the bourgeoisie"*
But the struggle has never been seen in isolation
as military* The 1961 definition of peaceful cor^xistence
declares that it:
"serves as a basis for the peaceful competition 
between socialism and capitalism on an international 
stage and constitutes a specific form of the class 
struggle between them* As they consistently pursue 
the policy of peaceful co-existence? the socialist 
countries are steadily strengthening the positions 
of the world socialist system in its competition 
with capitalism* Peaceful co-existence affords more 
favourable opportunities for the struggle of the 
working class in the capitalist countries aid 
facilitates the struggle of the peoples of the 
colonial and dependent countries for their liberation
"Politics is the guiding force? and vmr is only the tool"*
It 6
5o Lenin? V*l*? opacit*
6o Program of the CPSU? as adopted by the 22nd Congress 
(Foreign Language liiblishing H ouse? Moscow? 1961),
Lenin? V,I*? Leninskii Sbomik? XII? Moscow?1931? Po34»
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Marshal Sokolovsky^ differentiated thus between the relevât 
terms: military strategy encompasses the study of "the 
conditions and factors that determine, at any given 
historical moment ? the nature of a future war? the 
distribution of military tind political forces? the quality 
and quantity of weapons, the military and economic 
potential? the probable composition and strength of the 
opposing co;-kitions and tlieir geographical distributions"? 
and it should "develop the means for its (the future War's) 
conduct" o
Military doctrine? however? is "the officially approved 
system of concepts on the fundamental problems of v^ai*" % ^
"the general political line of the (every) state's ruling 
social class determines military doctrineo"' Military strategy 
only proceeds "from these general positions? develops and 
studies concrete problems bearing on the nature of the 
war" and is therefore subordinated to military doctrine*
The distinction corresponds to that between war and politics*
Sone further quotes proviae good syntheses of the 
doctrine(s): Colonel Uidelnikov started by defining 
Soviet military science as the absolute base? which 
consists of "a unified system of knowledge about the 
preparation and waging of armed struggle"*^ Military 
doctrine is thereafter defined as "the unified guiding 
view accepted by the Soviet State concerning the nature 
and aims of a possible war? concerning the fundamental/
8* Sokolovsky? V* ,* ? "Military Strategy"? 3rd ed*? USSR 
Ministry of Defence Publishing House? Moscow? 1968% 
-English Edition (revised)? Praeger? New York? 1963*
9c Krasnaya Zvezda 11th May? 1962 ("Concerning Military 
Doctrine")
Yfun. da] lient al problems of preparing the country and the
entire people" * * * * "It is based on the conclusions of
Soviet military science * * * * * (and) is a synthesis of
(its) Imowledge"
Military science cannot "decline to analyse new
phenomena"'^^ as it must look to the future and consider
all possibilities and hypotheses* Military doctrine? however,
consists of that which is appropriate to the comtemporary
period? and is therefore inherently correct and non—flexible *
Any challenge to it v/ould hence cause "a serious fissure
12in the entire military structure", and would consequently 
be unthinkableo
13Finally? a definition by Golonel General Shtemenko:
"(One elaborates) a single statewide system of views on the 
character and purpose of war in the given historical 
conditions, the principles of military . onstruction and 
the art of war? ana (prepares) the country and the armed 
forces for war* Such a system * * * * has been arbitrarily 
called military doctrine"*
Both Sidelnikov's and Shtemenko's contributions^^ are 
of interest also for what they said concerning the historical 
development of Soviet strategic thought* Sidelnikov 
emphasised that Soviet Military Doctrine is based on "Lenin's 
keystone ideas"? and such developments of these as 
exemplified by MoYoErunze's 1921 article bn "A Unified/
10 o l oi do
11 o Koimnunist Vooruzhiennikh Sil N0o5 March? 1964 (Art* by
MajoGeUo Kozlov on "Military Doctrine and Military 
Science") pp* 9-15*
1 2 0 Ibido
13o Nedelya No*6, 31st January? - 6th Eebruary? 1965*
14o Krasnaya Zvezda 11th May? 1962 opocit* and Nedelya 
NOo 6? 1965; opo clto
n13Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army'®* Shtemenko 
was equally firm as to the origin of military science and 
doctrine? as forming part of "Lenin's legacy"! But then 
they both go on to admit to a dearth of strategic thought 
thereaftero
Sidelnikov declared that Stalin had attempted to 
"erase" fuad "belittle" Soviet military doctrine: "There 
were (consequently) almost no well-worked-out general 
principles and theses on waging military operations 
by the troops in the initial stages of the war" (Second 
World War)* It was only later that advances were again made:
"A veritable revolution has tali en place in military affairs 
since the Second World War" * hut the Doctrine was. only 
reoUly to be "developed * * * in the materials of the 22nd 
Party Congress"* Shtemenko amplifies: "*.* * during the 
personality cult Lenin's military legacy was hushed up and 
dis;trted * * * * military theory was formulated largely 
according to the dieturns of JoV* Stalin* oooooThe possibility 
of the enemy invading our territory was completely ruled 
out" o
This confirms the evidence presented in previous 
chapters regarding the 'newness' of Soviet strategic thinkihg. 
It furthermore reflects on Khrushchev's partial liberation 
of such thinking from the encrusted dogmas? and on his 
forcing of the military to consider nuclear and missile 
developments and implications within a sophisticated framework.
It also focuses on the extent of the Party's absolute 
authority as the sole definer of military dogma at any one 
period* The military leadership's authority is absolutely/
15o 'Voennaya Nauloa'.iRevolyutsia' ? Nool? 1921 (See Sidelnikov).
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absolutely limited as within the frame of the definition*
It has? as quoted above? to "proceed from these general 
positions"? and can develop and study only "concrete 
problems"* It can put the theory into practice and it can 
develop the theory's implications? but it cannot alter 
the theory*
It can generally control and manipulate the material 
accorded to it ,;y the theory* But even this is limited 
as regards "modem weapons"? since these "are such that the 
political leadership cannot let them escape its control*
In other words? they and their potential use have political 
implications which inherently categorise them as falling 
within military doctrine* Hence the demand for absolute 
control inherent in previously treated comments on strategic 
preparedness? and inherent equally in the approaches to SALT*
Yet there remains? of course? a 'grey area'* The
mentioned SALT approaches highlighted one such area? with
apparent discrepary between Party and government positive
interest? and military scepticism and distrust* In a
favourable feature article on the opening of SALT negotiations
in Helsinki on 18th September 1969? Pravda wrote:
"tooooVoS* Semionov (head of the Soviet Delegation)o.o„
stressed the great importance attributed by the Soviet
Union to the negotiations that are now beginning? the
positive results of which will undoubtedly benefit
Soviet-American relations as well as strengthen general
peace* The slov/ing of the strategic arms race? the
limitations and then reduction of such weapons? VoS*Semionov
17noted? is an important aim*"
16*, Krasnaya Zvezda 5th January ? 1967 (Art* by Maj * Gen* Zemskov) 
17o Pravda 19th November? 1969.
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The military press^ however? chose largely to disregard the 
talks? and instead made pointed reminders regarding the 
need to ue vigilant and not jeopardize Soviet might»
But one must he careful* The most belligerent of the 
"military" spokesmen? and those most often cited by 
commentators convinced of the existence of acute military- 
Party tension — namely Colonels liibkin and Bondarenko^^ - 
are in fact political officers» Both are instructors at 
the Benin Military-Political academy? and therefore speak 
for the Party5 their most uncompromising articles in 
'Communist of the Armed forces' have been accompanied by 
small-print announcements that they form part of special 
Party lecture series* Or one may revert to Pravda coverages 
of SALT developments: Their favourable inclination should 
not be allowed to obscure their unwavering support for a 
high relative state of Soviet readiness% agreement is 
favoured? but not if it endangers Soviet securityo^^ A 
final comment might encourage a more complex conception 
of Party aims and endeavors than that, commonly accepted 
in the west* Differing tenor and superficial contradictions 
as betv/een articles are often explained by a consideration 
of different readerships? - and/or contemporary domestic 
or external politics* There is after all censorship? real 
editorial independence in the western sense does POT exist 
(see also footnote 18)* Articles in the military press have 
certainly been cleared by Party censorship orgcins*
18* Kommunist Vooruzhiennikh Sil? Bee especially No* 17
September 1966? No* 24? December 1968 and Nos» 7&8?April 
1969o N otes Bondarenko's old thesis was titled "The 
Revolution in Military Affairs” (Sovremennaya nauchno- 
tekhnicheskaya revoliutsia i dialek Lika rasvitia boevovo 
oruzhia); this partly explains his preoccupation* But see 
Krasnaya Zvezda 15th Jenuary? 1970 for yet another asserti# 
of absolute Party authority over Military Doctrine?.and for. 
a defining of strategic problem complexes as lying within 
the Party's domain* y Party military friction inferences 
are superficial? and all too often evince onlv a. fad tv !
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8A (i) Military Representation, on Party and Government Bodies
It is clearly often all too easy to infer military-Party
friction; apparent discrepancies are usually misleading*
There is a consiuerable degree of integration of the
military within the Party*
On the one hand Party membership is more widespread
in the Armed Forces tlian in any other profession of any
scaleo Thus by 1965 Malinovsky could assert that "almost
90/ of our officers, Generals and Admirals are Qommunists
20or Young Communists"» Just over a year later? on
3rd April, 1966, he revised the fi games as follows: 93/o of
officers were then declared to be Party or Komsomol members,
as were 80/ of total Armed Forces' personnel* There remained
some variations as to relative Service percentages* For
example "nine-tenths of all sailors are Communists or Young 
21Communists"o But in no service was the percentage very 
significantly below average*
On the other hand there was considerable military 
representation on the higher ■ elected organs of both Party 
and State* The latter will be considered first*
Overall scale of representation is indicated by the 
late 1965 announcement that "10*760 fighting men have been
elected to the (1966) USSR Supreme Soviet, the Union and
22Autonomous Répudie Soviets, and to the local Soviets"*
A similar number was elected in 1969; of these 58 marshals,/
18*(conto) faulty appreciation of the Party's role*
19o- See e*go Y*Shestov's long analysis in Prnvda, 3rd February, 
I97I0 Note: YoShestov is suspected of being a pseudonym 
for Semi0110Vo
20*. Pravda 23rd February, 1965»
21* Pravda, 24-th July, 1965*
22.0 Isvestia, 16th November, 1965o
Xmarshals? generals and admirals were elected to the
23Supreme Soviet which convened in June 1970*
They included all the Military District commanders, 
all the Fleet coimiianders, both F VO (air defence) commanders, 
and all the coimiianders of Soviet military Groups abroad*
Turning to military representation on Party bodies? 
it V'/as in 1966 announced that the 23rd CPSU Congress was 
attended by 352 military delegates representing 890*000
PA
Party members and candidates* ‘‘ T*HoRigby considered it 
appropriate to correlate Border Guard representation, - 
and concluded that a dispnportionate 7/ of the total Party
23membership belonged to the Armed Forces or the Borderguards*
jhit it is more appropriate to analyse the Central
Committee elected by the Congress, cind to base the analysis
on that elected by the 24th Congress in 1971^^ ~ as
providing the latest data* There were few changes from the
1966 C*C*o 13 military representatives were re-elected
(Bagramyan, Balitskiy, Gorshkov, Grechleo, lement'yev,
Yepishev, Zakharov, Konev, Krylov, Moskalcnko? Sokolov,
Ghuikov and Yalcubovsky) ; 3 ex-candidates became full
27members (Pyashchenko, Maryalchin and Ogarkov ) % 6 new members/
23o See "DeputafL Verkhovnovo ioveta SSSR, Sedmoi Soziiv",
Moscow 1966, and "heputatL i Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR, Vosmoi 
Soziiv", Moscow 1970*
24o "XXIII s' ezd Koimiiunisticheskoi P;;.rti Sovetskovo Soiuza
29 marta - 8 .prclia i960 godas stenograficheskii otchiot", 
Volol? pgo283, Moscow 1966*
25o Rigby, To Ho? "Communist P^rty Membership in the USSR
1917-1967", Princeton University Press, 1968* For a good 
historical resumé of evolving Party membership patterns in 
the Armed Forces see his Chapters 7 and 10*
26o Pravda, 10th April 1971*
27o The fact that Col*General Ogarkov, the Soviet Military
Representative at SALT, was raised to full Membership while 
Vo So Semjonov, the Senior Soviet Representative at SAUT, 
remained a Candidate does not reflect so much on SAnT 
relationships as on Ogarkov’s position as 1st Deputy Chief 
of the General Staff, - his predecessor here was elected 
a member of the 23rd Congress*
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members were elected (Bugayev, Ivanovsky, Kulikov, Eutakhov? 
Pavlovsky and Shavrov) * 5 candidates were retained (Budenny, 
Getman, Gruslievoi, Lobov and Psurtsev); 9 new ones were 
elected (Gorchakov, Koldunov, Kurkotkin, Mayorov, Olcunev, 
Salmanov, Smirnov, Tolubko and Tretyak), their distinguishing 
feature being youth, with the 'old man out' 56, the 
youngest 47 years old* It ought to be noted that the size 
of the turnover is deceptive: a large number of 1966 
members or candidates not retaining their seats in 1971 
had died*
The smaller nunber of candidates elected in 1971 
meant a decrease in total military representation, from 
LO to 9 per cent. But the net addition of 6 full members 
meant that the military voting strength increased from 
8,2 to 8p7 per cent (thus even more disproportionate than 
their share of total Party membership)*
Service-wise the 1971 0*0* looked as follows: The Navy 
had 3, the Air Defence 3, the Strategic Rocket Troops 2, 
the Air Force 2, the Rear Services 1, the Political 
Administration 4 (no change) and the Grouid Forces 2 
representatives*
Only the most critical Military Districts, Groups 
abroad and Fleets gained representation on the Central 
Committeeo Changes here are therefore noteworthy* In 1971 
they reflected first of all the Chinese border tensions 1966 
had pi'oduced Candidate memberships for the Pacific Fleet and 
the Turkestan Military District commanders, and Audit 
Commission membership for the Far East M*D, Cmdr*; 1971 
produced Candidate stature for the Pacific Fleet and the 
Far East Mob* commanders, Audit Commission membership for 
the Trans-Baikal Cmdr., and full Member stature for
the commander of the new Central Asian M*D* which was carved/
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carved out of the Turkestan District* - In the wests the 
conuiiander of Soviet Forces in Germany was raised from Candidate 
to full Member; the commander of the Central Group of 
Forces (Czechoslovakia), which was constituted following 
the 1968 intervention, was appointed a Candidate member»
These bodies are too unwieldly in size (The 1971 
Co Co contained 596) and meet too infrequently to serve as 
effective policy deliberators* One must therefore turn 
elsewhere for the decision-maicing agencies concerned with 
such matters as military doctrine or strategy -- see following 
chapter* But a study of the composition of the elected 
opgans remains of value as one indicator of military-Farty- 
government inter-relationships *
813 Strategic Utilization of Economic Factors:,
The USSR may have conducted more serous research 
than any other power into the necessity for a close 
alignment between the economy and strategic concepts, and
28into the benefits to be accrued from such a relationship*
Symptomatic of this was the 1957 publication in Moscow,
by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defence,
29of a lengthy investigation by Colonel AoLagovskij entitled 
"Strategy and Economy", with the sub-title "A Sketch of 
Their Mutual Inter-':onnection and Influence" » The book/
28o Adler Karlsson's "Western Economic Warfare 1947-67" (with 
a foreword by Gunnar Myrdal), Almquist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 
1968, whi ch documented the extensive economic warfare 
conducted against the "East" through embargoes and other 
control measures, confirms (especially) US awareness of 
such* Yet these actions end measures remained somewhat 
"implicit"o The treated Soviet analysis may or may not 
have been affected by UoS/ practices. It remains unique 
in its semi-official thoroughness* See Pravda 15th November 
1969 for article re contemporary and continuing Western 
economic warfare.
29o Given to me with most helpful coimnents by Colonel Egge of 
Norway*
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for
book deserves note both for its subject-matter and/its 
pioneering public end frank treatment of this. The first 
chapters gave an historical summary of the increasingly 
close comiection between strategy and economy? of 
strategy's increasing dependence on the conflicting 
parties' levels of technical and economic development? 
and of its dependence on their economic potential* A 
nation's economic?moral and military potentials were 
accepted as inherently inter-related*
The central third and fourth chapters presented a 
systematic survey of the economy's determining effect on 
strategy* It was noted that military dispersal considerations 
might dictate the building of-smaller but more numerous 
factories of plants? even when considerations of optimality 
would otherwise favour greater concentrations* The 
necessity to co-ordinate the economy, in peacetime with 
potential military requircm ents was taken for granted? and 
part of the analysis concentrated on evolving the most 
efficient method for such co-ordinations "The strategic
leadership i s  duty-bound to act as consultant in
numerous questions concerning the state's economic life? 
which in one way or another may influence the nation's defehsiîTt; 
capabilities"*
Similarly: "Under modern conditions a demmid has 
arisen for officers who are specialists in military 
economy* Let us call them (analogous to military engineers) 
military economists* Such specialists must be added to 
higher military staffs? but also to the planning organs and 
the economic organs within the state administration"*
Finally: "One must not believe that the militaiy under 
modem conditions shall concern itself only with purely 
military concerns? and the economists with economic concerns"*/
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concerns^ *
The book also contains an analysis of the effects on 
strategy of an enemy's economy* The author treats the 
USA's and Western Europe's dependence on overseas 
resources (a table showing "strategic raw materials" 
and their locations is provided) and on sea transport*
Naval strategies and technical innovations which affect 
such transport are dealt with in some detail. But the 
quintessence remained within the scope of the above quotes* 
An.d it clearly coiimiands the same acceptance today as it 
did then*
It is relevant to compare the quintessence with the
previously quoted definition of peaceful co-existence?
found in the Party Program adopted in 1961 (at the 22nd 
30CPSU Congress)* This definition was quite explicit in
defining peaceful co-existence only as the policy alternative
which?, at the time? was most likely to facilitate the
"struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries"?
and the struggle of the nonliberated peoples? "through the
strengthening of the position of the World socialist system"*
The theoretical implications of this thesis were not
cogently pursued or elaborated in the West until General
/vndre Beaufre and his colleagues (Institut d'Etudes
Stratégiques) presented their thoughts on "indirect"
31strategy in 1965* They saw international relations as a 
battlefield in which the communist powers? having lost Èhe/
50*. Program of the CPSU? Crosscurrents Press? New York? 1961% 
See also Chapter 8A*
51* Beaufre? A* three books? op*cit,
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the option of force due to the nuclear stalemate? now 
attacked the West through indirect means * And while one 
might question the premise (the effects of the nucaear 
stalemate)? this does not lessen the value of focussing 
attention on the alternative "v/eapons" % Beaufre's analyses
explicitly considered hoth political and economic manoeuvres a:
/
strategic manoeuvres*
32As Michael Howard put its strategy had progressed 
from the "operational" (Clausewitz and Jomini)? through the 
"logistic"- (the great build-ups of World War Two)? to the 
indirect* ^eaufre's tendency to present his ideas as 
assumjpti ons? anrl not argue them out? was lamented by 
Howard* But he clearly agreed with the conclusion? that 
the old concepts of strategy are today probably worthless*
And it is not difficult to find concrete examples that may 
serve as evidence for -eaufre ' s viev'/s*
For example: in the BSoli during the latter 1960's the 
rate of expansion of certain areas of the economy was such 
as could not always easily be explained in terms of 
"immediate" national needs? actual or potential* Three 
areas to which attention has been drawn by various 
commentators ares
(1) The dynamically expanding merchant marine;
(2) The vigorous build-up of aluminium producing capacity? 
especially following the greatly increased power 
production of the Baikal and Siberian river hydro­
electric complexes;
(3) The greatly augmented oil and gas extraction and 
procurem ent made possible through? for example? the 
newly discovered Siberian fields? and through the 
completion of the trans-continental pipe-lines to Northern/
32* Adelphi Papers? No* 54, ISS? London? February? 1969°
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Northern? Central and Southern Europe (one might 
also mention the 1968 agreement to link Persian 
fields to this net)*
A few comments regarding two of these areas? those
of shipping and of oil and gas, will suffice to clarify
the point at issue and to give it a just perspective»
In a February 1969 /vPN (Novosti) interview? Soviet
Merchant Marine Minister Victor Balcaj ev gave the following
data for the expansion of the Soviet Fleets it then
stood at over 11 million tons doW», and was expected to
stand at''13 million tons by 1970» After that one expected
aP increase of one million toim each year, with a tonnage of
22-23 million tons by 1980* The building program which saw
the Soviet Fleet increase from 2/ of the world total in
I960 to 6*5/ in 1967 was thus clearly envisaged as
continuing. The dynamic nature of the expansion was shown
kalso/ the facts that : over 80/o of the fleet's ships were 
built within the last few years; two-thirds had speeds above 
14 knots; and individual size (cargo capacity) in 7 years 
increased by 50/ for freighters and 80/ for tankers» There was 
furthermore an emphasis on the building of "specialist" ships 
such as container vessels (whose share of goods transport 
was expected to multiply by 4 or 5 times within 7 years)*
When one considers the fact that (as Bekajev noted) 
total world fleet capacity was expected to rise only from 
about 2 billion tons in 1968 to 3 - 3*5 billion in 1980, it/
33o 8ee Strategisk Bulletin April, 1969, Utrikespolitiska
Institut Stockholm* The Soviet merchant fleet's; develop­
ment is illustrated thus: about 3 million hr* tons in 
1950; 4o3 million in 1955% 5« 5 million in I960; 10*5 millior. 
in 1965; 12 million in 1968; 15 million (projected) in 
1970; and 20 million in (projected) I960* Capt* Raoust? 
opocito, estimated 25 million Lons as likely by 1980*
This seems an accepted range within which to base 
estimates* See also Bakayev's article in Krasnaya Zvezda, 
March 13, 1966, ("The growing soviet merchant marine")*
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it is clear that the Soviet expansion must affect the
relative position of other fleets and established
consortiums* The cutting of rates (economic warfare) is a
weapon that may be necessary to assure access to those
trading lanes organized by Western consortiums and
monopolies* (As was demonstrated in 1968 with regard to
34-the Australia trade , until a compromise was arrived at, 
and limited Soviet participation in the established 
consortium was agreed upon)*
But the clear Soviet appreciation of the inter-relation 
between economic, military and political factors, and the 
appreciation that economic criteria on occasion both must, 
and ceui, be subordinated the other criteria, points to 
further aspects* It is evident that a fleet of the size in 
question, the operation of which permits unfavourable 
economic returns to be considered as compenshted by political 
or other rewards, must represent a potent weapon. Its 
potential use has strategic, as well as economic, 
consequences and dagers for "Western" merchant fleets.
With regard to Norway in particular the dagger appeared to 
to be acute, because of the unusual dependence of her/
34o The Times, 21st Jcmuary, 1969: 36 cut-price Soviet 
sailings per year were envisaged - about 12 was the 
number finally agreed on* See also Sunday Times, 
10th November, 1969 for a relevant and interesting 
article by Dennis Bloodworth*
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her halance-of-payments on the large "invisible returns" 
from her fleet.
Yet theehorwegian Shipping Federation - as opposed 
to other quarters - saw little danger* They remained 
convinced that projected Soviet capacities were not in­
compatible or unreasonable in consideration of projected/
35 o The figures and information are talc en from "Shipping
and Society", Norwegian Shipping Federation, Oslo,1969o
Figures for 1st July, 1968, (in 1000 brt*):
Total Fleet Tanker Fleet
World 194,152 69,214
Liberia 25,720 14,663
United Kingdom 21,921 8,372
UoSoAo 19,668 4,487
Norway 19,667 9,992
JEqnm 19,587 6,755
IKKUt 12,062 2,936
- US figures include old reserve fleet*
“ Liberia's fleet is a liberty flag fleet ("no tax")
encompassing a motley collection of foreign owners*from
- Norway's is the neviiest fleet aside/the USSR's, with 
about 50/ of her fleet less than five years old as 
opposed to the world average of only 30/* Her fleet 
does not enjoy government support, and it flourishes 
only due to its ability to specialise, modernise and 
provide efficient service*
“ The other fleets are all government aided in various 
ways; thus as of 1966 the UfK* government subsidized 
their Lines' ship acquisitions (investments) to the 
extent of 20-25/ of costs* One might venture that thin 
lack of efficiency jUmmcxprcisndiky crystalizes the fleets' 
vulnerability in free m^rkelr conditions;^ a vulnerability 
necessarily magnified when opposed to indirect strategy 
(price-cutting "warfare")*
- The US fleet exists only due to Government subsidy 
measures based on strategic defensive needs*
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'56projected Soviet export increaseso One might perhaps
infer a confidence that, should their prognostication prove
wrongp then the sophisticated character of their fleet
would nevertheless ensure its future a confidence that other.
more outdated, Western fleets would suffer more (see footnote
35),
A comparable situation emerges when analyzing Soviet
oil an.d gas procurement prognostications* On the one hrmd,
extraorhnarily large production increases have been
envisaged by 1980; at one time about TOO million tons -
38presently about or somewhat less than 600 million tons*
Reports of the discovery and development of nev\f fields 
underlined the sense of forced development* A 1969 reports 
for exeunplep declared that extraction at the new Tiomen 
fields in Northern Siberia had increased from 1 million/
36o My then colleague at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, Mr* OverregUy ascertained this (partly 
on my initiative and on my behalf) through numerous 
conversations with leading officers of the federation; 
Oslo, May, 1969,
37o Pravda, 19th October, 1967 (in accordance with the 
somewhat overoptimistic directives of the Programme 
of the OPSU of 1961; foreign Languages Publishing 
Rouse, Moscow, 1961)*
38o Planovoye Khosyaistvo, No* 1, 1969? Research. Bulletin 
Noo 22, 19699 of the Institute for the Study of the 
USSR, Munich*
39* Ekonomicheskaya Gaaeta, No* 22, May 1969*
million tons in 1965 to 3 million tons in 1966, 6 million 
in 1967, 12 million in 1968, end finally, 20 million in 
1969; the indicated progressive increase rate was projected 
indefinitely*^^ ihi other major new area of extraction, 
in Western Kazalhistan, has been described as "one of the 
richest oil-bearing regions in the w o r l d " - with its main 
fields (at IVIangyshlalc) producing 10 million tons in 1969%
12 million tons in 1970, and 100 il) million tons projected
A 2
for ' 1980* Drastic parallel increases of gas procurement
4-3were equally confidently envisaged*
When this is coypled with reports of a serious under­
cutting of Western prices in oil export markets (of at 
times over 20/)^ '^ ', then the cycle of suspicious apprehension 
again starts to roll* hut a report from the "Petroleum
Press Service" suggested that the Soviet "salesdrive" was
4-3not of a size or character to justify apprehension* .And 
recent estimates of the 1980 requirements of Soviet domestic/
40* Pravda, 16th Pebruary, 1970 sets the ambitious targets 
far 1975o
41* Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 8th July, 1965*
42* Moscow Radio 16th September, 1969* — See also Mizan,
July/August 1969? Central Asian Research Centre,London*
43* Ibid*, ind see e*g* Soviet News, 28th. January, 1969?
Po42y as published by USSR Embassy, London*
44* Carlson,!*, "United States Naval Institute Proceedings", 
May 1967, noted Soviet oil prices as being 10-20/ lower 
than Western prices on the world markets; foreign Report, 
11th March, 1969j London, noted contemporary "dumping" of 
Soviet oil in Western Europe at about US$12*75 per ton, 
or about$5o00 per ton lower than the European price of 
Gulf oil* The report was contained in an analysis of 
Soviet expectations of increasing sales to the fRU from 
4 million tons to about 6 times that figure*
45* "Petroleum Press Service", May, 1969* See "Research
Bulletin" quoted above for quote according to which Soviet 
1968 sales actually decreased somewhat in comparison 
with 1967o
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domestic consumption do indicate that the expected 
production can be fully utilised in the home market*^^
The conclusion must therefore be restricted to a 
reiteration of the coma ont regarding the merchant fleet*
The Soviet undercutting of world export prices cannot 
be sliown to represent more than a necessary sacrifice, 
to achieve a distribution of trade conmiensurate with 
her economic growth as a whole. The only threat is 
potential; it lies in the willingness to utilize production 
capabilities in a non-orthodox fashion - a willingness 
inherent in the express acoptance of "Grand strategy']*
8D(i) Tlie Military 1 fidgets Guns and/or hitter?
Some discussion of the ^micro-factors^ involved 
appears necessary, to round off the treatment of 
economic effects on strategy* There is no doubt that 
some disagreement has existed, and does exist, regarding 
the relative weights to be assigned to military vs* civilian 
economic neecs, with the protagonists only partly split 
along professional lines*
The size of the problem is indicated by looking at 
(for example) the 1967.budget* Defence allocations 
officially constituted 13*2 percent of the total budget*
But unofficial reports then circulating in Moscow credited/
46c "Research Bulletin"- Ibid,
Valentin S-.ashin, USSR Minister for the oil extraction 
industry confirmed this at a reported 1969 press 
conference* He "doubted if Soviet oil exports would 
rise much in the near future because domestic demand 
was increasing so fast*" He placed Soviet 1968 oil exports 
at 57 mil. tons and estimated 1975 domestic needs at 
480 mil* tons of oil ("Soviet News", 28th January, 1969, 
Embassy of the USSR, London)*
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credited Brezhnev with admitting that 18 percent was a
more realistic figure, when taking into account military
47value-endeavours incorporated in other budget posts *
Western strategists in Moscow tended to increase this 
again, to 20-22/*^^ Reports of Academician Aganbegyan^s 
"secret speech" of 1965? which indicated that defence 
industries accounted for about a third of the national 
total, supported exaggeration of the military's economic 
role and position*
Or, one might turn to, for example, the 1969 budget*
This v^ as presented to the Supreme Soviet by finance . 
Minister Garbuzov on 10th December, 1968, and allocated 
17 o 7 billion roubles to defence * We:.:tern reactions were 
epitomized in the Economist's estimation, that the 
realistic figure was between one-fifth and on-third above the 
official all0 0ation* In other words, the realistic budget 
was estimated to be of an order of 21-24 billion roubles* 
Estimates along these lines received support also from
30information provided by U*oo Secretary of Defence Laird*
There were two basic problems involved. One concerned 
the size of "hidaen" budgetary allocations, and the other 
concerned the rouble-value question* Estimates of either 
(are at best) educated speculation, since the essential 
primary data are unobtainable * .hut a survey of some such/
47o Information received by author in Moscow, May, 1969,
48o Information received by author in Moscow, May, 1969.
49, Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1969-70, pp.233-237,
30* UoS. Secretary of Defence, Laird, National televised 
interview, Washington D&C*, 9th february, 1969,
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such speculation will be presented below, since it does 
help one acquire a more composite picture* It is thought 
to convey as accurate an impression as may be gathered 
at this time *
It appears conceptually advantageous first to present 
a chart of the last years’ military budgets, and the
31percentages these have formed of the total Soviet budgets? 
Defence Jhidget Defence Budget as A
Y e ar In Billion Roubles Percent of Tot
1958 9o4 1 4 .6 /
1959 9o4 1 3 *3 /
I960 9.3 1 2 *7 /
1961 11*6 15 .2 /.
1962 12.6 1 3 .9 /
1965 13.9 1 5 .9 /
1964 13 o 5 1 4 *4 /
1965 12.8 1 2 .6 /
1966 13o4 1 2 .7 /
1967 14.5 1 3 .2 /
1968 16.7 1 3 .5 /
.1969 17.7 1 3 .2 /
(1970 17.9 1 2 *4 /)
(1971 17o9 1 1 .1 / )
One analysis of interest is Emile Benoit’s, of 1968:
"Economics of Arms Control and Disarmament, the Monetary
3?and Real Costs of National Defence"* Weighing "real 
procurement costs", "opportunity costs of defence",and 
other similar data, as well as the difficulties suixoonding 
the establishment of their value, he hazarded the following 
estimates of "Purchasing Power Equivalents" (PPE), as between 
US and USSR Defence costs at the times/
51 o Basic list talc en from the New York Times, 11th December, 
1968; the last figures talc en from Finance kinister 
Garbuzov’s '0 gosudarstveunom biodzhete SSSR na 1971 
god i ob ispolneii gosudarstvennovo biodzheta SSSR za 
1969 god;’ Politizdat, Moscow, 1970.
52. In the American Economic Review, May, 1968, pp*398-416.
time
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Real Costs Real Cost Monetary Cost Monetary Cost
Million $ Per Capita (National Unit as % of
PPE  PPE $ Currency, Millions)____ GNP _____
USA 63,283  
USSR 44,500
322
191
63,283 9,1%
There is little doubt that considerable military-oriented 
funds, for example as pertains to research and development, 
are "hidden" under other budgetary headings (And one may 
compare this to similar non-disclosed expenditures in the 
UoSo, e.go research and development financed by private 
firms competing for contracts)* One ought to be sceptical 
regarding the all-too-easy over-rating of the extent of these 
practices* But if one minimizes US 'hidden expenditures'3 
e .g . by considering a large proportion of such private company 
endeavors as duplicaticn-waste, and if the 1967-69 data 
presented above were correct, in estimating that "real"
Soviet defence expenditures represent an increase of, say, 
25-30% of the official figure, then this would tend to 
produce respective PPE’s of near comparable order (see below)* 
Two recent estimates deserve appreciation, R.W* Davies 
and Ro Amann calculated in 1969 that "1 * * * the USSR operates 
a research and development establishment comparable in size 
to that of the UoS.* The differences between the two are 
getting fewer". Abraham S* Decker of the Rand Corporation 
elaborated:he declared that defence did not take/twice/
53* "Science Policy in the USSR", Scientific American,
June, 1969, pp.19-29o
54o "Soviet Growth, Resource Allocation and Military outlays" 
St* to the Sub-Committee on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress,June, 1969.
twice as large a proportion of Soviet GNP as did the
equivalent U.S, allocation out of a GNP nearly twice as
large* To the contrary,the respective percentages were ■
in fact similar* But as regards finance allocated to the
military, and military hardware costs, there was reason to
believe that the USSR received in excess of US$2oOO worth
per rouble (vs* official rate of $1*11 = 1 rouble)* The
USSR furthermore enjoyed favourable manpower costs* For
these reasons Soviet military expenditures could be declared
equivalent to those of the U*S*, inspite of her having
only about half the U*S* GNP, and yet allocating only a
similar percentage to defence*
Becker cautions against the overrating of "hidden"
expenditures, and he is plainly aware of and wary of the
consequences of the common ignorance of price behaviour in
the military sphere* But his hazarded conclusions support
the judgement that the effective military value procured
through the respective budgets is comparable, - as is the
respective strain on the economies^^ (See also Economic
Analysis in Chapter 3, and below)*
Two further points must be mentioned* One relates to
the 1969 UoSo Arms Control and hisarmament Agency survey of
37World Military expenditures*^ It established the fact of rapid
55o UoSo News and World Report 13th April, 1970, p*34 presented 
an extract from a list of U*S* weapon systems being devel­
oped, prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee by 
the State Department* The figures concerned 22 v/eapon^  
programs: Total original estimates - $39,730 million; 
total current estimates - $54,873 million? note also the 
1969 Pentagon report, which concluded, foilwing an 
analysis of previous weapon developments, that achieved 
operational efficiency was consistently far inferior to 
theoretical or planncd-for efficiency (See Chapter 5A)
56* As yet unpublished 1969-70 research by Professor Ariki at 
the Institute of Soviet Studies, Glasgow, clearly 
demonstrates the adverse effects on the economic growth 
rate of military budgetary allocations*
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rapid world-wide increases in armaiaents, as also the fact
that the relevant graph is going up at a faster rate than
the World GNP graph. It thus documented that military
expenditures constitute an ever-increasing drain on
resources; it expanded by noting that these expenditures
already, with only a few exceptions (these exceptions not
including the IJoSo and the USSR) p significantly exceeded
the nations’ expenditures on education and health*
Other authorities have documented the increasing economic
drains of military procurement* One of the more prominent
38was the Stockholm International Peace Institute; its 1969
39report received the following aclmowledgement from Pravda:^ 
"'The compendiumndocuments the yearly spiralling of the arms 
race that continually increases the danger to international 
peace and the burdens of expenditures to support it"*
The second, related, point concerns military over-spend­
ing and unre lian ce . It is clear that UoS* military allocations 
have been wasteful, with ultimate weapons system costs 
spiralling far above the original estimates on which their 
approval was based, and with achieved weapon efficiency far 
too often proving greatly inferior to the prognostications 
which had justified their budgetary allocations (« See 
footnote 55)o Soviet industry’s structural kinship to the/
57o "World Military Expenditures, 1966-67", The Economics 
bureau of the UoS. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
1969o A synopsis is available by A*Alexander, "The Cost 
of World Armaments", Scientific j\mericon, October, 1969, 
ppo21-27o “ The analysis, in practice, accopbs relative 
UoSo-USSRPPE estimates akin to those by Benoit presented 
above*
58. "Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament Problems", 
Stockholm International Peace Institute (DirectorsG-unnar 
Myrdal), Stockholm 1969*
59o Pravda, 19th November, 1969.
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the monopoly situation of UoS* Defence industries encourages 
the inference that similar developments had occured in 
Moscow, though perhaps not on quite the same scale* The 
waste resulting from monopoly and bureaucracy is probably 
comparable, but the financial waste of the immense profits 
in the U*8o industry is presumably greater than that 
possible under Soviet conditions (?)*
One further aspect to this military unreliance must be
considered* This is that inherent in the 1969 testimony by
Jonathan B* Binghtim (UoS* Congress Representative, and 
Member of DoS* DIN * delegation) , and which he himself 
called "illustrative" of "the present trend": "In a 
presentation with regard to relative Soviet and UoSo strength 
in submarines, the Navy deducted from effective U.So strength 
X percent for those vessels that would have to be in home 
port at any given time* V/hen asked what percentage had been 
deducted from the Soviet strength figure for the same 
reason, the answer was that no deduction had been made; 
the incredible excus^^as that ’we don’t Imow what percentage 
their lay-up is’"(])
The problem is the same as that referred to in Chapter
5, with ,relation to the military’s propensity to maximise
degradation factors associated with its own weapons, and to 
minimise those of the antagonist (See also the ’overkill’ 
discussion at the end of the same Chapter).
It remained clear, however, that neither economic 
(or uneconomic) consiaerations, nor otherwise induced 
stringency, could alone force curtailment of military/
60o Bingham, JoB., "Can Military spending be Controlled?" 
Foreign Affairs October, 1969, pp.51-66.
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military procurements thought necessary hy the decision- 
malcing authorities* Referring to projected Arms Control/ 
Disarmaments talks with the U8A, a prominent Soviet 
Diplomat is reported to have emphasized the following in 
the Spring of 1969s Soviet authorities considered an 
arms agreement as desirable and necessary, but as no more 
pressing on economic grounds for the USSR than the USA*
He declared a firm belief that "the 1941 complex" was still 
vivid enough, to ensure that the Soviet populace would 
endure the financial hardships necessary to guarantee that 
defence requirements were met, - while he doubted that the 
same was true of the Americans*
The assertion had a certain propaganda vaAue, but the 
belief is nonetheless one widely held* The Soviet Union had 
clearly become confident regarding her capability to 
su stain whatever military expenditures she considered to 
bo necessary*^^
61* Vorontsov, of the USSR Embassy in Washington was the 
Diplomat; the comments were made to a colleague*
62o An interesting light is thrown on soviet defence
industries' priveleged position as regards scientific 
manpower, on its productive capacity, and also on 
Soviet military-civilian intergration, by Brezhnev's 
assertion: "..* * 42 percent of its output is used for 
civilian purposes"* See his Report to the Central 
Committee, the 24th CPSU Congress, 1971 (pg* 77 of the 
Uovosti edition)* Our inference of confidence is more 
than brought out by the Report as a whole.
80 The Military in Society; Civil Defence in the Soviet Uni on .
Neither the scope nor the underlying assumptions and 
operational, motifs of contemporary Soviet Civil Defence 
programs appear to he properly appreciated in the West* The 
rare intimations, such as in Elise Nouël's highlighting of 
the similarities between Soviet programs and Norway’s unique 
(as concerns NATO countries) "total defence" system, have 
been too restricted both with regard to perceived concern 
and to depth of analysis *
The most common defect relates to the prevalent lack 
of a proper recognition of Soviet conceptions of nuclear 
implications* This was illustrated by those who contrived 
to see in Dnjepr and other nmmouws of recent years a Soviet 
trend away from nuclear and back to ’ conventional’ concepts*
6^Yet Soviet sources have been, and are, frank and unequivocal: i.- 
the introduction of nuclear arms is seen as of quite a 
different scale of implication than, say, the introduction 
of planes or tanks* It is accepted as introducing a new era in 
the way that the introduction of gunpowder once did; an era/
63o Nouël, Elise, "Civil Defence in the Soviet Union and 
Chechoslovakia" NATO better,January-Eebruary 1971? pg* 
13-16: "(The USSR’s) main objectives are to protect the 
population against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological 
weapons, to protect industrial installations and maintain 
production; to protect agricultural resources; lastly, 
to mount rescue operations and to eradicate as quickly 
as possible the effects of an attack."
64-0 Dee especially: Marshal IJCh* Bagramian, Uen*8*D* Ivanov 
and others* "Istoria Voin i Voennovo Iskusstva",Yoeniadat; 
Moscow, 1970* And: Col* A*A* Siderenko, "Nastuplenie", 
Yoenizdat, Moscow, 1970* Of related interests N*Y* Sushko 
.'3nd ToRo Kondratkov, "Metodologicheskye Problemi Teorii 
i Pralctiki", Yoenizdat, Moscow 1967*
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era in which most previous concepts become irrelevant, and
in which traditional military assumptions and te cliniques
have become obsolescent and unsuitable for all but the
most limited of operations - such as against military
pygmies (1968), or such as may be described as police
operations (Ulster).
The inherent strategic and administrative implications
have been accepted: dispersed economic investments are
6 3Sanctioned even where concentration is optimal ; every 
branch of the Armed Forces is trained to nuclear-oriented 
requirements (independent unit survival capabilities plus 
maximum operational flexibility, intra-Force and inter- 
Force, are prime concerns)and equipped with suitable 
matérielle (indicative of which are the new Kresta II  class 
destroyers, which are not even assigned conventional 
armaments!)^^; every civilian receives extensive training 
and/or education oriented towards nuclear eventualities, 
and the combatting of their effects* A secondary rationale 
of the latter is the effecting of more potent partisan/
65o C o l o  AoLagovsky, "Strategy and Economy - A Sketch of
their Mutual Inter-comiection and Influence", Yoenizdat, 
Moscow, 1957: Officer specialists on military economy 
must be added not only to higher military staffs, but 
also to the pi atm in g organs and economical organs within 
the state administration; the military must to-day 
concern themselves also with non-military affairs * *.*
66o See e .g . Krasnaya Zvezda, 17th May, 1969; For evidence 
re the development trend see e.g. Col* Yorobev in 
x-.rasnaya Zvezda 6th June, 1964, Col*Gen Schtmenko in 
Koimmunist Yooruzhiennikh Sil, No. 5, February 1963, or 
ColoSidelnikov in Krasnaya Zvezda 11th May, 1962, or 
Khrushchev’s famous Pravda 15th Janueiry, I960 article.
67o See e.g , Bundeswehr's "Soldat and Technik", No. 11, 1969, 
pgo 626, and same No* 10, 1970, for art* on "Keue und 
Modemisierte Kriegschiff-typen der Sowjet-Fktte",
(inclo survey on 'Kresta 11’)*
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partisan potentials: guerilla, or "People’s War", concepts
are seen as the remaining adjunct, complement, or alternative
to nuclear-affected modes of warfare*
Soviet nuclear perspectives are of long standing,
but the emphasis on and scope of the reiated civilian-
oriented programs were significantly extended during the
late 1960s* During the Khrushchev years their implementa™
tion had been hampered by the vagueness and resultant
policy vagaries of his insistence on the Party's "role and 
68influence". After his ousting it was more readily 
aclmowl edged that the Party must restrict itself to 
providing "assistance", and that the military must be given 
freedom and responsibility to effect the programs accepted 
by the policy-makers.^^ The military desiderata - 
- instilling the relatively sophisticated skills now 
required by potential mobilizations as well as improving 
survival prospects and general preparedness -, were possibly 
augmented by increased Party appreciation of the side-effects 
“ e.go more factory discipline ----  etc* - (?)*
68. Pravda 6th July, 1962.
69® Pravda 4th July, 1965®
- And see e.g* Marshal Grechko in "Yoenno-Istorichesky 
Zhumal" No. 6, 1966, or Col. Gen* Yefimov, Dep.Cmdr* 
of Chief Polit,Admino of Soviet Army and Navy, in 
Isvestia, 16th November, 1965®
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Civil Defence was in 1966 defined as "a system of
state-wide defence measures being carried out throughout
the country for protecting the populace and the national
economy from the weapons of mass destruction, and also for
70rescue work in the zone of a possible strike". "Every city
71and inhabited point" was to be given protection* Prime
shelter-building efforts were to be directed towards
ensuring "the un in ter lup ted operation of units of the
72national economy if nuclear war should brealc out" * As for
the population, cost and technical difficulties precluded
any encompassing shelter-building program* But "planned
and systematic" training would be given to "workers,
employees and the general public"; "attention is being
focusseu on the preparation of the entire populace, on the
ability to help onself and to help one’s neighbour"*
Evacuation and self-help became adopted concepts (with the
implicit corollary that a nuclear era declaration of war was
not likely to be immediately followed by the initiation of
71hostilities affecting super-power 'home areas'.)
It appears propitious first to present a tentative 
summary of the basic Economy-oriented efforts: shelters were 
constructed at or for important enterprises and institu-/
70o Marshal Chuikov, Gmdr* of G*D*, in Pravda Fmrainii, 
28th October, 1966*
71o Krasnaya Zvezda, 22nd November, 1966*
72* Ibid,
73. Pravda Ukrainii, 28th October, 1966, op.cit*
74o Ibid*
ilnd see e*g* Pavly and Isivelev. "The evacuation of 
Urban populations", in "Sposob Zashchitii ot Yademovo 
Oruzhia", Moscow, 1965*
See also Text below*
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73institutions, and around the production equipment of 
industries wiiich must continue functioning.They were 
built to withstand (unspecified) blast pressures, heat,
7radiation and potential chemical and bacteriological attacks.
And they were built for long-term occupancy, with a space •
78allotment of 2-2*55 metres per person* - Civil Defence
persomel involved were organized along existing territorial=
administrative structure lines, and subject to the authority
of the relevant administrative director (e.g* Soviet or
Sovkhoz chairman). Their work has been part-time but obligator.
with the men undergoing a minimum of 55 hours of instruction,
79and their civilian superiors a minimum of 70 hours* Full­
time military persoiinell have throughout been assigned to 
guide and direct each "task force" * Aid finally: the total
number of active participants was claimed to have reached 
20 million und< 
developments*/
der Khrushchev*^^ See below for further
75o A* Kharkevich, "Shelters", in Voermie Znanie, No* 11,
1968, pgo 20.
76 o Marshal Chuikov, "G-razhdanskaya Oborona b Raketnoyader« 
noi Voine", pg* 16, Atomizdat, Moscow, 1968.
77o Ao Kharkevich, op*cit*
78o Ibid* - To the extent possible, and presumably for
reasons both of convenience and cost, population sM.ter 
designs are incorporated into peace-time civilian 
activities and needs; this author "inspected" the 
Arbat Metro station’s protective door (to shut passage 
way and isolate shelter) in 1969, - and otheis since*
79o A* Kharpichev, Voennie Znanie, No* 8, 1967', pg* 20*
80* Leon -Gourê (of the Rond Corp.) in "NATO’s Fifteen
Nations", June-July 1969, pg. 51* See also his outdated 
but still relevant and interesting "Civil Defence in 
the Soviet Union"', University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1962*
]{XXIV
developments *
Wider-ranging efforts - Program extentions: The above 
endeavors were, together with the para-military onm 
sport like voluntary training long provided by POSAAF, 
to be considerably supplemented* The first portents were 
soon evident, viz* the following 1965 statements:
Party and public organizations were directed to be 
"more concerned with the military—patriotic up-bringing of 
schcd-children" Aid it was noted that "The YGL 
(Komsomol) coimiiittees are obliged to carry out more 
actively the work of military and patriotic education of 
Soviet youth and preparing them for service in the Armed 
Forces"*
It was aiinounced that there was to be established 
"patronage over military units by workers, collective 
farmers and cultural figures", - officially to "help 
strengthen and expand the army's ties with the people"
The' scope and perspectives were further indicated in 
testimony by Pavlov, then YCL First Secretary*
"Following the example of the Pacific Fleet, entire 
Youth flotillas have been set up in the Black Sea, the
Baltic and the North S e a  * In all comers of the
Soviet Union thiS summer tents were pegged out for the 
'Sbns of the Regiment' camps where juveniles Teamed about 
military technology uid studied the heroic history of the 
USSR Armed Forces"
81o Yefimov, in Isvestia, 16th November, 1965 
82* Komsomolskaya Pravda, 15th June, 1965*
85* Isvestia, 16th November, 1965, opocit*
84* Pravda, 27th June, 1965*
And they were equally indicated by a number of other 
subsequent articles affirming the need to extend para­
military programs for civilians in schools and outside. One 
of these revealed that new "military-political organs" had
been established to administer the USSR in the event of 
85nuclear war* The concept was reminiscent of earlier
espousals of a more formal, co-ordination of military-
economic-political plai'ining and administration, as a
necessary consequence of nuclear considerations and their
ramifications.^^ Its apparent implementation at this
time was pregnant, but more information was not made
available* The portents thus remained ’unclear, as also
the essential question of whether there had been a real
innovation or merely a confirmation of an already existing
formal or informal, structure*
1968 saw the first concrete expressions of the new
developments* On the first of January existing voluntary
programs were extended to talce in all youths domi to grade 9
They were at the same time put on an obligatory basis* Then
in November their scope was again extended, to incorporate
also the training of pioneers* A lengthy September 1969
Isvestia progress report on the implementation of the
67decrees serves to provide an illustrative res’umê*
85o- Maj * Gen* Zemskov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5th January, 1967. 
For a sample western comment, see Prof* John Erickson’s 
in Survival, May 1967, I*8*S*, London*
86o A* Lagovsky, op„cit*
87o Isvestia, 15th September, 1969, art* by I* Potapov and 
Vo Sysoyev on "A Matter of State - The Law on Universal 
Military Obligation is in effect" (The Decree in 
question: "New USSR Law on Universal Military Service 
on the training of yo'ung men of pre-conscription age")*
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It confirmed that all establishments, schools, 
institutes, factories and farms were now obliged to provide 
training facilities* But while some areas (Moscow and 
Leningrad were among those named) had done so fully, 
others had not yet provided the necessary facilities*
Certain enterprise and collective farm executives were 
furthermore SLUd to have paid only superficial attention
to the required military instruction* ---  This could be
interpreted as indicating that exam papers and results had 
not been made obligatory* Or it could be seen to mean that 
satisfactory marks were handed out no matter the level of 
achievement, by managers whose concern or need for their 
men’s productive capacities led them to discourage the 
time-consuming and non-productive military training*
Yet such deviations were to be ensured against, 
according to the article* It stressed that all youths had 
to receive preconscription military training* They must 
all study the service regulations and the serviceman’s 
oath, and classes munt be held to ensure mastery of drill 
and the firing of small-caliber weapons* Military 
instructors were to be chosen from reserve sergeants and first 
sergeants* The Komsomol should aid LOSAAF in the organiza­
tion of the training, and public education agencies and 
military cormuisariats should aid both in ensuring supervi»
Sion £ind verification of procedures and results* As a 
further security and benefit, the review recommended that 
every school and other training centre be adopted by some 
military unit or warship*
Five months later, in March 1970, another progress 
88
report appeared* This stressed that the Party and Komsomol/
88* Pravda 8th March, 1970.
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Komsomol organizations do of course retain ultimate 
responsibility for insuring the universal implementation 
of the program (the scope of the responsibility delegated 
to the military being restricted to questions of curricula 
and modes of instruction). It was asserted that the 
military-patriotic theme must as a consequence "never" be 
absent from the pages of provincial Komsomol newspapers.
It aclvnowledged tiiat there still remained areas in 
which the programs were not carried out sufficiently. Some 
areas of Central Asia and the Maritimes were singled out 
for criticiznu It the former there were, revealingly, 
declared to be cases of managers taking "the v/rong attitude" 
to the organization of mass defence work (See reasons, as 
analyzed above)s In the Maritime territory there was said
to exist "no clear notion   of the number of persons
acquiring military-teclmical specialities,, their 
distribution, or the technical centres involved."
The report stressed that this lagging must be 
rectified, and Kursk province (and the city of Saratov) 
was held up as the standard v/hich must be emulated. There 
the Komsomol had organized the young people of "every 
district" to work on Sundays so as to earn money for the 
construction of shooting ranges, clubs, and "method 
centres" for military and patriotic training. Military 
reservists were utilized in the actual instruction, and 
participants were taught military history and theory as 
well as the handling of guns, rifles and other equipment. 
Military sports were furthermore engaged in, to secure the 
desired physical standaros.
There did not emerge any new formal program specifically 
oriented towards increased shelter-constmction or similar/
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similar endeavors. But educationary efforts were
evidently being given increased priority by the late 1960s*
Not only were there such as might be presumed to be encompasse
v/ithin the scope of the above described programs* There
fui'thermore appeared a spate of surprisingly fr;mk books for
the general public, which expanded on nuclear potentials,
pressed the need for relevant knowledge and suitable
preparation, and provided detailed explanatory diagrams*
89A typical example began by discussing various contemporary 
nuclear missile weapon systems and concepts* It then dwelt 
on strike blast, heat and radio-active effects, and 
provided illustrative charts and diagrams. There finally 
followed a comparatively lengthy treatment of Civil 
Defence theory and practice, again accompanied by relevant 
charts, sketches and diagrams (on the effects encountered 
at varying radii from a strike centre, on the potentials 
of various protective measures, on simplified air-filter 
construction teclmiques, etc.).
iind it was indicative that even Moscow University, 
that most privileged and duty-exempt of institutions, 
became involved. Exhortatory posters were prominently 
displayed: "Comrades® Master the knowledge of national 
defence!"; "Every citizen must learn how to protect 
himself from the effects of nuclear attacks, and how to/
89o A* Ivanov, I. Naumenko, II. Pavlov, "Ralvetnoyademoe 
Oruzhie i evo Porozhaioshchee Deistvie", Yoenizdat - 
Nauciino-Populyamaya Biblioteka, Moscow, 1971o For 
shorter articles specifically re. related shelter 
developments, see e.g. I.Kraznov in Yoemoie Znanie 
No. 1, 1967, or LtoGen. Shuvyrin in same, No. 10, 1968
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to protect his comrades!
By 1970-71, if not before, it had, become impossible
for anybody not to have acquired at least some knowledge.
Aid it was clear that a large majority had received or was
receiving at least some active training or instruction.
Conclusion - One may distinguish between three
inter-relating strands: the endeavors’ effect on
mobilization calculations; their effects on general
survival prospects; and their implications vis-a-?^ vis
’Home Guard’ and 'People’s War' potentials.
U 0bi1ization calculations: The 1968 intervention in
Czechoslovakia and the spring and summer 1969 Ussuri border
battles afforded illustrative glimpses. The former witnessed
efficiently camouflaged selective mobilizations (and one
may note that the utilization of Aeroflot capacity evident
at Prague airport testified also to the further-ranging
military-civil co-ordination treated above).. The latter
were accompanied by a progression of divisional up-gradings.
Some previously classified as grade 3 (30% manned) were thus
brought up to grade 2 (about 60/ manned) standards, while
some grade 2 divisions were re-inforced to grade one
requirements (80 - 90% maimed).
Two factors deserve comment: 1) - Concerns the
technical aspects of acquaintance with weaponry and the
the
utilization thereof, and/complementary abstract that the 
resultant knowledge must increase confidence, and hence 
morale. Familiarity with one’s weaponry induces confidence/
90. This author spent the academic year 1970-71 in Moscow, 
on the Britis^Lcademic exchange program.
91o Information received by author in Moscow, August 1969; 
- The three degrees of readyness are also referred to 
e.g. in 'The Military Balance 1969-70’, 1.8.8., London,
:CL
92confidence in one’s ability to utilize its capabilities. --
2) *-■ Concerns the greater ease and speed with which trained 
civilians may supplement reservists, and be incorporated 
into divisional structures so as to affect their upgrading 
and comba/readiness. This must facilitate military policy 
calculations and increase military options. An action such 
as the Czechoslovak intervention might for exanple otherwise 
have demanded a slower and more easily detected mobilization 
process, and might, therefore have met or meet better 
prepared counter-measures.
General Survival prospects: 'Familiarity* and its 
implications are again of paramount importance. A universal 
conmion minimuuii of knowledge of the theory and implementation 
of protective techniques, actions and devices must inherently 
decrease the likelihood or scope of pcmic, and increase 
survival prospects. The precise effects do not allow of 
calculations since they depend on too great a variety of 
unlmoTOS (e.g. v\iaming-time given) aiid abstracts (e.g. 
psychological factors). They will not suffice to negate 
UoSo second-strike potentials, cvid will therefore not 
affect the ’axioms’ of the present era of mutual assured 
second-strike capabilities? it is no longer logical to 
expect local wars, even if nuclear, to escalate to encompass 
the home-areas of the two super-powers; since mutual second- 
strike forces entail self-destruction for the initiator of a/
92o UoSoNoCapto G.Grkovic (Naval Attache to Moscow 1965-68) 
in "Soviet Universal Military Service", U.S.Nav.Inst. 
Proceedings, April 1, 1969, pgo 55-63, provides 
^^FPlGmen'ba,ry evidence before arriving at a complementary 
conclusion re. high morale and service pride among Soviet 
Armed Forces personnel.
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of a first strike, such becomes logically inconceivable; 
excepting and until the procurement by one of means 
negating the other’s second-strike, both will explicitly or 
tacitly accept locale restrictions throughout the course 
of a future war*
But Civil Defence measures and knowledge will 
significantly improve prospects vis-a-vis the smaller and 
’cruder’ nuclear powers, which remain theoretically 
susceptible to the crisis-temptation of initiating a first 
strike due to the extremely vulnerable non-secondystrike 
nfciture of their missiles * When added to the more important 
super-power BMD endeavors, the effecting of universal com­
prehensive Civil Defence training may be seen as resulting 
in practical immunity as concerns nuclear eventualities of 
th is type.
Home Guard - People’s War Dotenticils? A home guard, 
or territorial Army, had never really existed in the bSSRo 
She always appeared satisfied with the regular Army, 
supplemented by special border guard units. The practice 
of sending personnel to serve in other than their home 
provinces further emphasized the resultant defensive gap 
as far as potential guerilla or partisan activities in the 
face of invading forces were concerned. The gap may have . 
been considered of less importance in view of the post-war 
stress on offensive operations, and the emerging confidence 
that a future war would not be fought on Soviet territory.
And some might have been inclined to consider it as irrelevant 
in an era in which nuclear capacities would be used against an 
invader./
:{Lii
invader.
But the emerging problem-complex of the mid end 
late 1960s, acute Sino-ooviet tension over a militarily 
highly problematic border, clearly resurrected fears of 
hostile incursions, and stimulated a desire for 
supplementary capabilities. The above described training 
of civilians had as its implicit auxiliary the improvement 
and extension of Home Guard potentials* l\xid the emphasis 
of the above-quoted Pravda article on laxness in the 
Maritime Territory, and on the need to eliminate this, 
may then be correlated with the fact that this area was 
obviously that for which a Home Guard appeared most important 
at the time.
This is supported by a Pravda article of Hay 1970*
After first lauding the border-guards (They are "mobile,
motorized and te clinically-equipped and possess crack
cadres, modem arms and a high degree of combat readiness,— --
and (are) capable ---  of repelling --- armed provocations
on both the dry land and maritime sections of the border -— ") 
it proceeds to concern itself with "the working people of the 
borderlands": "The local Party and Soviet agencies hold a 
leading position in the organization of military - patriotic 
work and of mass mobilization for the rendering of assistance 
to the border-troops in the safeguarding of the frontier".
One may finally consider the USSR’s persistent refusal 
to acknowledge the Geneva convention according to which civil 
defence forces are prohibited from performing combat duties* 
Her ’grazhdanskye oboroni' have throughout been accepted as 
an integral part of her Armed Forces*/
93o Pravda 28th May, 1970
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Forceso
Aid. it becomes logical to conclude that the USSR has 
in practice if not in theory effected a substantial 'Home
/ Guard’ equivalent* ---
8D_ ibi Official Exposition: "The Political Side to Soviet 
Military Doctrine"*
Towards the end of 1968, Colonel candidate Milit* 
Larionov, (now retired^ and working with the Academy of 
Science’s "Institute - U * S * A *") , then on the General Staff, 
wrote the above named article* It constitutes one of the 
most comprehensive presentations of contemporary 
official thinkingo^Excerpts from it may therefore be 
quoted as a valuable supplement to our discussion, as 
well as an interesting yardstick for comparisons:
"Vfithin Soviet military doctrine it has been agreed to 
distinguish two facets - one political, and one military- 
technical* This is a haphazard differentiation, since our 
military doctrine emerges^ united harmonious system of 
the Party’s and State's ideas and decisions * * *. Thus Soviet 
military doctrine emerges as a concrete expression of the 
Communist Party's military policy* ****The Communist Party 
and its views regarding questions of war and peace in the 
present epoch retain the leading role in the formulation 
of Soviet military doctrine *..* (wars') objective existing 
origin (is) imperialism* Realistically viewing the possibility 
of new imperialist aggression, the Party finds it necessary/
94o Colonel Larionov, Ivom'iiunist Vooruzhionnylch Sil, No* 22 
November, 1968* The quotes are as translated by this 
author, who is also responsible for the emphases 
occasionally added*
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necessary with all means to strengthen the economic and 
military mighto
oooooootlie CPSU 2ord Congress directives on the new Five 
Year Plan state that v/e must ahways show concern that our
Armed Forces tiave the most modem typos of military
QC
equipment at their disposals The growth of Soviet 
defensive might is a necessary prerequisite to peace and 
people’s securityo" ”ooo„four-fifths of the industrial 
growth (in the LISA) since 1910 occurred during the two 
World Wars and the Korean War .« «,. monopolies have broken 
through State borders .».. super-concerns are formed .«, 
(and) military coalitions hostile to the socialist 
countries are built « « « « In the USA the military personnel 
occupy many leading State positions, and they are often 
appointed as diplomatic representatives, especially to 
countries v/here the USA conducts armed interference in 
local conflicts « o «.«" ".„ = ..The characteristics/classi­
fications (of war) can in our opinion be divided thuss 
according to a war’s political character; according to 
the class structures of the warring nations; according to 
the extent of the military conflict; according to the type 
of weaponry which is utilized oooo Vtl. Lenin divided wars 
into just and unjust just wars are those conducted to
liberate the subjugated from capitalism’s slavery, wars to 
protect freedoms won, and to achieve and assure national 
independenceooo»o A decision as to a war’s justness or 
unjustness is inextricably tied to its classification into/
95o Materials from the CPSU’s 23rd Congress, p.233,
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into types determined by the main lines in the social 
struggle. Such lines are: struggle between opposite social 
systems - socialism mid capitalism; the proletariat’s 
revolutionary attack on the bourgeoisie; the human masses’ 
joint struggle against monopolistic amalgamations; peoples’ 
national liberation wars against colonialists; battles between 
capitalist nations to strengthen the positions of monopoly 
capital. From these characteristics one may divide wars of 
our time into the following four‘categories: wars between 
states with opposite social systems; civil wars; national 
liberation wars; wars between bourgeois states.”
"The most bitter character belongs to wars between states 
with opposite social systems, wars in defence of a socialist 
fatherland against imperialist aggression. Such wars know 
no compromise and are conducted with a maximum utilization 
of all forces and means at the States’ disposal. Soviet 
military doctrine views such, wars by socialist states as the 
most just of all wars history has luiown.
"....The noimiiunist Party and the Soviet State taice 
full cognizance of the international situation which has 
emerged, the balance of forces on the world arena, the 
qualitative qdvances seen in the military field, and the 
capabilities of our probable enemies and the socialist 
brother nations. Put at the same time our doctrine rests on 
the superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the strongest 
capitalist armies, not only in technical-military sense, but 
also, and this is especially important,in the sense of 
military preparedness and morale.
"To another category belong natio.nal liberation wars.
The uniting of different anti-imperialist forces often occurs 
on a national basis, aid this often gives such wars a/
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wars a nationalist character. This must be taken into 
account . o... Imperialist forces often interfere in genuine 
civil wars under cover of "activity for peace", ostensibly 
to protect democratic liberties and with reference made to a 
request for help from the "legitimate" government. .*...
(the existence of) the socialist camp, of course, limits 
and restrains the possibilities for imperialist intervention 
o o. but oooo one cannot exclude the possibility that it can 
become necessary to provide the most determined opposition 
to interference into sucli countries from outside. Therefore 
ooo the Soviet military doctrine reflects the thesis of 
active support to the proletariat's armed struggle in civil 
wars and readiness to cut' off foreign interference with 
other nations' internal affairs.
"In wars between bourgeois states; which ore conducted to 
satisfy the interests of the exploiting classes, .... 
various political compromises are permissible. .... enormous 
calamity for the people...o. Leaders of the proletariat 
have always condemned the wars, while encouraging the 
people to wii-te in a revolutionary war oooo to turn a mutually 
destructive war of conquest into a civil war.
"oooo Wars of our time may be world-wide or local. ... A 
world war may cover a great part of our globe, incluaing all 
continents and oceans, and space adjacent to the earth. Such 
a waii? vrLll from the beginning have the character of a class 
war 0.0 0 (the parties) will set themselves determined 
political aims. ... the Soviet Union will (then) be forced 
to employ all its material and moral forces and possibilities 
so as to crush aggressors and once and for all smash 
capitalism as a system. In full accordance with this ... 
the Soviet military doctrine directs its i%in/prime attention/
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attention towards the preparing of the nation and the Armed 
Forces for a world-wide thermonuclear war.
"On the basis of means for the conducting of conflicts, 
wars of our time may be divided into nuclear and non-nuclear 
o o q the Soviet Union’s conduct is based on humane conside­
rations. o o
"Within the State’s activity to ensure the nation’s 
defence capacity, its economic organisational policies 
play a major role. One cannot escape a mutual interlocking 
of tasks concerning the development of the USSR’s defensive 
mighto An interlocking of considerations towards developing 
of the national economy and towards strengthening the 
nation’s defence in peace-time mal^ e it possible to ensure 
that the Armed Forces correspond to today’s demandso
"In war time one achieves interloeking of t>-. <> internal
domestic and external political functions through a near 
complete subordination of all to the achieving of the tasks 
of the nation’s military defence.
"Soviet military doctrine determines the political
principles for the military build-up .... Lenin formulated
the
the political principles for/bull ding up of an army of the 
new type. He placed the party’s leading role in the forefront 
Ô.OO certain population groups were (in the beginning) deprived
of the right to serve in the army. .... the army’s composition
of several nationalities, due to the particular domestic 
circumstances of our State, serves as a clear expression of 
the principle of internationalism in the build up of the 
Soviet Military.
"A most important principle .... is the single man 
leadership. ..I (it) ensures the necessary centralization 
of directions under conditions with very mobile and dynamic 
operations ... the personnel is organized and disciplined./
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disciplined.
"oooo(the necessity) to keep a regular cadre army built 
on the basis of general conscriptions ... (we must) at any/ 
every moment be prepared to beat bach an attack and inflict 
defeat on the enemy.
"The principles of a harmonious development of the 
branches of the Armed Forces .... do not entail that one 
keeps all forces and weapons-types on the same level, but 
that one seeks to have a rational ratio between them 
corresponding to .... combat possibilities and tasks at 
any one time.
"oooo the Party stresses.o. the increasing role of the
personnel of the Army and the Fleet, and its morale. It
correctly sees the moral-political and psychological 
education of the troops as one of the decisive factors towards 
achieving victory in a luodern war, o... A good result is 
based on humans equipped with modern material, who are fully 
conversant with such, who are ideologically steadfast and 
convinced that their cause .... is just."
"Important are ... the principles of adherence to the 
demands of military science and the art of war, of combining 
of theory and practice in education, of talcing account of
technical developments in our nation and abroad, and of
uniting a centralized leadership of the troops with initiative 
from the commanding cadres, and securing constant combat 
preparednesso
Comment seems unnecessary, except to note the stress on 
the troop morale factor, and to note the discrepancy between 
the generalities attached to the last three categories of 
war and the commitments attached to the first category - 
the only one which includes the USSR, by définition.
Conclusion s
The Armed Forces are thus expressly stated to 
constitute (only) one of the instruments at the disposition 
of a political leadership in the pursuit of its goals and 
aspirationso But the instrument should not be a dormant 
factor which is only to be activated in times of war. It has 
to be used actively in the battle for advantage also in the 
period of tension, of no peace - no war, in which the 
contemporary world lives.
There are two inherent necessities, both of which we 
have dealt with. The first (See chapter 6) is the development 
of the requisite physical range and capacity to allow 
effective political utilization of military capabilities in 
areas not adjacent to the homeland. The other is the campaign 
to enlarge and secure the home base by increasing civilian 
support and co-operation; - by both augmenting domestic 
support for the aims, and by increasing domestic aid towards 
the effectivlzing of the means.
CHAPTER 9.
Institutional Inter-Relations and Gommaxid Changes.
The previous chapter indicated that the inter-relationship 
and inter-dependence between the military and Party establish­
ments was of such a complexity and order as to cast question on 
any crude division of functions or spheres of influence.
The present chapter will first survey some developments 
with regard to strategic research facilities and the Military 
Command apparatus. This will be followed by a return to 
aspects of the inter-Party/lnter-Armed Forces alliances and 
allegiances dealt with in Chapter One. The final section vnll 
thereupon review post-Khrushchev military appointments« The 
aim will be to pin-point doctrinal decision—making venues 
and to identify such doctrinal, institutional and personnel^ 
allegiance changes and fluctuations as may have occurred»
The efforts towards the establishment of better-qualified
strategic research and decision-making councils were in part
referred to in earlier chapters. Initial developments were
there perceived as lying within the context of exhortations
such ass "Political leaders must, linow the potentialities of
strategy in order to set tasks before it skilfully (at each
historical s t a g e ) o f  assertions that even economic
developments entailed such strategic implications as made
military participation within the relevant planning organs both
2desirable and necessary ; and of pointed reminders regarding
1. "Voennaya Mysl" p edit., March 1956»
2o bagovsky, "Strategiai Ekonomika", Voenizdat, 1957, op.cito
3the implications of specific strategic realities .
The inherent anxieties and the logical conclusions were 
spelt out in the period following Khrushchev’s removal. There 
was the major Grechko article "25 years ago", of 25 May, 1966, 
wherein a review of past experiences led to the unamhivalent 
assertion that;, political leaders COULD in theory make mistalces 
when dealing with military matters. And Grechko himself 
followed this up the following year, again on the basis of a 
review of the 2nd World War and of the mistaices and hesitations 
which prece/ded it, by emphasizing the fact that "correct and 
timely evaluation of the si tuation prior to war, and the 
reaching of initial decisions" took on increased importance
and urgency in "the nuclear age""^ .    Further articles
in a, similar vein are related in Chapter 4»
As to conclusions, these were first explicitly pursued
by Marshal Sokolovsky and Maj. Générai Che re dni chenko in a 1966 
5article . Its theme expressly concerned the need for greater 
flexibility - and improved quality - of military doctrine 
in particular and strategic thinking in general. Their main 
argument concerned the Soviet need to match the combat readiness 
and deployment spread with which UATO was credited! UATO’s 
asserted peace-time deployment of forces in the right places, 
numbers and proportions for the achievement "of its main war 
tasks in a short period" was held up for emulationo And the
3o Emelin, "Sovremennaya Voennaya Telaiika”, pg. 131? Voenizdat 
1956, opocito ( - Referring to the inferiority-induced 
necessity to strike first if limited aapabilities were to 
be effectively utilized*),
4o Grechlco, "Yoenno-Istorichesky Zhumal", No. 6, 1966.
5o Kommunist Vooruzhiennikh Sil, ho. 7, April 1966.
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implied HATO sophistication was utilized to support the 
recommendation that either one established research institu­
tions such as the RAhD Corporation of the U.SoAo, or else one 
encouraged more extensive strategic discussions at General 
Staff levels than had hitherto been possible.
These aspirations clearly y t o u  establishment appreciation
of the need for significant military-expertise access to
defence policy de ci si on-malting councils^» There even emerged
informal admissions regarding the theoretical need for a new
"supreme military-political organ", - through vdiich information
might more easily be procured, and decisions more easily 
7disseminated *
The fact that no announcement was to be forthcoming 
about the establisiment of such an organ or institution was 
not in itself conclusive. One must caution against drawing the 
negative inference, if only because this has too easily led, 
and can too easily lead, to an assigning of responsibility to 
presumed Party prejudice against a body potentially able to
affect decision-malcing^o  ----  A conmient is appropriates
There appeared no reason why a body of this type should have 
more political leverage than could anyway be exercised singly 
or collectively by military leaders already enjoying prominence 
within the establishment» While it might have stream-lining 
benefits of efficiency, its political weight would in fact most 
likely merely reflect that of these same military eminences»
60 ItoGeneral Zav’yalov, Kraznaya Zvezda, 50-51 March, 1967o
7o Maj.General Zemskow, Kraznaya Zvezda, 7 dan., 1967.
8. On the basis of articles such as Colonel habin’s in
Kraznaya Zvezda, 6 April, 1967; he presented cautions 
against such separatist tendencies as could not be condoned 
due to the consequences they would entail»
And while an inter-service research body might forestall 
potential strategic one-sidedness occasioned by the dispropor^ 
tionate prominence of one or other partican of a particular
Q
serviee-branch or doctrine , it might equally be dominated 
by the said partisan.
Indirect evidence does in fact cast doubt on the ob'vious 
inference of an establislruent concensus - (however motivated, 
and however encouraged by the inertia inherent in familiarity 
and/or satisfaction vfith traditional procedures) that 
aclmowledged necessary qualitative improvements could be 
effected through existing procedureSo It is to these tradi­
tional channels that one must turn for guidance.
9 A - A historical survey of the apex of the Military 
Command Apparatus is essential for an understanding of its 
present-day composition and function^^»
March 1918 saw the establishment of a Higher (.Vysshiy) 
Military Council, composed of "the military leader and tvm 
Political Commissars", and responsible for "leadership of all 
military operations of the Red Army"* "Subsequently the 
composition and tasks of the higher Military Council were 
significantly broadened"» And "From April 1918 the People’s 
Commissar for War and Haval Affairs, members of the Collegia 
of the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs and also 
specialists on military and naval Affairs were on the higher 
Military Council"
9» One here thinks e.g» of suggestions that Zhukov wau
responsible for the continued (and even increased?) neglect 
of naval strategic potentials during the mid-1950So - See 
G-arthoff, "Soviet Military Policy   ", op« ciin ,pg»50o
10» For much of the below I am indebted to the detective-work 
and translating of Haariet Fast Scott, - See her SRI Paper 
on "Soviet Military Doctrine, Its formulation and 
Dissemination"5 pg» 60-64o
11» Vo Do Sokolovsky, ed, "Military Strategy" ("Voennaya
Strategia"), 3rd ed»,pg» 417, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968»
But it failed to cope satisfactorily with, war-time
demands, and was re-organized: "On 2* Sept., 1918, by special
edict of the YTsIK, the country was declared a military camp,
and the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic was
12formed as the highest organ of direction of the Red Army" o 
The Revolutionary Military Council continued to function 
throughout the Civil War and until 1934, when it was replaced 
by the Military Council, attached to the People’s Coimiissariat 
of Defence»
This v;as again re-organized, in March 1938, when it 
became the Main (G-lavny) Military Council of the Red Army:
"It was attached to the People’s Commissariat of Defence. It 
examined basic questions on the organizing of the Red Army and 
on the strengthening of the defence capability of the country". 
"At the same time the Main Military Council of the Kavy was 
formed"
On the second day of the war the Stavka of the High 
Command was form ed, taking over responsibility from the Main 
Military Council. Peace saw the 8tavka replaced by the 
Higher Military Council»
"In February, 1946, the Higher (Vysshiy) Military Council^ 
which was attached to the Ministry, Yfas formed"
—— -"In March 1950, subsequent to the division of the Ministry 
of the Armed Forces, the Higher (Vysshiy) Military Council was 
created. It was attached to the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR. Main (Glavny) Military Councils were formed, which were
12o ibido
13o ’50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR’, pg» 1 9 9 s
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968»
14» Ibid, pgo 256»
15attached to the War and haval Ministries” »
The immediate pre-war terminological confusion was
evidently resolved hy nailing the highest organ, at Council
of Ministers’ level, the Higher Military Council, and the
Service Ministry orgai or organs as Main « Evidence
suggests that this practice was continued after the 1955 re«^
uniting of the Service Ministries into the Ministry of Defence,
with one Main Military Council being attached to the 
17Ministry s"' The most important questions of military
policy are discussed and decided collectively at Congresses 
of the Party and Plenums of the Central Committee» Organs of 
collective leadersh/,ip are also found directly in the Armed 
Forces in the Main (G-lavny) Military Council, and in the 
military coun.cils of the services of the Armed Forces, militg.ry 
districts and fleets. Military councils, collectively examine 
and decide all important questions in the daily life and 
activity of the troops”.
This author could find no exact reference th the work of 
the supreme Higher Military Council during the early end mid. 
1960So Sokolovsky (who was quoted above), did however refer to 
the 8tavka. The reference was most unclear and ambiguous, and 
produced the impression that the Stavka Idid not exist at 
present but would be created at times of war.
1 5 o Ibido, p g o  4-78.
1 6 o 8o8o Lagovsky, "Army of the Soviets", pg. 4 0 5 ,  
Politizdat, Moscow, 1 9 6 9 .
1 7  » AoSo Zheltov, "V.I. Lenin an.d the Soviet Armed Forces”, 
p g o  1 4 8 ,  Voenizdat, Moscow, 1 9 6 7 .
But by the late 1960s came evidence that the Stavka was 
synonjrraous with the Higher Military Council, or at least that 
the bodies enjoying either title had been so similar in function 
and composition as to encourage inter-changeability of désigna- 
tion o And by 1971 came evi den ce that a S tavka DID enlst:
"In correspondence with   (Respective-C.G. J » ) tasks
each service of the Armed Forces is designated for waging 
military actions primarily in one definite sphere — - on the 
ground, at sea, or in the air and accomplishes the
fulfilment of tasks under the leadership of the Commander in 
Chief of this service of the Armed Forces, or directly of the 
8tavka of the Supreme Commander”
Sokolovsky's obfuscation may then be seen either as 
intentional and motivated by political or security considera­
tions; or one might presume the Marshal to be correct, and 
infer that the Stavka remains formally a war-associated term 
for the body otherwise known as the Higher Military Council.
Or it might be due to the book being out-of-date (it was 
prepared in 1957)o In this case the later existence of a 
8tavka might be seen to reflect on the representations described 
in the first section of this chapter (above) -—  I ?
The hierachy established by the early 1970s may in 
conclusion be delineated as follows:
1) The Stavka, cum Higher Military Council, attached to 
the Council of Ministers. One can procure no information 
regarding its size. 'But "reliable sources’ name Kosygin as 
chairman, a Col.General of the General Staff as Secretary, and
18 0 YUoPo Petrov, "The Structure of Political Organs of the 
Party and Komsomol Organs of the Army and Havy", pg» 391, 
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968.
19o SoKo Kozlov, "Officers Handbook", ("Spravochnik Ofitsera") 
pgo 127, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971.
Marshal' Zakharov as enjoying a pivotal role. There are also
indications that the Minister of Defence, and his Ist. Deputy
and Deputy Ministers are members. One might perhaps further
presume access also as concerns CPSU General Secretary Breshnev
and the Secretariat’s 'strategic overseer' Ustinov, if that is
20indeed his role.
2) The Main Military Council, attached to the Ministry of
Defence. Its composition is unkiown. But representatives 
from, each Service may be presumed to be members, together with 
the Minister and his Deputies.
3) The Military Councils attached to individual Service
branches and Military Districts. These were in 1958 (on the
occasion of Khrushchev's re-emphasising of the Party’s
directing role), expanded to include the military commander,
Ills 1st. Deputy Commander, and his Chief of Staff, plus his
"political" military colleague, the Secretary of the local
21Party commettee and "leading workers". Apropos of military-
party integration and mutual sympathy: Amiong the local Party
22Secretaries then included were K.T. Mazurov, V.P. Mzhavanadze, 
ho Vo Podgomy and A.P. Kirilenko. The first, third and fourth 
are to-day full Members of the Politburo, the second is a
Candidate Member --  all with a number of years of close
contact with the Commanders of their areas' Military Districts 
behind them. Many of the latter have meanwhile become leading 
members of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Establish­
ment.
20. The designation is inferred from a) his long association 
with and supervision of defence industries, combined v/ith 
b) 5 his Secretariat status. It is supported by his 
protocol ranking above the Minister of Defence (See e.g. 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 July, 1969).
21. Yu.P. Petrov, op.cit, pg. 444.
22. Ibid.
Tlie exact importance, function or responsibility of the 
different councils is union own. There are, as shown, indications 
that the Stavka/Higher Military Council may for some years have 
been in abeyance as a formal body, only to be resuscitated 
follovnng the acceptance of the need for more sophisticated 
research and policy-coordinating facilities. But these indica­
tions may be misleading» And although the body now appears to 
be formally constituted, its operational mode may in practice 
be more akin to the British pattern» That is, with most policy 
deliberation and decision-maloing conducted not in quorum, but 
through informal ties and consultations between the political 
leadership and some of the more prominent military professionals* 
As for strategic research, no more is laiown. It appears 
plausible to view it as still basically fragmented betv^een 
the various headquarters and commands. But one may presume 8. 
certain amount to be co-ordinated, on direct commission from the 
supreme body or one or more of its members, or through research 
facilities attached to the General Staff»
9 B Inter-Party/lnter-Armed Forces alliances and allegiances: 
One must again revert to Chapter One and the therein treated 
"Stalingrad group" (See also the introductory comments of 
Chapter Three). Kolkomcz' treatment of the group , or 
constellation, was viewed with some scepticism due to its in 
part non-credible assertions regarding post-war group 
allegiances and factional preferences, - due to the unanswered 
questions which arise from his inferences regarding the 1950s and
2'5o Kolkowicz, R., op.cit*, pg. 224-258, 241-255, 279 and 281.
1960s. And one may in fact question also the basis for his 
group identification. Goimnon war experiences certainly acted 
as a cementing agent. But the identified group members had 
bonds of even greater ages Most of them studied together, at
PÆ
the Frunze Academy, or at the General Staff Academy » hever-> 
theless, the "Stalingrad" categorisation can be justified and 
may be retained, in tribute to Kolkowicz’ diligent data 
gathering, if not to all his conclusions»
As regards the contemporary situation, with 'group' 
members retaining positions of pre-eminences The long history 
of their relationships must be stressed. A reading of the 
memoirs some of them have written encourages the superficial 
conclusion that each is the others' best friend This
may be correlated with the evidence referred to in our section 
above (supplementing: IColkowicz' documentation), of an extra­
ordinary history of working contact vd.th political leaders 
eminent at the present time. The logical conclusion must 
emphasize harmony, both of basic concepts and of basic 
aspirations»
As concerns future developments, Kolkomcz himself 
pointed out how group members were spread after the v/hr One 
section occupied prime command posts in the east, another in 
the north-west, a third in Warsaw Pact or West Central areas, 
and a fourth in Moscow» There was some movement within and 
betv^ een these categories» Bu.t it was not until after 1965 that
24-0 Kazakov, M.I», "had Kartoi Viiliikh Srazhenii", 2nd»ed., 
Voenizdat, Moscow 1971»
25o Kolkomcz, R», op»cit., pg» 259-24-7»
'the group’ as such might be said to re-assemble, this time in
Moscow^^o And while the separation, appears not to have
affected inter-group affinity, one may infer a somev\rhat
ambiguous consequence of relevance to the future„
It may be presumed that each prominent 'group' member
gradually acquired a separate retinue of commanders and
officers, as well as separate ties with local or provincia,!
Party members. In the absence of any definite indications of
post Brezhnev-Kosygin political successions or policies it is
impossible to guage the future importance of any of the
foetus 'groups' thus developed. Any such attempt would entail
27greater promise for pitfalls than for illuninating inferences » 
It is best to restrain oneself to pointing out that the days 
of contemporary group conceptions are numbered»
9 G. The final investigatory venue of some promise relates to 
post “Khrushchev military appointments; - the changing 
pattern of military leadership: a synopsis of the more 
importent changes will be followed by an analysis of inferable 
charact eristies»
Marshal Malinovsky’s death was soon followed by a. rather 
extensive replacement, transferal and supplementing of leading 
cadres within the Armed Forces. Although his death v/ill be 
seen as a co-incidental and not a causal factor, it serves as 
a convenient point of departure»
At the centre, Marshal Grechlco' s 12th April, 1967, 
appointment as Minister of Defence was by the end of 1967 
accompanied by: Marshal 1.1» Yalcubovsky's elevation to 1st 
Deputy Minister of Defence, and Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander;
26» Mbid, pgo 255o
27» The data of Chapter One and Three strongly support this 
assertion»
Army General Sdo Sokolov’s transfer and promotion from
Cmdr. of the Leningrad Military District to 1st Deputy Minister
of Defence (and co-ordinating officer vkLthin the Ministry);
Army General I.G» Pavlovsky's promotion from Cmdr» of the Par
Eastern M.D. to Deputy Minister of Defence, and Commander in
28Chief of Soviet Land Forces ; and Naval Cmdr» Gorshloov's 
elevation to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union»
- By the end of 1968 eleven of the Military Districts 
had been given new Commanding Officers: Bel o-Eus si an MoD. 
ColoGeneral Tretyak (June 1967); Carpathian M.D» - ColoGenera 
Bisyarin (October 1967); Par Eastern M.D» - ColoGeneral 
Losik (May 1967), Kiev M.Do - Gol.General Kulikov (July 
1967); Leningrad M*Do - Col.General Shavrov (June 1967); 
Moscow MoDo - ColoGeneral Ivanovsky (June 1968); North 
Caucasus M.D. - ColoGeneral Altunin (Oktober 1968); Odessa 
Mo Do - ColoGeneral Shurupov (May 1968); Siberian M»Do 
ColoGeneral Tolubko (June 1968); Trans-Caucasian MoD» - Colo 
General Kurkotin (May 1968); Volga M.D. - ColoGeneral Parshi' 
kov (May 1968); And a new Military District, the Central 
Asian M.Do, was created - carved out of the old Turkestan M.Do 
in response to increasing Chinese border tensions. It became 
responsible for all areas bordering on Sinkiahg, was head­
quartered in Alma At a, and put under the command of Army General 
Lyashchenko »
28o Armed Forces appointments and transfers in general emerge 
only through a scrutiny of the Soviet press, - typically 
through the printing of an article by the affected officer 
with the new title or position noted beneath the officer's 
name at the end of the article. A variation of this 
practice was exemplified by Pavlovsky's promotion» This 
was first noted vAien a Krasnaya Zvezda report on a, speech 
he gave to military joumali sts (24th Dec.,1967) 
ascribed the said title to him»
29Five Military Academies received new Commanding Officers
The Gagarin Air Force Academy - Air Force Marshal Rndenlco
(October 1968); The General Staff Academy - Army General Ivanov
(October 1968); The Finnze Academy - Army General Stnchenlco
(November 1968); The Military Armoured Corps - Col.General
Babadzhanyan (October 1967); The Military Commanders' Acahemy,
Anti Aircraft Forces - Col.General Zimin (December 1967)o
Other notable changes of this periods Ma.rshal Batitsky,
previously 1st Deputy Chief of Staff under Marshal Zaltharov,
was appointed to head the F.V.Oo (Static Air Defence) and was
30subsequently promoted ; General Shtemenko, Deputy Chief of th
General Staff became also Chief of Staff, Combined Armed Forces
31of the Warsaw Pact ; Air Force General Kutakhov emerged to
32become 1st Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force , and 
was promoted to Marshal in anticipation of an iimminent
33succession to ageing k.A. Vershinen as Commander in Chief ; 
Army General Maryakhin succeeded the 71 year old Bagramian 
as Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander of the Main
34.
Directorate for the Rear Forces ColoGeneral Malykhin was
35appointed Maryalchin's 1st Deputy ; ColoGeneral Grigoriev
36became 1st Deputy Commander of the Strategic Rocket Defence ;
29o Rudenko’s and Ivanov’s promotions emerged from ’Voenno-
Istorichesky Zhumal’, No. 10, 1968; S tu chenko’s, Babadz­
hanyan’s and Zimin’s appeared in Krasnaya. Zvezda, 6 DeOo, 
1968, 27 Octo and 31 Dec., 1967; Babadzhanyan was later
promoted to Marshal of the Tank Forces (Isvestia, 29 Oct.
19671)
30» Pravda 16 April, 1968, and Krasnaya Zvezda 15 April, 1969°
31 o Krasnaya Zvezda 6 August, 1968 (A comeback towards the
authority he enjoyed as Chief of Staff under Stalin).
32» Isvestia 18 August, 1968, and Krasnaya Zvezda 22 Feb»1969o
33o Duly confirmed by Krasnaya Zvezda on 19 March, 1969
following also his elevation to USSR Deputy Minister of 
Defence (Krasnaya Zvezda 26 April, 1969)o
34» Krasnaya Zvezda 16 June, 1968,and 28 June, 1968°
35o Krasnaya Zvezda 14 August, 1968»
36» Krasnaya Zvezda 15 November 1968»
AJl V
ColoGeneral Ogarkov was promoted from Gmdro of the Volga M.Do
37to 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff (Presumed to he in
charge of Operations); DtoGeneral Mayorov hecame Commander of
38the new Central Forces Group (Czechoslovakia);and Lt.General
39Sozinov became Chief of Staff of the Air Defence System »
1969-70 saw a continuation of this high rate of
transfers and replacements, the chief of which were: ColoGeneral
Tolubko was transferred to Commander of the Par Eastern
MoDo^^g while his predecessor there, Col.General Losik, became
Commandant of the Tank Academy in Moscow^'^; Lt. General Ivanov
replaced ColoGeneral Ko Provalov as Comiander of Southern 
42Forces (Hungary); ColoGeneral Khomulo was transferred from 
1st Deputy Cmdr. in Chief of Soviet Forces in the DDR to
A '5
Commander of the Siberian M.Do ; his former Commander, Mars had,
Koshevoi, vm.s soon thereafter replaced by ColoGeneral Kulikov^^;
LtoGeneral Salmanov took up duties as the new Commander of the
4-5Kiev Military District ; while Col.General Dankevich became 
Deputy Commander of the Strategic Rocket Defence^^.
37» Krasnaya Zvezda 16 August, 1968»
38» Krasnaya Zvezda 29 December, 1968,
39o Krasnaya Zvezda 4- December, 1968,
4-0» Krasnaya Zvezda 6 August, 1969°
41o Krasnaya Zvezda 8 August, 1969»
42o Krasnaya Zvezda 7 Hovembbr, 1969°
43o Krasnaya Zvezda 31 July, 1969, - Khomulo's successor in
the DDR YJ0.S L t o  General Govorov; as re, his Siberian fief,
a new Chief of Staff, Maj .General Pashuk, had been 
assigned just prior to Khomulo’s transfer. See Krasnaya 
Zvezda 24 May, 1969»
44-0 Krasnaya Zvezda 17 November, 1969, and Isvestia 1 May, 1970
(For his promotion to General of the Army)°
43o Krasnaya Zvezda 10 December,1969*
46o Krasnaya Zvezda 3 August, 1969o
XY
The survey of 1967-70 land and air command changes may he
rounded of hy noting Marshal Kutakhov’s confirmation as
Conmiander of the Air Force (see footnote 33), and hy mentioning
the 1970 promotions of Col.General Silant'yev, to Chief of the
Main Air Staff, and LtoGeneral of the Tank Corps Ohaturov, to
Commander of the Carpathian
Within the Navy the same period saw the o,pi ointment of
Rear*A.dmiral YaoNo Gloha as 1st Deputy Commander of the Balti c 
47Fleet o But of greater importance was the appointment of 
Admiral Smirnov, exoCommander of the Fleet's Operations Depart­
ment^^, to Pacific Fleet Commander. His predecessor, Admiral 
ArneIk0, was transferred on 1 April, 1959, to Assistant 
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy.
Shortly thereafter the incumbent Deputy, Fleet Admiral 
Kasatonov, was promoted to 1st Deputy Commander in Chief of the 
Soviet Navy'^ o^ This was follov\red by the promotions to Fleet 
Admirals also of Sergeyev, the Chief of the Admiralty Staff^^,
and (significantly) of Lobov, the Commander of the Northern
The top naval leadership was thus to look as follows: 
Commander in Chief - Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union^^ 
Gorshlcov; 1st Deputy Commander in Chief - Fleet Admiral Kasa­
tonov; Assistant Commander in Chief - Admiral Amelko; Chief of 
Admiralty Staff - Fleet Adiiiral Sergeyev; Commander of the
4-7o Morso Oboron No. 4-, 1969»
48» During which time he served as Cmdr. of the Fleet in the
Mediterranean and wrote a lengthy article on its activities; 
his transfer was first noted in Isvestia, 20 May, 1969»
49o Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 October, 1969»
30» Pravda, 1 May, 1970»
5I0 Supr» Soviet decree of 28 July, 1970»
52» Isvestia, 29 October 1967»
Northern Fleet - Fleet Admiral Lobov; Commander of the 
Pacific Fleet - Admiral Smimovo
In attempting to draw relevant implications from these 
changes, the first comment ought perhaps to he that they/ 
brought a new generation of commanders into prominence» The 
amorphous 'Stalingrad group' retained its hold on policy- 
influencing positions, as indicated for example in memberships 
of the Central Committee. But younger cadres were being 
promoted at a rate not generally appreciated in the west (see 
below)o
Special importance continued to be attached to certain 
positions and areas, especially the Kola and Far East Command 
areas (The geo-political reasons for this were analiaed in 
Chapter 7. And historical Soviet appreciation of these reasons 
is reflected in a list of previous commanderss Zakharov, Krylov, 
Eremenko and Malinovsky in the east; Stuchenko, Zakharov, 
Krylov, Bagramian and Kazakov in the north-west). Previous 
distinction appeared to be a pre-requisite for commands in 
these areas, as seen for example in the cases of Tolubko, 
promoted to Army General in May, 1970^^, and Admiral Smirnov»
And a successful execution of command seemed to lead to 
positions of high central military authority, as seen in the 
cases of General Pavlovsky^^ and General Sokolov, and 
Admiral Amelko».
53o Isvestia 1 May, 1970»
54-0 Brought to Moscow in June 1967 after (according to Moscow 
Army sources) having "revolutionized" Par East defences 
while Commander of the Far Eastem M. B», - to perform the 
same on a national scale. One of his minor but interesting 
Far East innovations is thought to be the introduction of 
helicopter inspection of the Mongolian-Chinese border by 
joint Soviet-Mongolian crews.
This is testified to also hy the fact that both the 
Pacific Fleet and the Far East M.P. Coimr.anders are Candidate 
Members of the select CPSU Central Committee, together with 
the Northern Fleet Coiimiander, while the Leningrad M.Do 
Commander is a full Member (as are the former MoLo Commanders 
Pavlovsky and Sokolov) » One ought however to note that the 
prominence thus attested related primarily to the positions, 
not to the incumbents. Admiral Amelko had to give up his 
Candidate standing upon leaving the Pacific command, in spite 
of his promotion. This reflects both on the exclusive charac­
ter of the Central Committee (Uorslhcov himself, a full Member, 
is the only other naval representative)^^, and on the vital 
role attached to the above-mentioned commands.
Some commentators saw Tolubko's transfer as epitomising 
a new policy, according to which prior experience with both 
conventional and non-conventional weaponry brought priority 
consideration for any promotions of consequence. This was 
based on the fact that he had been a tanli officer prior to 
being transferred to the Strategic Rocket forces (where he 
served as Deputy Commander, before being given the Siberian 
M.D.)» Khomulo has also been seen as exemplifying this 
perceived trend, in consideration of the accredited thorough 
nuclear/conventional integration of his former command, Soviet 
Forces in the DDR. ^
55c Pravda, 10 April, 1971»
56. Ibid. (and see Chapter 8:) - 1971 C.G. elections resulted
in 5 representatives from the Navy, 5 from the M r  Defence, 
2 from the Strategic Rocket Troops, 2 from the Ground 
Forces, 1 from the Rear Services and 4- from the Political 
A dmini strat i on.
57o See e.go Peter Krushin, in the Bulletin of the Inst, for
the Study of the USSR, Munich, Vol. XVI, No. 10»
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Xet this appears to he incorrect. The integration of nuclear 
weaponry within the Armed Forces clearly placed a premium on 
corresponding training and experience* But the real trend was 
towards greater specialization, not towards generalized 
acquaintance.
This is supported by the follovnng assertion by Cd.General 
Grigoriev, 1st Deputy Conmiander in Chief of the Strategic 
Rochet Forces (in a, review accompanied by photographs, of the
role and present capabilities of his command) " --   Our
troops are composed of mature and highly educated cadres. It 
is enough to mention that more than 95$ of the md-ssile officers 
have a higher and secondary education» The officer corps 
possesses outstanding command skills and organizational 
abilities. The percentage of engineering and teclmical per-- 
sonnel in our units is growing constantly. At present these 
personnel account for 80$ of the entire officer corps* The 
commander vdio is at the same time an engineer has become a 
central figure."
Or, as stated by Marshal K rylov :" -- - A missile
soldier has no right to be a specialist of only average 
competence; he must be a tru e master of his profession»"
And similar assertions became increasingly prominent also
60with regard to other Service branches, the Navy in particular
58» "Powerful Strike Force", in Isvestia 20 November, 1969. 
59o "Strategic Missile Troops", in Pravda 19 November, 1969, 
60o See e.go Kasatonov, in Krasnaya Zvezda 27 July, 1969»
Tolubko's promotions therefore reflected not so much the 
'integrated' nature of his experiences * His original transfer 
from the Strategic Rocket Forces reflected rather the fact 
that he was not really a missile specialist, end had no 
engineering background of relevance. (Although his 'strategic' 
backgroun.d and reputation was not to come amiss in the Far 
East, where it later served to re-emphasize the importance 
assigned to the command). - khomulo's promotion may be better 
explained by recalling his reputation as an expert on combat 
trainings his recall to a domestic command was presuaably 
motivated, or influenced by, the re -o rg a n iz in g  of combat 
t ra in in g  practices and concepts at present being imolementedo
Tills primary emphasis on tbe requirements of the position 
rather than on the character of the incumbent invites also a 
focusing on MaryaJchin. His appointment as Commander of the 
Main Directorate for the Rear was made important by the c ru c ia l 
nature of logistics witliin Soviet tactical concepts* (See 
Chaptersl, 3, 4, and, especially, the end of Chapter 6)» With 
th e achieving of strategic parity, and the emergence of 
interventionary and general purpose forces, the question of 
logistics necessarily commanded increasing attention and 
priority»
But it is nevertheless tim e to survey also the character 
of the new incumbents * The first point must relate to their 
relative youth* There remained a number of older officers 
still serving in prominent positions, such as Marshal Zakharov 
(bom 1898), or Deputy Minister of Defence Marshal Krylov (bom 
1903) and Marshal Vershinen (born 1900)* This reflected partly 
the fact that Marshals of the Sovi et Union never retires they 
are exempt from the 60 year retirement age which applies to all 
officers up to 4-star rank» But it may be assumed to reflect 
also on their capabilities* Aid it reflected, finally, on a
reported shortage of higher officers (I) - presumably arising 
out of the cumulative effects of the Czechoslovak intervention, 
and continuing tension along the Chinese horder^^* The service 
of these elcer officers ought not, however, to he allowed to 
obscure the trend towards promotion of youtho
A large percentage of prominent incumbents in 1970 were 
under 60, a considerable number were in the 50™55 year bracket, 
and some were still in their fortieso They generally made 
their name originally as lower and middle rank officers during 
the 2nd world war, achieving the first rank of General only 
in the 1950s<, Army General Maryakhin^ s career pah tern is a 
typical exampleo
Many of them did not choose or feel obliged to join the 
CPSU until comparatively late in their careerso Typicah are 
havy Commander in Chief Gorshkov, who only joined the Party in 
1 9 4 2  (a year after becoming, at 31? the youngest Admiral of 
the Soviet N avy); Admiral Amelko, who joined the Party at 
30 years of age? in 1944; and General Ogarkov, v\fho joined the 
Party in 1945? vhien he warn 28o
Yet they subsequently gained access to the highest policy 
councils, excepting only the Politburo itselfo An analysis of 
the 100-odd top marshals, generals and admirals (including 
CPSU Central Committee Members and Candidates, Supreme Soviet 
representatives, and the remaining 4-star rank and above
6I0 The existence of a deficit in khe number of higher officers 
was revealed'- by Colonel Losik, then Military Attache 
(ex-Gmdro of the Moscow garrison, and with Siberian 
experience), to a colleague in 1968* The deficit is 
startling when compared to what has been considered the 
reverse situation, in ’bhe West during the post-w ar years, 
and the inference above therefore appears warrantedo
62o It is proper here to comment on Western speculations
regarding Soviet military senility and/or purges, such as 
were occasioned by the 23rd April to 10th May, 1969? 
Krasnaya Zvezda aimouncements of the death of 12 Generals*
On that occasion 6 of the deceased were over 65 years of age 
And a wider reading revealed that the 12 deaths brought the 
number announced so far that year to only 33; the number
63personnel of the Armed Forces)? points to two conclusions :
The first confirms the conclusion regarding relative youtho The 
second relates to the fact that well over half occupy seats in 
the Supreme Soviet high Government posts (outside the
military)* Yet only a few are Political officers? as opposed 
to regular staff officers and line officers o'*
This second point further supports our tentative 
conclusion of a greater stress on professionalism vùthin 
the Armed Forces * Military competence was accorded somevihat 
greater priority vis-a-ris "political" considerations than 
might have been the case in the past* This does not mean that 
political considerations? in the form either of fine ideological 
variations or of personal contact with politicians? may not 
remain a factor of concern* In fact, rumours that such are 
responsible for this or that promotion can often be picked  
up in Moscow* But the evidence of our previous sections 
encourages a discounting of these (on the grounds of their 
being mj.sleading and/or of their pursuit being inherently 
futile)o The available evidence clearly suggested a basic and 
mutually recognised compatibility of Party and military 
aspirations^ And it suggested that this compatibility was of 
an order to allow the Party confidently to delegate most 
problems of military concern to the councils of military 
professionalso
The deaths may therefore be seen merely as confirming 
the suggested demand for experienced officers to remain 
in active service^
63o See Harriet Fast Scott? The Soviet High Command-Age
Analysis? in "Soviet. Military Doctrine? Its Formulation 
and. Dissemination", SoRoI* Paper? April? 1971o 
The treated CPSU CC is that elected in 1966; the Supreme 
Soviet that elected in 1970* It must be said that the 
CPSU CC-elections of 1971 only confirm her conclus!one„
See also our Chapter 8? Section on Military Representation 
on Party and Government bodies*
G on dus ion g The aim of this Chapter was defined as "to 
pin-point doctrinal de oi si on-making venues and to identify 
such doctrinal, institutional and personnel-allegiance changes 
and fluctuations as may have occurred*"
The first aim was pursued through a historical tracing 
of military conmiand developments* This endeavor clarified 
some of the obfuscation surrounding the complex of contemporary 
institutions* And it made possible the delineation of the 
Military Council hierachy of to-day*
As regards the further aims our analysis of the increasing
professionalism and specialization of the new officer cadres
encouraged us to decrease the importance attached to institué' 
tional and personnel-allegiance factors* Vüien correlated also 
with the more balanced contemporary development of the service 
branches? this indicated that no single service or institution 
coukd any longer hope to gain disproportionate dominance* Even 
Krylov's missile command would henceforth share its important 
strategic influence with the havy and the Air Force* Aside 
from the aspect of specialization, no common denominator could 
be found to embrace the new cadres*
With reference specifically to doctrinal changess the
analysis invited scepticizm regarding the extent to which 
these could be deduced* The importance of a personnel change 
was generally determined not so much by the character of the 
man? as by the status of the post* Maryakhin's professionalism 
is a, case in point» Ills appointment's importance was indicated 
by his background? but wan more reliably gauged in the light of 
such doctrinal emphases as could be inferred from ascertainable 
policy declarations, and visible procurement orientations *
Naval developments provide a similar example on a wider 
scale* The type and cpuality of the relevant promotions? 
together v/ith the increasing assertiveness of naval literature*^^
suggested doctrinal changes or re-adjustments in favour of 
the Na,vyo But they might on the other hand he seen as merely 
mirroring the more conclusive evidence* This consisted of 
general policy pledges? plus such procurement programs as 
could not have been initiated if the indicated changes or 
re-adjustments had not already occurred*
It is appropriate once more to resurrect the caution 
of Chapter Three and elsewhere» Co many part-contradictory 
motives can determine the orientation of given speeches or 
articles? as to cast serious doubts on the using of a study 
of these as a prime source for doctrinal inferences*
64* See e*g* Kasatonov's articles? as related at the end of 
Chapter 4o
CHAPTER 10 
SUPER-PQVÆR IMPLICATIONS
10 A Super-Power Status; Reflections.
Henry Kissinger is the best Imown exponent of the
"military bipolarity, but diplomatic multipolarity" concept,
as that best describing the situation of the lathr' 1960s*
He considered this to have evolved once the mutual destruction
capability of the super-powers became assured. With mutual
destruction capability assured, one could no longer envisage
a raison d'etre for either to initiate a nuclear exchange;
he concluded that the very strength of the super-powers'
nuclear arsenals in fact provided greater security for lesser
powers* It gave them, greater freedom to pursue independent
1national interests*
But the argument may be at fault* Assured mutual 
destruction and second-strike capability did evolve* Rut 
this does not necessarily preclude the use of nuclear weapons 
in some capacity in local military conflicts, interventions 
or initiatives* It could to the contrary merely ensure 
that local conflicts, whether nuclear or not, would not 
escalate to the stage of involving either super-power's "home 
area"* Military bipolarity may in fact not militate against 
either's involvement in local conflict-areas (through fear of 
escalation and destruction),but rather encourage involvement, 
since its inherent corrolary would inhibit the other from 
escalating beyond the local confines*
It might be expressed somewhat differently: excepting
the real possibility of significant changes, through the
lo Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy", 
in Brookings Institute's "Agenda for the Nation", 1968*
development of unlrnowa or new weapon systems, present 
developments leave little room between "brealcthrongb" level 
and "elimination" level* 7/bat is referred to, of course, is 
the anomaly whereby the super-powers have not only reached 
some kind of equilibrium in their technological and weapon 
systems development, but have achieved or can achieve
2
invulnerability to all but major assaults by the other*
This author consequently tends to conclude: (a) There no
longer exists a plausible basis for expecting either super­
power to intervene against the other's national area or
sphere, no matter the cause or circumstance (always remem- 
the
be ring/above reservation) ; (b) it follows that vital
inhibitions on potential inclinations to engage in fringe 
interventions may thereby be removed* This could lead to an 
escalating scramble to secure the adherence of non-committed 
states to either's sphere, a scramble which ooul.d see 
"preventive interventions" - based on the logical convictior 
that the other will not interfere against the presence of 
one's own forces*
Herein lies a basic potential for instability, as well 
as for super-power confrontations* The crucial point which 
follows from (a) is that such confrontations will be local, 
or at least remain in areas outside the two's immediate 
spheres, whether the confrontations are nuclear or not* The 
limitations are restricted to locale, not to the scale of the 
confliot*
As regards the possible removal of inhibitions affecting
2. Viz*, the cost-exchange ratios revealed by the ITS Dept, 
of Defence's "Posture Papers" of 1967 and 1968, op.cit. ; 
the assertion refers, of course, to the technological 
possibility of BHDs of great effect* See previous 
presentations and discussions.
interventionary designs, this may have consequences not Immedi
ately obvious. Concerning Vfest Europe some strategists
concluded by the late 1960s that any expectation of US
retaliation against Soviet aggression had become utopian, and/
or irrational, with the advent of an assured Soviet capacity
%
to strike against the US homeland. They proceded from this 
conclusion, to urge acceptance of the thesis that; the 
installation of a US B¥D did not reflect or entail US 
isolationism. By providing some credible defence capability, 
it to the contrary reintroduced the otherwise defunct 
possibility that the US might intervene in defence of West 
Europe,^
The argument is correct, but insufficient. The 
credibility of US assured destruction capabilities did, 
together with the credibility of her activating and utilizing 
this, act as a deterrent to any Soviet designs that might be 
envisaged* But the emerging credibility of the Soviet 
countering capabilities, acted as an equally powerful 
deterrent aganst US reactions (or actions). If our sugges­
tion, that the development of mutual capabilities had reached 
the stage wherein any direct action by either against the 
other’s home area was inconceivable, then a very different 
alternate conclusion emerges.
This would see the elimination of the deterrence on both 
action and reaction, by either super-power — as regards 
non-direct confrontations. The possibility and/or likelihood
Herman Kahn presented this view forcefully at the 1969 
Oslo Conference, op,cit*
Ibido no-one should or can expect the USA necessa­
rily to intervene in aid of friends if she herself is not 
attacked and if her intervention may mean self-destruction" 
That is: in a last resort self-preservation considera­
tions would outweigh moral commitments®
of local conflicts, even on the Eu.ropean continent, would be 
increased, at least as long as mutually acceptable agreements 
were not arrived at (e.g., through a European Security 
Conference of some type)*
There remained the possibility that a cycle of super­
power interventions leading to localized super-power confron­
tations might nevertheless lead further, to mutual declaration 
of war* But our analysis of nuclear stalemate, resting on 
secure second-strike capacities, leads one to query the 
effects of any such declarations* They would most likely 
reflect psychological considerate; they would not reflect 
immediate intent. Mutual all-out hostilities would remain 
implausible, or illogical. The result would probably be a 
shadovf war of some years, with both super-powers consent rating 
on all-out civil defence constructions, plus energetic BMD 
research and deployment efforts, - in the hope of achieving 
survival capability. The most likely conclusion would be a 
truce based on the results of the localized fighting, without 
any all-out exchange ever being initiated ( — in lieu,
of course, of potentially decisive New Weapon Systems develop­
ments, or plain irrationality).
In this context it is relevant to challenge also the 
commonplace belief that the distinction between conventional 
and nuclear conflicts is of necessity clear-cut* One might 
(as has, e.g., Professor.Erickson)^ imagine a hypothetical 
status quo testing Soviet attack into West Germany, - an
5c This hypothesis was tentatively discussed at the same 
Conference, ibid.
6. Conversation with author, 17 January, 1969*
attack utilizing nuclear v/eapons only at high altitudes, for 
defence-disruptive purposes, and which is halted at the 
Rhine* In response to this scenario 7/est Germany would 
probably herself veto allied use of nuclear weaponry to 
dislodge the intruder* But, of greater consequence; since 
no actual ground or hunan destruction explosion had been 
effected, - could one really consider the "nuclear thresh- 
hold" to have been crossed?
Whether because of logical or practical reasons, the old 
nuclear-conventional distinction had clearly become obsolete 
by the late 1960s* The distinction held potential value only 
as long as one feared escalatory war, leading inevitably to 
all-out exchanges. The inhibition associated with passing 
the thresh-hold was diluted, and possibly eliminated, when 
it became, unrealistic to expect that local nuclear exchanges 
would entail the ultimate involvement of the super-powers' 
"home areas"*
This analysis received indirect support from' the new
NATO policy of December 1969, which permitted the initiating
use of tactical nuclear arms against Warsaw Pact aggression 
7in Europe* But (on US insistence) such a utilization of 
nuclear arms was authorized only against possible East 
European (forward) bases, and not against USSR (rear) 
bases The policy decision was supported by
deployment decisions, whereby only missiles incapable of 
reaching the Soviet heartland were stationed in West Europe*^
7c BBC News, 3 December, 1969, 10*30 pom.-
8o The Times, 2 December, 1969, written by Defence corre­
spondent Charles Douglas-Home®
9# Major-General Hansteen, protocol for Norwegian Disarma­
ment Committee Meeting 1 December, 1969 (released by 
Norwegian Foreign Office), p*9o - re discussion as to 
which weapon systems might be considered comparable 
within the context of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
Farther indirect support of the above analysis may be 
seen in Soviet practice. The integrating of nuclear capable• 
lities in all branches of the Soviet armed forces mplies 
a) she no longer conceives of non-nuclear wars of conse­
quence; b) she conceives of the possibility of total war, 
but not as resulting from escalation caused by the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons, (Non-nuclear scenarios, such as 
e.g. relating to the Czechoslovak intervention of 1968, are, 
when juxtaposed with Soviet capabilities and concepts, best 
viewed as "police-operations")*
But attention must be reverted, to the "new" balance, 
and to the above-treated lessening of associated inhibitions 
The emerging situation was also one of increased potentials 
for the political utilization of strategic strength. For 
example; what would or could Sweden answer if the USSR 
approached her, stating that present technological and 
reaction time considerations demanded Soviet ABM (atomic 
warhead) interception of US I OEMs over Swedish territory?
The USSR might declare that this w^ as in. order to secure the 
safety of Soviet territories, - the priority consideration 
of Soviet defence calculations* * "We presume the conse­
quent but unavoidable fall-out to be undesirable for Sweden. 
But in. order to make earlier interceptions possible we need 
radar facilities and installations on Swedish territory.
May we ... ?"
A Swedish analysis similar to ours might logically see 
the danger as tolerable, since any such nuclear exchange 
would be considered to be highly unlikely,. Yet one must 
always allow for uncertainty factors, so ... ? - And there 
remained, of course, the corollary that if the analysis was 
correct, and if Soviet "aggressive" designs were a fact, 
then refusal might precipitate the physical advances which
were made more conceivable by the analysis ...... Potential
mutually acceptable, and preferably wide-ranging,agreements : 
again appear to represent the only hope,
■ An other sequence equally possible as a 1970's scenario 
involves hypothetical. Soviet action against Northern Norway, 
This would be unlikely to be motivated purely by a desire to 
test or alter the status quo; and the decreasing need for 
bases (associated with the Soviet fleet's conversion to 
nuclear propulsion) lessens the importance of the fjords 
in the area* The area's strategically dangerous proximity 
to the "core area" of the Kola peninsula, could, however, 
tempt intervention, if the USSR feared a hostile utilization 
of its capabilities (e.g. "close" radar supervision and 
detection affecting missile interception or exchange poten­
tials - . see Chapter 7 ) # The strategic balance would 
imply considerable impunity as regards action, and considera­
ble leverage as regards political pressures based on credible 
action alternatives or needs.
But it is relevant to pose a reminder. While local 
conflicts vri-th super-power enga.gement can now occur v/ithout 
Armageddon implications, the range of political, military and 
economic factors involved in any decision to intervene 
remains substantial - even if the prime immediate deterrent 
will be political, and the prime long-term deterrent the 
attrition costs of unfriendly occupation,(The deterrence 
value of non-super power armies has become of secondary value 
to both perspectives.)
The lesser powers' military capacity to deter has 
rightly met with scepticism. Two developments concerning 
the defensive options of lesser powers are of interest;
(1) In Norway tanlcs and other heavy equipment have 
been assigned to the limited conscription forces available
( - forces entrusted with the task, of hindering the 
establishment of hostile forces in Northern Norway, until 
the expected NATO aid,). This orientation of military 
procurement is being questioned by some Norwegian experts* 
Tliey consider heavy conventional army units to be vulnerable, 
and believe.that the distance between their bases in any 
case makes immediate action against certain enemy initiatives 
difficult* They fear, for example, that a naval landing 
might enjoy the benefit of surprise, if a peace-time pattern 
of naval manoenvers off the coast had evolved during the 
preceding period, A beach-head, as well as more far-reaching 
objectives (e.g., an airfield), may well be secured by an 
enemy before native forces had time to engage. Within such 
a scenario immediate if small-scale engagement prior to an 
enemy's establishment could cause relatively far greater 
damage than consequent counter-attacks by conventional units* 
This "school of thought" therefore seeks an expansion of the 
existing home guard, with armed depots scattered 'suffici­
ently to always ensure immediate access. The resultant 
posture is expected to represent a more viable deterrent.
The Swiss pattern, of peace-time weapon distributions to 
citizens, causes interest*
(2) In France early 1969 saw the emergence of a 
related debate, through numerous articles published in 
he Monde, Among the more notable was an article by J. 
Georges-Picot, "Apres I'universite, I'Armee",^^ He defined 
the present "trilogie" of forces dissua,ding enemy action as 
(a) the nuclear force, (b) the regular army, and (c) the 
operationaJ- territorial defence (now practically non- 
.existent) •
^0. he Monde, 1 January, 1969, ("It took the May revolution
to reform the university; will it talce Soviet tanks
in . ,  to reform the army?)®
He suggested that the regular army be disbanded, as he 
considered that it was no longer capable of serving any 
function commensurate with its cost* He thought that the 
nuclear force (concentrated e.g., in Polaris-type vessels) 
should be kept, since it expanded the conceppb of deterrence 
to encompass also retaliatory capability (however dubious 
the extent of this might appear).
The article then referred to the wars of Prance 
(194-2-44), Indo-China, Vietnam, Biafra (and Czechoslovakia?). 
These were seen to have demonstrated the efficacy of a 
"territorial defence equivalent".The third factor of the 
"trilogie" should, therefore, be that relied on. The present 
barrack system, with its inherent time-wasting, was declared 
to be conducive only to instilling distaste - especially 
when its futility was recognized. The aim of reform must be 
to involve everybody, not least the intellectual and moral 
elite. Decentralization of authority, even do\m to communes, 
and the incorporation of natural student leaders into 
responsible positions, were seen as necessary complements to a 
training which must be tru.ly universal, and short-term but 
frequently repeated ("refreshed"). The "regukar array" would 
then basically be composed of only the needed number of 
instructors and the like. (Similar features were incorpo­
rated into the 1969 Yugoslav national defence lav/; it 
emphasized decentralized small-unit independent capabilities, 
and "total mobilization"^^).
Yugoslav and Norwegian experience during the Second 
World War, the Asian wars of the 1950s and 60s, and even the 
Palestinian "resistance" follov/ing the Arab defeat by Israel
11. Le Monde, 26 February, 1969, Paul Yankovitch,
in 1967, may be said to support the thesis that a "people's war" 
(guerilla movement), which enjoys popular support, has greater 
durability, and attrition possibilities, than more traditional 
forces - at least when these forces are of the order within 
reach of lesser or medium powers.
A related line of thought indicates that such a policy might
not only prove a better deterrent. It might conversely be that
best used against the super-powers themselves, - through
encouraging or ai.ding their dissident ethnic or other
minorities. The 1965 Watts Negro riots in Los Angeles, the
spectacle of the 1968 Chicago democratic convention, and similar
events, may be seen as evidence of US vulnerability. The most
vocal Soviet supporters of the Czechoslovait invasion were party
leaders from the areas most exposed to the reception of ideas
from Czechoslovakia (the Ukraine and especially "Zakarpatskaja 
12oblast") . This could be t alt en to indicate Soviet unease about 
potential Soviet vulnerability*
The suggestion, inherent in the above, is, of course, that 
as the super-pov/ers have increased their military capabilities 
to the extent of securing near military immunity, this has not 
affected their vulnerability vis a vLs internal unrest. This 
vulnerability has furthermore been exacerbated through the greater 
dissemination of people's war-guerilla type theories, which 
occurred during the 50s and the 60s as a result of Chinese and 
Vietnamese experiences *
In 1954 the Vietnamese victory at bien Bien Phu destroyed 
only a small section of the French army, which remained militari­
ly superior, but it crystalized a moral defeat and weariness 
which brought about the French withdrawal from Souih-Sast Asia.
12. See e.g. Partinaya Zhizn, 6 January, 1969 (or Pravda, 
15 February, 1969, for parallell evidence re Tadzhik 
nationalism).
Equally instructive (although questionable) is Professor 
Galtung's theory of the chances of success if the Czecho­
slovak reaction to the 1968 intervention had been "friendly 
15disapproval", Galtung noted the historic incidents, of 
Red Army soldiers refusing to fire on fraternal v/orkers in 
East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956. He suggested 
that while despairing of the efficacy of armed opposition, 
the Czeohoslovalcs ought not, as they did, have chosen a 
mixture of moral condemnation and passive obstruction (e.g., 
refusal to provide food and lodgings). They ought instead 
to have "invited them in". Instead of severed contact, this 
would have resulted in far more .extensive Red Army personnel 
awareness of the issues. This awareness would then have had 
a better chance of seeping eastward, where the decisive 
changes would have to come from. (One must coimment that the 
far-sighted discipline implicitly demanded of the Czechs may 
not be within human rea,ch , **).
Both the actual events, and the hypothetical event. , 
indicate the potential strength of otherwise inferior 
population groups - when united* The necessary degree of 
uiity v/ould in most cases remain ephemeral. But while a 
uiiversai knowledge of guerilla techniques is of no conse­
quence when there is no unity or will, small conventional 
armies are of no consequence even when there is unity and 
willo
13. In "Tsjekkoslovald-a Haertatt", Minerva, Oslo, 1968.
10 B Domestic Considerations
The previous section indicated that the following 
situation had emerged hy the late 1960s; (1) The Soviet
Union had increased its strategic capabilities so as to 
achieve a guaranteed second-strike capacity; this breaking 
of the earlier US monopoly of such capacity produced a 
logically secure guarantee against either nation escalating 
any local super-power conflict to the point of affecting the 
other's 'home area'; (2) Soviet non-strategic capabilities 
were furthermore such as to overwhelm those of any but its 
fellow super—power® The implication was that the Soviet Union 
had finally achieved full security vis-a-vis any potential 
exterior military threat, — the inference being that such 
security could only be challenged by internal threats (if at 
all) *
It is therefore intended here to engage in a limited 
survey of domestic considérâta with a view to judging whether 
or to what extent such threats exist* Two venues will be 
pursued; first, instability within the leadership or 
establishment,^^ and thereafter instability external to it* 
Information with regard to both, became more accessible after 
the ousting of Khrushchev, aid especially following the 
Czechoslovak intervention of 1968, These years vd.ll therefore 
be those concentrated on*
The years saw a multitude of rumonrs of shifting Polit­
buro personnel alliances and conflicts. Most of them, were
14$ Such has been pursued further in this author's "The
Party Leadership" - a 1969 draft to the Institute of 
Soviet Studies of a thesis chapter later excluded. It is 
hoped to revise and publish this separately as an 
article®
related to Shelepin - presumably due to his youth and the
image of 'more dynamic competence' which he left with people
who came into contact with him - , and Suslov - presumably
partly due to his long shadowy tenure as the Party's ideological
spokesman, and partly due to intriguing questions arising from
15his seeming conversion from 'Stalinist' to 'moderate' beliefs.
But there were also others relating to Polyansky - presumed
dissatisfied with the tardy implementation of agricultural
investment p r o g r a m m e s - to Podgorny - presumed over-eager
to placate consumer demands before military necessities had 
17been secured - , and. to other members of the Politburo,
There were periods which saw the demotion of groups of
lower officials v/ho appeared to have been particularly close
to one or another Politburo member, and such were most often
taken to indicate the failure of a supposed drive for greater
power by that member® The first major such purge was of "the
18Kharkov group" of officials indebted to Podgomy's patronage , 
in 1965 ® •
The second such was■of officials associated with Shele- 
pin.^^ This process coincided with his being relieved of his 
membership of the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers, as 
well as with the abolishing of the Party State Control Commissio] 
which he had chaired. Although he later added the chairmanship 
of the National Trades Union Congress to his Politburo member­
ship (July 1967), the above was taken to confirm the failure
15c See e,g, "Soviet Decisionmaking ,., the Czechoslovalv 
crises"Ç NUPI, Oslo, 1969*
16, See e,go speech printed in Kommunist,No,15, October,1967*
17*^  See e,g, Podgomy's speech as related in Pravda, 22 May, 
1965 and Suslov* s'answer' in Pravda, 5 July, 19'65&
18, This is traced by Michel Tatu, in "Le Pouvoir en l'URSS", 
Bernard Grasset, Paris 1967*
19* Logo KGB Chairman Semichastny, Moscow Party chief Nikolai 
Yegorichev, Head of Tass Dimitry Goryunov, and finally 
(1968) Komsomol 1st Secretary Popov,
of an attempt to replace Bresimev as 1st Secretary in October 
of 1965o
There were farthermore periods during which the lengthy 
absence from public view of Politburo members occasioned vivid 
speculations regarding their demotions or their purge involve­
ments® The fact that these periods most often coincided with
normal flu epidemics did seldom affect the speculations*
20 21 Early 1969 and early 1970 saw especially strong such
rumours ®
Another variety of power-shift indicators may be seen in 
the following: The junior Secretary Katushev, whose "domain"
included supervision of relations with rudfng CP's, seemed 
during the latter part of 1968 temporarily to replace Kuznetsov 
as the official responsible for Czechoslovak relations* In 
mid-Pecember he was strangely referred to by Pravda as the 
"Secretary attached to (pri) the Central Committee", an 
unprecedented formulation® He was by some regarded as. a 
Breslmev protege, in recognition of an interpretation of his 
role as being that of Breshnev's "right har,d man" (vdth 
Kirilenko), However, although his quick rise to prominence 
indica/bed high level tutelage, there was scant evidence 
supporting such a categorization. And since his previous 
career encompassed industrial, tasks away from Moscow, there 
was no reliable evidence as to political inclinations* But 
his emergence was by some observers seen as mirroring an 
assertion of greater authority by Breslmev, his perceived 
mentor*
20e The Interpreter, the ECO, London, March, 1969 
21* Newsweek, 20 April, 1970*
Yet none of the conceived or actual policy and power 
challengers were themselves removed from the Politburo* A 
number of their sometime purged associates were in fact to 
make partial come-backs* Semichastny, for example, who had 
not been heard from since his May 1967 demotion, was by 
November-Decémber 1968 again referred to in public as func­
tioning in his new position as 1st Deputy Premier of the 
■Qlcraihef Pavlov, who had been demoted to Chairman of the 
Central Council of Sport Societies and Organizations, had his 
new responsibility upgraded to a Union-Republic committee in 
November 1968.
This leads to the conclusion that while allegiances and
policies might shift, they did never do so to an extent which
permitted the definite ascendancy of any one power group or
concentration. This was partly because no Politburo member
(with the possible exception of Suslov, whose health was
dubious) enjoyed a combination of seniority and eminence
sufficient to establish hegemony, and partly because of a
22tendency fo r  u n ity  in  the face of domestic and ex tern a l 
tension . The l a t t e r  was caused o r ig in a lly  by lin g e rin g  
s tra te g ic  in f e r io r i t y ,  la t e r  by pressures a ris in g  from the 
Czechoslovak in te rv e n tio n  and the border dispute w ith  China.
The result was relatively greater freedom for the airing 
of divergent viewpoints, and a related tendency towards a 
devolution of power and some greater autonomy to the various 
pressure groups or establishments on which the power-elite 
depended. As concerns the latter tendency, previous chapters 
(3 and 4) have already provided some verification relating to
22. As indicated e.g. by Breshnev's speech on the state of the 
economy in Pravda , 16 December, 1969*
the military establishment. As seen in the footnotes of the
same chapters, it appeared that the tendency was accompanied •
by a trend whereby military debate articles were moved from
the pages of Pravda and more Party-cent rolled nev/s papers, to
those of. Krasnaya Zvezda and other papers of more specific
25military expertise and concern. The trend reflected that 
previously evident with regard to economic matters : professio­
nal journals like Ekonoml.cheskaya.Gazeta came to print more 
(and more of) economic debates, with the national Party papers 
concentrating rather on. general policy announcements, direc­
tives and indicators,
A similar development, as well as an. apparent consolida­
tion of Shelepin.’s position, surfaced by early 1969. There was 
increasing public exposure of Shelepin at this time (notably 
through a visit to Cairo, and through unusual prominence in 
the reception, of a Czechoslovak delegation to Moscow). Then 
came the controversial articles by Anatole Shub,^^ He first 
related a Partinaya Zhizn article^^ which in theoretical terms 
attacked inclinations to one-man rule and management. One-man 
and committee decisions without prior consultations m t h  the 
relevant organs or assemblies were derided. Shub drew a 
parallel to the manner in which the decision to intervene in 
Czechoslovakia seemed to have been arrived at.
His detractors viewed his identification of Breshnev as th 
"target" as hasty, and chose to view the article as having 
a more general, and thus not as significant, intent. But 
Shub went on to note that Trud placed the final communique of
23. Of interest is a Krasnaya Zvezda article of 11 February,
1969, by General Yepishev. He admitted that some military 
newspapers and journals did (by then) lack "a correct and 
principled Party evaluation" - "of works which tolerate 
attempts to a subjectivist and one-sided approach",
24# Washington Post's Moscow correspondent. Especially his 
despatches of 4 February and 12 February, 1969.
25# Partinaya Zhizn, 4 February, 1969#
the Czechoslovaks' meetings (which featured Shelepin. and
others, hut not Breshnev) on its front page, while a Tass
bulletin referring to Breshnev's separate meeting with the
delegation leader was placed on a back page (the other main
papers placed both "reports" on their front page).
26A few days later a long article in Trud pursued 
Partinaya Zhizn* s theme* It emphasized that there was trouble 
if a leader "starts to become dizzy with a success, if he 
abuses his official position, if he gets puffed up and thinks 
he is infallible, if he stops consulting people and fails to 
show them concern, and consideration".
A comparison supporting Shub's thesis that Breshnev was 
the leader in question, and that the very appearance of the 
article therefore meant his relative degradation, could be
27made with the Pravda editorial on the ousting of Khiushchev.
Although the latter went further in its recapitulation of
"sins", the tone and form of their descriptions were similar
(it may further bes noted that Pravda had not specified the
possessor of such, sins then either, but left the inference as
28obvious). Shub finally pointed out that, as opposed to 
previously, Trud was now becoming a forum for the introduction 
of news of significance*
This, and its variance with other papers' reports was 
evident on 11 February. Then Pravda commentator Gregoryev 
delivered a normal, denunciation of the FRG, coupled with strong 
support for the heralded DDR attempt to obstruct the West 
German Presidential, elections to be held in West Berlin on 
March 5o Trud (commentator:Grigoryants), however, chose an 
unusually mild tone in its disapproval of Bonn policies, and
26. Trud, 9 February, 1969 - article: "The Authority of a 
Leader".
27. 17 October, 1964*
28* Washington Post, 12 February, 1969*
featured a call for a European Security conference (an idea 
which had been dormant since the call for such at the 1967 
Karlovy Vary C o n f e r e n c e ) T h e  "old" minimal conditions of 
(a) recognition of existing European borders, (b) guarantees 
against ERG atomic weapons procurements, and (c) recognition 
of two German states, were reiterated* Yet the tone was mild 
and the desirability of such a Conference was emphasized to 
the exclusion of semantic paraphernalia* It thus augured 
the later Warsaw Pact initiative of 17 March, 1969*^^
Shortly thereafter Trud again reaffirmed its emergence as 
a paper of import* This was when it published the first 
comprehensive account of the Chinese "bandit attack" on an
51unsuspecting Soviet; border-guard detachment on the Ussuri.
The account was strongly nationalistic in fervour, invoking 
a "holy" soil of the motherland reference and emphasizing the 
patriotic indignation sweeping the Eastern provinces*
While no major leadership change occured this time either, 
the above remains of interest for two reasons* On the one 
hand it demonstrated the advent of yet another organ with a 
certain licence to pursue policy-affecting printing policies* 
The fact that it appeared to serve the Trade Union Congress 
Chairman's policies rather than typical Trades Union interests 
did not detract, from its interpreting as evidence of some 
devolution of authority. This fact moreover provided yet 
another example of the dangers of associating any Soviet leader 
Y/ith definite policy leanings; the westem-ori.ented material w 
was most 'moderate*; the eastern-oriented material could be 
seen as jingoistic and hard-line, if not 'Stalinist'
29. April 26, 1967o
30. See e.g. the New York Times, 4 March, 1969, and The Obser­
ver, 9 March, 1969, for rumours as to hard-soft line 
Politburo splits*
51* Trud, 4 March, 1969, and Trud, 5 March, 1969*
52* It is of interest to note' that much dispute regarding
Shelepin's inclinations existed among western observers, ir
One final 1969 sequence of events further illuminâtes 
both the aspect of leadership disagreements and the extent of 
the consequent freedom for divergent opinions;
Suslov's "opposition" during and after the Czechoslovak 
intervention is treated elsewhere. It is there also noted as 
significant that while many of the ideological justifications 
for the Czechoslovak policies were authored by members of 
ideological institutions associated with Suslov, the most 
prominent ideology cadres, such as Suslov himself and Pono- 
mariov (supervisor of relations with non-ruling communist 
parties), remained aloof. This was no doubt partly due to 
their' responsibilities with regard to the gathering of the 
then planned world CP conference. The need to produce harmony, 
and to soothe apprehensions arising from the "limited sover­
eignty" doctrine, may in fact have been the prime reason.
Tliere was probably greater consensus as to the need for 
increased supervision of Czechoslovakia following the inter­
vention, than there had been regarding the intervention itself.
But at the Come con meeting in Moscow on March 25, 1969,
a further "new" policy was enunciated by Suslov, and to some
extent also by Ponomariov. This was associated with the.
anti-Stalin attacks and trends which had been gradually
stifled since the 23rd Congressj^^and which had practically
disappeared since the August 1968 events (the intervention in 
Czechoslovakia) .
32. Cont. early 1968 the majority adhered to the view of NYT 
Moscow correspondent Harrison Salisbury, who saw him as a 'neo- 
Stalinist' of sharply reduced influence. But a minority (not­
ably Henry Shapiro) disagreed strongly. They sg.w Shelepin's 
influence as continuing, and characterized him as liberal and 
anti-Stalinist, — citing the fact that he was the only Polit­
buro member v/ith a "humanist" education (he graduated from the 
Moscow Institute for History, Philosophy and Literature).
33. Izvestia, 26 March, 1969; Pravda, 26 March, 1969.
34. Among the few references to Khrushchev's endeavours was a 
summer 1968 booklet by Anna Klyueva on the 20th Party Congress, 
which contain ed numerous derogatory references to Stalin 
(although Khrushchev was not mentioned).
Typical of the published material had been such as the military 
memoirs favouring Stalin's war-time role, which were reviewed 
by Ye. Boltin (.Deputy Director of the Marxism-Leninism 
Institute) in Kommunist^  ^ 7/hi le not furthering the praise of 
Stalin as such, the reviewer concentrated approvingly on the 
memoirs' implicit attacks against Khrushchev's 1956 anti- 
Stalin. campaign.
Another example had been the Yoprosi filosofi article of 
December 1968.^^ Attacking revisionist East European 
theorists (especially Czech and Yugoslav) who saw Stalin as 
material proof for rejecting ideological dogmatism, the 
article whitewashed the deprivations endured under Stalin*
The article provided justification for a continued use of 
coercion, societal discipline and political controls, even 
after the material conditions for a better life had been 
created.
Now came the first published attack on Stalinist 
procedures by a CPSU leader since the 23rd Congress. Pono­
mariov heralded the attack when he wrote in the issue of 
Problems of Peace and Socialism published before the meeting 
that "the negative consequences of the personality cult of. 
Stalin,and the retreat from Leninist norms connected with it,
were also expressed in the work of the Comintern - mainly
3 7concerning its cadres". In a generally laudatory review of 
Comintern history and achievements, Suslov followed up by 
specifying that the "consequences of the cult of Stalin" had 
"adversely affected the activity of the Comintern in its later
35. Kommunist, February, 1969.
36. Written by D. Chesnokov*
37. New York Times' translation, 26 March, 1969.
years". His comments may again Have been motivated solely by
considerations associated with the forthcoming CP meeting.
They did, however, appear stronger than necessitated by the
58imagined motive* This and attendant policy disagreements 
may have caused the failure of the Tass summary to mention it 
at all*.
A further departure from, previous policies was evident in
the differences over the role of social democracies, as between
Suslov's and Ponomariov's speeches, and that of Ulbricht*
Hlbricht's traditional and emphatic defining of the Social
Democrats as the "main" historical enemy was ignored by the
former* This may not only explain the unceremonious departure
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of Ulbricht on March 27, but might also be seen to relate 
to the new detente approach towards the ERG (an approach 
initiated in February)* It is of significance that the PRG's 
new policy of comparative approachment towards the USSR and 
Eastern Europe, a policy partially aimed at isolating the 
DDR, was enunciated by the Social Democratic leader. Foreign 
Minister Brandt* The implications inherent in greater 
appreciation of Brandt's "Wander durch Ann&herung" (change by 
coming together) and "Geregeltes Neveneinander" (regulated 
coexistence) must have caused DDR apprehension, an apprehension 
which may have been further increased by rumours that the USSR 
contemplated withdrawing its troops from Czechoslovakia.^^
38* In Kommunist No. 5, May 1969, he was to further it by the
flat statement that one could now no longer speak of "a
leading centre for the communist movement"•(i)
39* Contrary to normal protocol he was seen off by only
Pelshe of the Politburo and Katushev of the Secretariat,
after having had no recorded meeting with Breshnev or 
Kosygin,
40* In Prague these were widespread, and attributed to "high
sources", towards the end of March; - to increase with 
the leadership changes of April (1969)*
(Although, in, the latter case it might have heen. assuaged hy th; 
introduction, of official pre-puhlication censorship, and 
tighter domestic discipline against reformers, which was 
agreed to hy the CSCP^^ in response to the anti-Soviet drift 
of the large demonstrations accompanying the return of the 
national ice-hockey team in late March*)
Yet again, the enforced or otherwise policy changes caused 
no real leadership dislocations* Early 1970 saw rumours of a 
new Shelepin-Suslov design to establish, ascendancy - with the 
subsequent pendulum, swing towards entrenchment and orthodoxy 
explained as resulting from the design's failure.
But the only definite conclusion that could be drawn 
in the summer of 1970 was that a relative devolution of 
authority had occurred, and that somewhat more extensive 
’official.' debates were being tolerated*.
41* See CSCP presidium's communique 2 April 1969 and 
Babcek's speech 5 April 1969 (Czech radio and IV)*
These measures were not unexpected, but the putting into 
effect of such should not be accorded significance out­
side the peculiarities of the Czechoslovak situation. In 
this connection one must remember that the Soviet-Gzecho- 
Slovak Treaty of October 18, 1968, could (until its 
agreed abrogation) be used to permit the unhindered and 
unlimited entrance of Soviet agents and/or troops, even 
after the withdrawal of most, or all, of the troops 
stationed in Czechoslovakia* Of greater significance, 
then, was the composition of the Soviet delegation to 
Prague, whose statement of the Soviet position precipated 
the introduction of the new control measures (and the 
subsequent instatement of Bus ale) . Beside Ambassador 
Chervenienlco and Deputy Foreign Minister Semionov, this 
consisted of Minister of Defence Marshal G-rechko and 
Commander of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, Colonel 
General Mayorov (Pavlovsky had then returned to Moscow) * 
Semionov may be presumed to have commanded the delegation. 
But the proniinence of the military, in discussions of 
primarily political security relevance, could be taken to 
mirror relatively increased military influence in Soviet 
policy councils*.
42* Newsweek, 13 April, 1970; Newsweek, 20 April, 1970 - and 
major Western newspapers of the preceding week(s) * The 
younger Politburo members D* Polyyansky and K* Mazurov 
were also reported as supporting the "opposition"!
No immediate threat to basic Party hegemony was ascertainable* 
And it appeared that the internal autonomy accorded, for 
example, to the military hierarchy, would not so much, threaten 
the Party as be balanced by the greater autonomy accorded 
other hierarchies within or without the Party* The Party 
remained the arbiter and final, de ci si on-making authority* The 
position might be seen to have reverted somewhat from Khrush'i.. 
chev* s single. Party hierarchy back towards Stalin* s encourage­
ment of competing hierarchies - of which the Party was only 
one, and over which he himself was the only ultimate 
authority*^^ The 1965—70 difference was that ultimate 
authority was divested not in a single: person, but in. a 
carefully balanced collective in the Politburo ( - a collective 
which was moreover, as a group, acutely av/are of the dangers 
of single person dominance) *
With regard to pressures external to the establishment, 
these may be perceived primarily through the mirror of 
establishment reactions* Evidence of the stem official 
attitudes prevalent at least in. some authoritative quarters 
during 1968-1970 are to be found in quotes like the following;
There were numerous fears expressed concerning apathy 
and lack of consciousness. In December 1968 Sovetskaya Rossiys 
attacked a youth's claim that his generation was developing 
"immunity against ideological demagogy",This was pursued 
by complaints against "apolitical attitudes" and "non-class 
interpretations of such concepts as democracy, personal
AC
freedom and humanism" ,
43. See e.g. Peinsod, "How Russia is Ruled", op.cit* pg. 109,
185, 387 and 578* ,
44* Sovetskaya Rossiya, 12 December, 1968,
45. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 21 February, 1969o-
There evidently existed a widespread view according to
whi-ch ideology was seen, merely as an other "emotion" To
some extent this was aclcnowledged as a result: of a generation-
gap which appeared to have developed also in the Soviet 
4-7Union* But it was furthermore seen as reflecting a more 
general malaise, of attitudes such as adopted for example by 
Academician Sakharov;, he denied any positive value to any 
ideology, and took refuge in traditional liberal humanism*^ 
The malaise was clearly considered to reflect dangerous 
hostile subversive influences and bourgeois propaganda, some 
of which, emanated from or through East European sources,
This was seen, as all the more odious for accompanying 
nationalist and separatist propaganda.
There therefore ensued strong demands for "vigilance" 
over writers, artists, the communication media, and what was 
termed "purveyors of alien views" in Soviet life*^^ Pravda 
attacked "certain authors of scientific and literary works" 
who "sometimes depart from class criteria", and castigated 
"certain workers in publishing houses, press organs and tele­
vision" for "insufficient steadfastness",^^
4-6* Sovetskaya Rossiya, 27 December, 1969,
4-7, B ite ra tu m a y a  Gazeta, 2 J u ly , 1969,
4-8, Sakharov, "A Cry fo r  L ib e r ty " , published by the Norwegian
Committee in. Support o f Smog, (a  movement o f young Soviet 
in te l le c tu a ls )  *
49. Kommunist B krainy, No. 1, 1969 (see reported  speech by
Y u ri l ln i t s k y ,  1st Secretary o f the Trans Carpathian  
o b la s t)*
50* See e .g . P art in  ay a Zh izn , 6 January, 1969, and Pravda
13 February, 1969, re Tadzhik and C en tra l Asian develop­
ments, J\nd Pravda, 19 February, 1969, re "tenacious" and 
"dangerous" n a tio n a l sentiments in  L ith u a n ia , See also  
Kommunist, I'To, 1, 1969, -  which demanded more c u ltu ra l
51.
52,
uniform i.ty; and L ite  r  a tu m  ay a D krainy , 9 December, 1969 
^ravda, 14 February, 1969,
Ib id
In a similar if cruder vein, Piotr Shelest was reported, 
at a Kiev rally of 18 February 1969, to have attacked "some 
young people, including students" who were "spreading various 
rumours and fables from the dirty wave of foreign radio broad­
casts", They were declared to employ a "dissolute manner" and 
"dirty tricks", “insulting their elders" and "falling prey 
to the erosive bourgeois culture".
Less emotive were a number of stem warnings concerning 
the permise able limits of criticism, as well as reminders 
that the Party retained the power to silence those who 
continued to criticise action policies, or who attempted to 
develop factions within the P a r t y , I t  was made clear that 
such warnings would be acted on if necessary. The reported 
trials of recalcitrants, such as that of Chemyshevsky in 
Kiev in early 1968 (which follov/ed his persistent challenging 
of the legality of previous closed trigls involving Ukrainian 
intellectuals),^^ testified to Party determination.
The dissidents and 'civil rights' champions were 
clearly not stifled, and they continued to express themselves 
in illegal Samizdat printings,^^ Bat it remained highly 
questionable whether such had much import outside their own 
groups. There remained reason to believe that the groups were 
basically isolated, and that the major population groups were, 
if not hostile to them, at least indifferent,^^
53* B,g, Kommonist, No, 16, 1968,
54* Hill, Christopher R,, ed,, "Rights and Wrongs", Penguin, 
1969, (especially chapter by Peter Reddev/ay, L.SoE,^ 
lecturer)*
55* Ibid.
56, See also, e.g,. Chapter 8, re. Civilian- Training, for 
related establishment efforts.
In conclusion: the Party remained acutely aware of
the danger of internal opposition and threats, as to some 
extent: it had always been- But there was reason to believe 
that the vigour of its public concern reflected anxious 
over*-re action, to limited, if persistent, circles of critics, 
rather than the true extent of these critics’ disruption 
potentials. There was no evidence that opposition might be 
either widespread enough, or sufficiently organised, to 
represent any real threat to the establishment’s power 
apparatus.
CHAPTER 11 
PERIMETER DEFENCE
11 A The Warsaw Pact - Military Integration into
Soviet Command Structure,
In a comment, on this subject-topic, NATO Secretary General 
Brosio declared in late 1967s "A veil is drawn over the fact 
that the Soviet Union has already concluded a network of 
bilateral pacts with its allies, such as to render the Warsaw 
Pact superfluous, and make the dependence of the Eastern 
countries upon the Soviet Union even more entire,"^ As con­
cerned military relations, the first- point was true even at
p
the time of the Warsaw Pact's founding, and has remained so
*5
since. This fact gives credence to interpretations of the 
Warsaw Pact as a super-structure created primarily for poli­
tical and psychological reasons,^ It is here, however, inten­
ded only to indicate the extent of the military integration 
within the Warsaw Pact, and to clarify the extent to which 
East European mi.litary events must be viewed as concerning or 
influencing Soviet military decisions, and vice versa.
It was only in 1961 that joint military manoenvers became 
acknowledged. Since then such manoenvers have become regular- 
ized, with between tvro and seven every year, a frequency 
which in itself suggests close integration. Military Staffs 
and Defence Ministers' meetings or conferences became more 
frequent, especially after 1965#
1, NATO letter, December 1967, Brussels,
2, See, e,g,, K, Grzybowsky, "The Socialist Commonwealth of 
Nations", Yale University Press, 1964, p, 174,
3# See, e.g., Soviet-Czechoslovalc Treaty examined in our
analysis of "Soviet Decisionmalcing .. * during and after 
the Czechoslovak intervention",» N.U.P.I., 1969,
4. A, Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact", International Concilia­
tion (Carnegie), May 1969#
5, Korbonski, ibid, pp.46-47, for Chart;. R. Remington, "The 
Changing Soviet Perception of the Warsaw Pact", pp.146-147;
± x
The same years witnessed a trend for most of the
mano envers (and talks) to he organized in, and to involve
primarily, "northern tier" countries.^ The development could
he seen as partly motivated hy strategic considerata, which
were far more involved where the northern countries were
concerned. This interpretation explained the fact that
Bulgaria, while certainly one. of the staunchest supporters of
unity, nevertheless often participates on a lower level than
the other active members* There could conversely be little
doubt that political differences, or scepticism regarding
utility, was a factor in the case of Rumania* She did not
participate in any manoeuvers between September 1964 and 
7'August 1967, and did thereafter again refrain from partici­
pation until. March-April 1969,^ - and even then only to a
limited extent*
But, with the probable exception of Rumania, there were 
indications that military integration between Warsaw Pact 
nations increased further during the late 1960s* That 
integration was the operative word, rather than mere coordina­
tion, was made clear by the then Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff, 
Army General N.Io Kazakov, in 1967. He "made it abundantly 
plain, that the basic organization of the air defence forces
5. cent*:
MIT Center for International Studies, Cambridge; /'The 
Warsaw Pact - Its role in Soviet. Bloc Affairs", Washing­
ton, B.C.,GPO 1966; "The Warsaw Pact", Military Review,
pp. 89-95, Port Leavenworth, July, 1967, for interesting 
analysis of (then) 'latest W*P, Conference'*
6* Korbonski, ibid. For an analysis of the organization of
the Warsaw Pact with, emphasis on the Northern tier -
Southern' tier complex, see P* Wiener: "Die Arme en der 
Ostblockstaaten" , pp. 9-52, Truppendienst Taschenblicher, 
Vol* 2, J.P* Lehmanns Yerlag, Mlinich, 1967 (first 
published 1965 with title "Warschauer Pakt Staaten"),
7* Korbonski, ibid.
8* Tass, 1 April, 1969# See also The International Herald 
Tribune' of 4 March, 1971, for report of Warsaw Pact 
Defence Ministers' conference in Budapest; Romanian Defence
of the Warsaw partners was ' different from former times' in 
that it formed part of a unified system which included the air 
defence system of the USSR. This arrangement, he was careful 
to stress, gave the PYO forces of the Warsaw Pact the capabi­
lity 'of striking at air targets far from the installations 
to be safeguarded'.."^
On March 17, 1969, i n  Budapest came the f i r s t  Warsaw Pact 
meeting a f te r  the f iv e -n a t io n  in te rv e n tio n  in  Czechoslovakia* 
The two-hour meeting, presided over by Alexander Dubcek, 
produced two published documents:^^ the one re fe rre d  somewhat 
vaguely to new conmiand s tru c tu res ; the o th er was a moderately- 
worded c a l l  fo r  a European S e c u rity  Conference. Western 
specu lation  concluded th a t the very vagueness o f the f i r s t
meant defeat for a hypothetical attempt to streamline the
11Pact according to the requirements of Soviet control* And
12Dubcek* s elaboration upon his return to Prague, - that the 
meeting had established a Committee of Defence Ministers, and 
had promulgated a "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and 
Combined Command", and that the Conference's main purpose had 
in fact been the improving of the "organization" of the 
combined command of the Pact's forces - , was interpreted 
to mean that the USSR had agreed to Rumanian-Czeck demands for 
a greater sharing of command and policy authority. Subsequent
9. Kazalcov' s a r t ic le  was in  ' 7T eue s Peut chi an d, 25 February,
1967. The d esc rip tive  quote is  from the Research B u lle t in ,  
4 June, 1969, of Radio L ib e r ty 's  C en tra l Research Depto, 
Munich.
10* GTE, Prague, 17 March, 1969, and Iz v e s t ia ,  19 March, 1969.
11* See The Times, 19 March, 1969, fo r  comments regard ing a 
perceived (probably in c o rre c tly )  S o v ie t desire fo r  
Warsaw Pact troops to be s ta tio n ed  on the U ssuri r iv e r *
12* Rude Pravo, Prague, 19 March, 1969
rumours, that consideration had heen given to the idea of a
joint staff, in which, the participation of members would be in
1:
proportion to their contribution to the alllance (a la NATO. *), 
were similarly interpreted. Later evidence, however, indi­
cated that, while the Pact meeting had achieved or at least 
presaged a greater unification of Pact command procedures, 
this was not of a kind to diminish Soviet authority ••• •
The first evidence appeared In April* Unification of 
command over the Pact's air defence forces was created, or 
reaffirmed, when Marshal P,P. Batitsky, Commander in Chief of 
Soviet PYO forces, was appointed to act also as Commander of 
the PYO forces of the Warsaw Pact as a whole.(Retroactively 
the appointment of Cmdr. of Soviet Land Forces Array General 
Pavlovsky, to act as Cmdr. in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces 
engaged in. the intervention, in Czechoslovakia, might also be 
seen to reflect on command unification endeavors.)
Command unification, under the relevant Soviet Commander, 
may be intended to be activated or enforced only for the more 
vital manoeuvers or events. But the import is of great 
importance. It should be related to indications that the 
Soviet military presence, at least as concerned the northern 
tier of the Pact, was increasingly regarded as permanent 
rather than temporary.
This assertion rests especially on two 1968 events. There 
was first of all the Czechoslovalc intervention and the 
resulting Sovlet-Czechoslovak Treaty. This clearly indicated
15. See, e .g .., rep o rt from Prague by M ichael Hornsby, The 
Times, 20 March, 1969.
14 . Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 A p r il ,  1969.
Garthoff,. ’'Soviet Military Policy op.cit., pg.152,
notes that ^ such a dual Soviet-Warsav/ Pact PYO command 
arrangement was first publically referred to in 1964.
such pernianency. Then came the DDR, 7 November, 1968, celebra­
tions, at which Marshal Koschevoi was addressed as "The Supreme
15Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces stationed in the DDR".
The titulation. contrasted with previous practice: "temporary" 
(zutweilig) had always been inserted before "stationed"* In 
January 1970 came apparent confirmation that the indicated 
unified command pattern had been instituted on a wider basis 
than that of just individual .or specialized services or tasks 
(in an editorial by Army General Shtemenko,^^ v/hich referred 
specifically to the 1969 Warsaw Pact meeting). It remained 
for Western analysts to draw the conclusion that, if insti­
tuted to any extent, then such a unification of command must 
be presumed to encompass only "northern tier" countries, and
perhaps Bulgaria, with only a symbolic contingent from 
17.Rumania*
It may, however, be proper to view Schtemenko's article
not as reflecting an innovation, but rather as confirming
18
previously developed and known pra ctice.
This expands on the fact that Warsaw Pact territory, and 
especially that of the Northern tier, is considered per defi­
nition to consti'trute the forward defence area of the USSR
(which necessarily represents the core of the Pact and its 
19'defence). This,again, reconfirms and augments the tenet
that a prime concern of the Pact’s forces is to secure that
20"(Soviet) .. installations ... be safeguarded." Regular
15* DDR News Medi.a, 7 and 8 November, 1968»
16. "Boevoe Bratstvo", Krasnaya Zvezda. 27 April, 1970.
17. E.g* Victor Zorza, "Unified Command for Pact Forces", The 
Irish Times, 4 February, 1970.
18* Radio Free Europe's Research Bulletin of 27. January,
1970. And see the article by Rumanian Defence Minister 
Col.Gen. Ion. lonita in Krasnaya Zvezda, 25.January, 1970*
19. Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 May, 1970, - an article by Warsaw Pact 
Cmdr. YalcubUsky made it quite clear that the Soviet Union 
would not consider giving up what she deemed legitimate 
Second World War gains*
training and administration procedures to this end appeared 
to have heen instituted ..*
The conclusion must reflect, the previously presented 
evidence, regarding Soviet strategic and tactical concepts, 
and American recognition of these# The data presented above 
furthermore provides desirable emphasis to a factor and degree 
of military concern in Eastern Europe which necessarily 
entails a "military influence" on inter-state policies. It 
points to the need to consider military requirements,.
The developments may be synopsized by the following 
quotes
1965: "Operational units of the armed forces of
different socialist states can be created to conduct joint
operations in military theatres. The command of these units
can be assigned to the Supreme High Command of the Soviet 
21Armed Forces."
1970: "Until recently Warsaw Pact Forces (of USSR,
Poland and G PR) operating in the Baltic were separate but
20* Kazakov, op.cit. One might also point to an article by 
Colonel S. Lipitsky in Voenno Istorichesky Zhumal, No.l, 
1969, in which he explicitly draws a parallel between the 
contemporary situation of "countries of the socialist 
community" and the post-revolutionary situation of the 
Soviet Baltic, Belorussian and Uicrainian republics: 
eventual unity vms then forged through the instrument of 
military alliance and integration; with regard to the 
socialist community this venue was all the more necessary 
to counteract separatism encouraged by pro forma poli­
tical independence... (I)*
21. Sokolovsky, op. cit., 2nd edition, Moscow 1965, pg. 475.
similarly equipped entities. This is no longer true, as
intensive training has made them capable of being integrated
22under a single command team." Grechko elaborated: "To
better co-ordinate co-operation each Armed Forces has allotted
staffs and formations from the Army, Air Force, PVO and Navy.
There exists-a Military Council for the united forces; the
statutes for the committee of Warsaw Pact Ministers of
25Defence have been sanctioned (ratified)."
And Pravda v/eighed in. with the following doctrinal (and 
conceptual) promulgation: "The boundaries of the Soviet
Union and other socialist states are boundaries of a new 
type. — --  These brothers-in-arms see that their inter­
national duty lies in the reliable safe-guarding of their 
states' frontiers as component parts of the whole socialist
camp's boundaries. :—  The idea of fellow-ship in arms runs
like a red thread through all these t r e a t i e s . ( T h e  
referred-to treaties were those recently signed with Hungary, 
Poland, Roumania and Czechoslovakia.)
- One may juxtapose this with the contemporary definition 
of the main 'duty' of the Soviet armed forces; - To defend 
the Socialist Fatherland and socialism's and communism's 
victories, and to halt the spread of counter-revolution.^^
22* NATO Letter, September 1970, op.cit*
23, Pravda, 23 February, 1970.
Note the relevant diagram which is attached to this
section; it was procured in Moscow, summer 1970.
24, Pravda, 28 May, 1970*
25, Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 July, 1979 - lengthy article by
Maj*General, Professor E. Sulimov and Col., Posent A.
Timorin. (Both believed to be political officers)* 
Previous interventions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
PPR are emphasized to have been both legal and necessary,
The socialist commonwealth is clearly a whole; the 
component parts C”hrothers-in-arms") must consequently 
strive for greater integration; until such is consummated, 
the prime or ultimate responsibility as concerns both 
unification and defence falls to the USSR Armed Forces.
(See also following section.)
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11 B- The Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty.
The need to consider military requirements is equally 
evident in the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of limited 
sovereignty. The doctrine was based on the premise that
there was in being a Socialist Commonwealth based on 3oint
26 2Yresponsibility* Or, as elaborated by Pravda: Every
socialist state was said to belong to a system of states 
which formed the Socialist Commonwealth, and it could there­
fore not pursue policies independent of the whole.
There was nothing really novel about the doctrine itself* 
It could be traced back at least to the 21 Conditions for 
Comintern membership (as promulgated at its Second Congress, 
in 1920)* They had explicitly asserted that any member would 
have to brealc unequivocally with any dissenting movement or
organization, and that it must divert all its energies to
28the furthering of the organization as a united whole*
The novelty lay in the accompanying definitions of
29peaceful counter-revolution. According to these definitions 
the increasing strength of the socialist forces had forced 
the West to abandon attempts to instigate armed uprisings 
within the socialist camp* Thus forced to change tactics 
the West had as a consequence stopped criticizing "communism*'* 
Instead she now concentrated on attacking ”bureaucratic 
dictatorship' , and 'conservatives' in the Parties and
26. As defined in G-romyko's otherwise conciliatory speech to 
the XJ.IT. following the intervention in Czechoclovakia. 
Pravda, October 4, 1968.
27. Pravda, 25 September, 1968, and Pravda, 26 September, 1968.
28* The Second Congress of the Comintern, Stenogr* Report, 
Moscow, 1920, pg. 652.
29* Pravda, 11 September, 1968*
Governments. The aim was perceived to he a dulling of the 
people's vigilance, so as to permit a gradual dissemination 
of disruptive ideas, and the infiltration of traitors into 
key offices.
This defining of peaceful counter-revolution is novel in 
that it entails an easing of the conditions in response to 
which the Socialist Commonwealth majority would consider 
intervention against an errant member to be necessary and 
justified. The kernel of the peaceful counter-revolution 
concept might also be considered to have been inherent in the 
21 Conditions, but this had not then been elaborated expli­
citly.
The two concepts were after 1968 re-emphasized and
elaborated on until no one could doubt their relevance to
contemporary affairs.
The Parties which remained faithful to Leninist ideals
were declared per definition, to "avoid actions v/hich could
contradict the tasks of the general struggle of all communist
SOparties against imperialism"."^ As regards the determining
of these tasks, it was pointed out that "the experience of the
construction of a socialist society in the Soviet Union ...
has been adopted by the communist and workers' parties as the
31basic model of socialism".^ Other models which had been 
constructed a priori (i.e* the Czechoslovalc Dubcek model), 
were declared to have "contradicted the experience of the 
Soviet Union and the whole international communist movement"
30. Sitkovskiy, E.P., Doktor Uauk, "Marksism-Leninism - 
yedinoe intematsional'noe uchenie rabochevo klassa" in 
Piles of skie UaulcL, Uo. 1, 1970.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
Notwithstanding Suslov’s 1969 acknowledgement that one 
could no longer- speak of "a leading centre for the communist 
movement", it was made clear that the USSR still considered 
her experience to entitle her to priority influence in the 
directing of the communist movement, — certainly as long as 
imperialist designs were seen to make united action necessary* 
It vfàs made clear that the Stalinist concept of intensified 
class struggle as a nation approached communism retained 
validity*
The imperative need for unity was elaborated as the basic
premise. Anyone who supported a "theory of relying only on
their own forces", must be affected by "adventu.rous, hege-
monistic tendencies"^ such a theory could only be based on a
rejection of "the internationalist principle of the defence
of the socialist fatherland"
The intervention in Czechoslovalda was a "confirmation
of loyalty to the principles of internationalism (by) the five
3 6fraternal countries". One was left in no doubt that similar
aid would be extended to defend the "socialist achievements"
of any future member considered by the Commonwealth, to be
3 7unable to secure this alone.
Soviet conceptions, of the need for unity and for co­
ordinated action, were reflected equally in the economic 
field: economic considerations complemented those of a 
political/ideological and military nature
33. Koramunist,Mo» 3, 1969.
34o Pravda, 11 September, 1968,
33. Pravda, 7 March, 1970. Art. by Colonel S, Lukonin
(Chinese policies are the object of the quoted passages).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid,
rrir
The integration was, as yet, far from fruition. The 1969
38meeting in East Berlin of the Come con Council and its 
Executive Committee (21-23 and 23-27 January) had for example 
not succeeded in significantly furthering integration, endea­
vors, It had produced only vague references to the co-ordina­
tion of 1971—75 plans, and to the need for recommendations 
regarding production specialization, currency and foreign 
trade problemsJ it had stressed the need to strengthen 
existing links between "interested partners", and had noted 
that the Engineering Commission was authorized to programme 
further intra-Comecon. (including Yugoslavia) specialization 
of macliinery and like equipment.
But by the time of the 1970 Conference (in Warsaw) it
was claimed that considerable progress had been achieved on
39an agreed programme of integration.'^ This conference 
approved a draft project for an international bank, to co­
ordinate investments, and to provide credit for ventures under 
the programmie of international socialist division of labour 
Ca programme of production specialization as between the 
members). And in. August, 1971, in Bucharest, it was finally 
agreed to introduce a "collective currency", based on. a 
"convertible ruble" (further specification, or time-table, 
was not provided); a far-reaching 15-20 year programme for 
East European economic integration was approved at the same 
conference.
38* This meeting was of some import due to the very widespread 
rumours at the time that the Soviet Union would force 
rapid integration on. her partners*
39. It provided for more organized consultations between the 
various planning commissions responsible for product 
planning, allocation and distribution.
NB* "Socialist integration" is defined as "a process of 
bringing together and gradua3.1y merging the national 
economies of the several countries into a single system",- 
See Pravda, 13 May, 1970; Isvestia, 14 May, 1970&
mu 1 A Mcnr 1 0*7 Pi
How far or fast the integration of the respective 
economies would proceed remained in question (especially in
consideration of the lack of enthusiasm by Rumania, regarding 
the theory and its implications,^^ and by others, with regard
AO
to detail. ) But since the "hegemonistlc tendencies" 
inherent in departing from co-ordination with the whole of 
the Socialist Commonwealth were accepted as potential justifi­
cation for fraternal "aid", it remained probable that closer 
integration would be pursued and implemented. Some le away 
might be conceded to Rumania, but, as concerned the Northern 
tier countries at least, it was clear that integration was 
and would remain a priority policy aim.
The priority concern for political and economic entegra- 
tion, and the putting into effect of measures to this end, 
supports a ' real-politik' view of Eastern Europe as an integral 
part of Soviet home area. To put it somewhat differently; 
the strategic defence of tlie perimeter was considered as 
inseparable from the strategic defence of the home area; the 
two were in a very real sense considered parts of the same 
whole. The Soviet conception received, or commanded, the 
adherence of East Europe (excepting possibly the ambiguous 
Rumania). And its importance in Soviet eyes was clearly such 
that she would do all in her power to ensure that this 
adherence be permanent.
41* Berghianu, Î.I., in International Affairs, Moscow, 
September, 1968.
42. Ibid. See also e.g. The Times, 16 May, 1970, op.cit.
43. Pravda, 7 March, 1970, op.cit. (see above).
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